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CHAPTER I 
.. DACKGROtJND 
The gr0up ot islands formerl1 known as Nether- 
lands India .forms a part ~r·the ·Malaran Archipelago and, 
geographically speaking, links Australia with Asia and the 
Pacific with the Indian Ocean. While this terr1torr 
consists primarily or t1ve large islands, the entire 
archipelago is dotted with numerous·1slands or var71ng 
sizes. Under Dutch administration Netherlands India was 
divided into the tollowing geographical d1v1a1ons1 Java 
and Madura, Sumo.tra.Reglon, Dutch Borneo, Celebes Region, 
end Moluccas, New Guinea, and Sunda IslandsJ the total area 
'or this terr! tory is over 700 ~ 000 square miles •1 
When the Portuguese reached India in 1498, they · 
found that the chief l!Brket for spices was Malacca, located 
in the. Malayan peninsula. Consequentlr, in the interests o.f 
increasing their trade, the Portuguese took over the citJ 
after attacking 1t twice with a small al9m1'.2 
13. s. Furn1vall, Netherlands India, A Study!?..!. Plural Econom:r, P• 1. For a diacuaslon or the relative 
Importance of the factors or geographical location and natural 
resources 1n Indonesian history, aee A. E. Sokol, "Communica- tion and Production 1n Indonesian H1sto17," 1!:!.!: Eastern 
Quarterly, Vol. 7, August, 19481.PP• 339-353. 
2a. II. M. Vlekke~ The Storl or the Dutch East Indies, P• 56. Chapter IV or 11.r. ffikkela bookii devote"dt"O a 
discussion or the part which religion plared in the t1gllt1ng between the Catholic Portuguese and the Mohammedan natives. 
1 
2 
Shortl1 a.fter this conquest, the Portuguese traders 
discovered that ap1ces in Malacca cost t1ve to aeven times 
as much as the spices bought in the islands Where they grew. 
On the basia or this knowledge the1 quite naturall1 desired 
to establish direct relations with the Spice Islands (Moluccas) 
1n order to b1•paas the middlemen., This did not prave to be 
dittioult as the local rulers were quite willing to give the 
Portuguese such a foothold in return tor aid in carrying on 
the almost constnnt warfare or the ialands.3 
In 1522 the Portuguese were granted the right to · 
build a fort 1n the Spice Ialands and were also granted a 
monopoly or cloves. Wherever Portuguese traders went, 
m1as1onaries followedJ consequentl1, when the Portuguese 
moved into the Spice Islands, Chr1at1an1ty began to spread 
through the territoryJ Islam, however, aproad muoh taster. 
During the earlier part or the 17th centur1 thia was an 
1ncreas1ngl1 important cause of friction. The trouble came 
to a head when, 1n 1570, the Sultan or Ternate was assassinated 
and the evidence strongly indicated that the Portuguese 
Governor had instigated the·act. In a matter ot da1s the 
ttoluccas were virtually in unanimous revolt against the 
Portuguese. 4 
By 1580 the Portuguese were in desperate straits as 
a result of the alliance ot native princes against them when 
the Portuguese received help from an unexpected 1ource1 in 
3Furn1val1, ..2l?. ill• , pp • 15-16 • 
4vlekke, .22• ~., P• 62. 
that rear Philip II or Spain had made· good h1a claim to the 
throne or Portugal.· With the aid or the Spanish and new 
bases in th9 Ph111pp1nea (which were closer than Malacca), 
the combined Portuguese-Spanish forces maintained a precarious 
hold in the Moluccas. However,· the· power or.Portugal was 
broken· and, toward the end or the century, 1t seemed that 
the·entire tropical Far East would tall to the Mohammedans.5 
The Dutch arrived in the Indiea in 1596. Though the7 
had never wanted to come East, the ?letherlanders were forced 
to do a o b1 the same event that had enabled the Portuguese 
to' maintain their weak hold 1n the Ind1~a--the aucceas1on ot 
Philip II or Spain to the throne or Portugal. Prior to 
1580 the Dutch spice trade had been pr1mar11J with Portugal. 
King Philip, a bitter enemy or Dutch independence, closed 
the harbors 'or Pol'tugal to his rebellious Dutch subjects. 
Thia torced Dutch traders to go to the source o~ the spice 
'trade or else give up a lucrative trade wh1oh had become a 
necesaacy moans or livelihood fo'l9 the Holland merchants. 
· The Dutch ventures into the Eastern trade were not 
backed by private organizations, but rather by the State and 
civic corporations. Experience aoon demonstrated the . 
necessity or a common policy ot trade and selling it trade 
was to remain protitable.6 
·· Tho deaaJ.y end unrestricted competition between the 
Dutch traders quickly torced prices up in the East and drove 
5Fl:...~1vall, O;?• ~., pp .16-17. 
6Ibid., PP• 20-24. 
them down on the home market. · Thia situation, combined with 
the ~act that the Dutch Republic was not able to protect 
trade in distant waters, led the States General to incorporate 
the East Indian traders into the United East Indian Compan7 
in 1502. The new corporation was given divers rights or 
monopoly and.sovere1gnt7. Thia monopoly operated to the 
exclusion ot all other Nethorlandors 1n the areas east or the 
Cape or Good Hope and west ot the Straits ot MagellanJ the 
powers ot sovere1gnt7 included the power to I?Bke alliances 
and contract~ with the various princes and potentates in the 
delimited area., :The Dutch Republic retained "onl7 a·right 
or contro1,n7 
The Compan7 did.not want to acqu1re·terr1tor7 at the 
outset. of the venture 1X> the Eaat.. Its aim was to preserve 
the Spice Islanda aa a private trading ground. However, auch 
a policy, though allegedly only comm~rcial, inevitably led 
to a polic7 of territorial expansion •. This change grew out 
ot:the d1acover7 b7 th8 Company that it was impossible to 
trade sucoesstully unless the area was also governed.a 
As a result of this change in polio7. the Compan7, 
through agreements and a111enoea with native rulers,.acquired 
an indirect control or dominance over largo areas in the 
llalay Arch1pel1go. By 1750 the Company had largely, but not 
completely, shifted trom a co:mnercial to a territorial end 
,Pol1t1cal bas1a. Steadily declining profits, poor financial 
?A. Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies, ..!!! Govern- ment, Problems,!!!.!! Polit!"Ci'; P• 5l.---- 
8Fuz.n1 vall, .21?. .ill• , p. 25 • 
5 
administration at home, penurious treatment or its personnel 
1n the East, and tho breakdown or the connneroial monopoly 
.. 
combined, however,to cause the collapse of the Company . 
toward the end ot the 18th centu:rr. In 1798 the charter of 
the Comp8.?11' was null1t1ed,to take etteot on l January 1800. 
On the latt~r date the Dutch Government took over both the 
Company's aaseta and 1ts 11ab111t1ea.9 
During the Napoleonic Wars the British took over the 
Dutch Colonial possessions:1n the Far East. The English 
maintained that they did not come as enemies, but rather 
to prevent the power ot France trom becoming dominant 1n 
that area,· By the Treaty of Amiens ot 1802 all or these 
possessions except Cerlon were restored to the Netherlands. 
Renewal of hostilities placed the Dutch colonies at the 
disposal ot the English once again. In 1810 France annexed 
the NetherlandsJ consequentl7, when the English arrived in 
Java in August, 1811, they took the island trom the French 
" rather than trom the Dutoh.10 
Java was placed under Raffles as Lieutenant Governor • 
. Rattles instituted a system of taxation based upon the Eastern 
concept that all property belonged to the ruler and that the 
tenants kad to pay land rent. This rent was tixed at two- 
t1tths or the harvest and the ruler •s share o ould be paid 1n 
either moner or produota. Rattlos instituted other reforms 
'dealing with administrative structure, the police force, and 
9A. Vandenbosch,· "Indone11a," PP• 79-80, in L.A. 
Mills and A1sooiat~s, .!h! ~ World .2! South~.!!!!• 
le>.Purnivall, ..2.2• ,g!!., PP• 54-67. 
6 
the judicial organization. While some ot .these reforms were 
only _or. temporary- importance, others wero or permanent value 
and marked Ra!'t'los_' administration aa a tuming point 1n 
colonial administration in the lletherland Indies •11 . . . 
. August 1814, , the East Indies were givon_ back to the Nether- 
lands •. However, because ot Napoleon'a return !'rom Elba, " . ·' .. . ~ . . . . \ ' '· - 
the aotual trans.fer did not take place until 1816. B1 1819 
the Dutch had 01'.fec_tlvely occupied onl7 a tew small areas in 
the Outer Terr1tor1es--Padang and Palembang in Sumatra, 
Pontianak,_ Sambas, and BandJermssin 1n Borneo, .Madassar in 
south and the Mina.hasa in north Celebos, and the Moluccas, 
Which had made up the old center o.f Company activity. In 
general it l'IBJ be said that the formation ot the Dutch 
colonial empire. _has been vecy _ largel1. tho_ work ot thtt lut . 
century, with particular emphasis upon the period trom 1900 
to 1940.12 
. Under the.provisions o!' the Treat7 of London ot' 13 
' • • .. - . ~ J " • 
Following the Napoleonic Wars the Dutch initiated a 
now system ot taxation in their East Indies· possessions. 
Prior to this time, the natives had been required to turn over 
to the government a portion or their crops as land rent or 
taxes. U~der the new ayatem, which ~ame to be known aa the 
Culture Syst~m, tho natives were required to place at the 
disposal or the government a portion Of their land and A 
certain number or working days. The land and working time 
llvandenbosch, .21!• ill•, pp. 55-56. 
l2Ib1d., pp. 56-57. 
. ~ ..... ' ,. 
7 
thus put atgo"leJ'nment disposal was used tor the cultivation 
ot crops to~.export out ot the islands; the whole.process 
waa under the supervision ot government ott!ciala. While 
the plan was tinanciall1~aucceaatul tor the Dutch, serious 
abuaes·1n·the·adm1n1atrat1on ot the program began to create 
conditions ot distress among.the Javanese peasants1 the 
human tendenc7 to profiteer became evident in·t.he Nether- 
lands Min1atr1 tor the Colonies. Advoca~~g, as it did; 
, ~- goveni men t supervision ot land, this program operated to ' 
the disadvantage ot: the· Netherlands Indies ·in that Western 
private enterprise .was kept out ot the countr,- Md the 
economic development ot the area waa thus retarded.13 
· ' While the Culture 87stem did result 1n the introduction 
ot man7 new export crops which ultimatel7 benet1ted the islands 
econom1.call7. b7·1850 the economic detic1enc1ea ot.the.87stem 
had become·apparentJ in addition, liberals opposed the S7stem 
on the grounds. that it was inconsistent with th8 economic 
principles or the liberal trend ot thought which was then 
prevalent·in the Hetherlands •. "In the long run ••• there was 
no escape trom the.conclusion that the principles ot 
Liberalism were irreconcilable with a a7stem ot government 
enterprises baaed on compulso17 labor and trade monopolies.•14 
Cond!tlona in Netherlands~India were·brought to the 
attention of the Dutch public 1n 1860 when Edward Douwer Dekker, 
a tormsr Eaat Indies otticial, published his.novel,~ Havelaar. - 
13vandenbo~ch, .21?• cit.~ 1'1 L.A. r.t1118, .21?• .2.ll·• P• so. 
14vlekke, .22• ,ill., pp. 156-160, 
9 
In 1901 a coalition ministry composed of the repre- 
sentatives or three Christian parties came to power in the 
Netherlands. In th~ same year the Netherlands Government 
1ssu~d an important ·atat.emant embodying the change 1n 
pol1c11 "As a Christian power, the Netherlands 1a obligated 
in the East Indian·Arch1pel1go to imbue the whole eonduot or 
the Government with the consciousness that the Netherlands 
has a moral duty to .fulfill with respect to the people of 
those reg1ona.ttl7 .In lfJ05 this polioy was implemented by a 
forty million guilder loan which was paid by tho Netherlands 
treasury to that or the· Indies Government so that funds might 
be made available in the Indies for the improvement or 
economic conditions on Java and Madura.le 
As stated above,'prior to.the l890's the Dutch had 
not.attempted.to penetrate the vast territories or th& 
1slanda, outside or Java, with their adm1n1strntion. By 
the turn or the centUI71 however, several factors combined 
to force an abandonment or this policy ot ftnon-penetration." 
The planters who inhabited the east coast or Sumatra, which 
had become the center or a thriving European agricultural 
industry, were demanding more effective administration • 
.. 
Another tactor or Dlljor importance was fear or foreign 
intervention and a growing uneasiness over the fierce out- 
break or economic imperialism in the Far East. The task ot 
17vandenbosc·h, on. cit., 1n L. A. Milla, .21?• ill•, P• 81. 
lA..- . -vlekke, .22. ill• , p , 175 ~ 
10 
establishing Dutch control over these areas was entrusted to 
Governor-General van I!eutz; a tew years earlier General 
van lleutz had successfully prosecuted a war against the 
Achehnese, a tanatica1· tribe ot aborigines who inhabit the 
northern tip or Sumatra. BGtwoen 1900 and 1912, and part1ou- 
larly during.the period between 1904-1909, ettect1ve Dutch 
control was established over most ot the Outer Territories. 
In addition, van Heutz•s administration marked the first : . .i;' .. 
' serious attempt to lay the basia·ror a popular educational 
system; van Ueutz also introduced measures designed to 
promote the ooonomic development or the Indonesians.19 
Prior to Dutch rule tho arch1pe14go was-divided into 
innumerable small states and this oond.1t1on made possible the 
conquests or tha Portugueae and later.those or the Dutch. 
Betore.1596 there_had been a great deal ot a1m1lar1ty 
between tho situation in the islands and that ot teudal1at1c 
Europe ot the Middle Ages. Howeyer, the long period ot 
Dutch rule resulted 1n integration 1n many apheres1 this 
integration finally resulted in the development or a ~eel1ng 
ot unity among the Indonesian peoples and eventually gaye 
rise to a nationalist movement.20 
In 1908 Indonesian nationalism was first expressed 
1n an organized and institutionalized manner when~. Wa1d1n 
Soedira Ceaada, a ret1:••d medical subordinate, founded the 
tirat Indonesian nationalist aooiet11 Doed! Oetomo (the 
l9vandenbosoh, .21?• .ill•, P• 65. 
20vandenbosch, .21?• cit., 1n Le A. Mills, .21?• ill•1 P• B2. 
11 
Glorious Endeavor). Thia organization, which wa~ o~!s1.ually 
composed or Javanose intellectuals, had at first O!ll'f n .· 
social• econom!o, and cultural program, but later it also 
entered the political field. This society, however, has 
never been a popular movemont, working chie.fly among those 
who have. obtained a Western education. By virtue of these 
taata ·it has, on the whole, exercised a moderating 1nfluonoe 
on nationalist act1v1t1es.2l . 
Shortly after the formation of Boedi Oetomo another 
pol1 tical soc 1et1 was formed, Barelm t Islam. The primo.17 
cause tor the formation or this society was the depressed 
condi.tiona in the batik 1ndustr,. in central Java. For tho 
moat part the depression had been caused b1' competition from 
foreign countries. Ylh1le the principal element in the 
formation ot Sarelmt Islam was economic, a religious element 
was·1ntroduced in order to secure popular support for the 
movermnt. Had Sareknt Islam confined its aot1v1t1es to the 
economic field, it probabl1' would have remained primarily 
a middle-class part1. The tounders of the movement recognized 
thia tact and appealed to the only common elensnt in Javanese 
11te--Islam1am--1n order to secure the interest ot the masses 
and thus create a.wide.popular.base ~or tha movement.22 
In general, the program of Sarekat Islam embodied a 
twofold purpose--the promotion.or economic welt'are and the 
advanoeJT18nt or the interests ot Islam. In connection with 
2 . ' . . '' . . 
1Puz.nivall, .2!?• .£.!!., P• 243. 
22vandenbosoh, on • .£!!., P• 317. 
12 
the latter purpo~e, the movement not onl1 wished to keep 
the people true to Mohammedanism, but also to oppose all 
wrong conceptions ot the religion ot the Prophet. At the 
t'1rst congress ot Sarekat Islam, held_.1n 19131 expressions 
ot lo1alt1 to the Netherlands were made, but the congress 
aleo passed a resolution calling tor the evolut1on&.r7 
.. 
establishment ot a selt-govern1ng Indonesia within the 
Dutch e~p1re, B7 1917, when the aeoond con.gross ot the 
part1·wae held, a much more radical spirit had become 
apparent; by this time independence had become tho prima17 
goal of.the movement. While the1 professed the desire to 
obtain thia independence by parli~menta17 means, it peace- 
1'ul activities tailed, the leaders implied that the party 
lrould then lmow what course of action to t'ollow. Within a 
ehort time this new ap1r1t began to express itself in action: 
in 1918 the personnel or the government p&1ftlBhops went on 
strike out ot sympath1 tor a discharged pawnshop ott1e1al. 
The third party congress, held in October, 1918, embodied a 
new and still more radical trend as the leadership ot Sarekat 
Jalam began to take on the charaoter ot doctrinaire socialism. 
This was evidenced by the tacts that the party propnganda had 
now singled out capitalism as the major ene?D7 and the class 
atruegle. was given 1noreas1ng emphas1s.2~ 
A third tacet ot the nationalist mover::iont was reflected 
in the Indian part1. Thia part7, which was organized 1n 1912, 
- . . was composed ot both Eurasians nnd Indonesians; the party's 
23Ibid _., P• ~la. 
13 
platform was based on an appeal tor a brotherhood of these 
two groups tor an independent East Indies. However, the 
early leadership·ot this'movemant was very radical and, as 
a result, in 1914 three ot its leaders were exiled• This 
action quelled·tha radical element·in the party and it 
continued a morepoaoet'ul exiatenoo under the name ot 
Insulinde. 24 ·· · 
In December~ 1916, ·th9 Volksra3d1 the central 
legislative body, was created as a conce3s1on to the nation- 
alists. Its functions were only advisor,- and 1ta powers 
extremely limited, a tact which continually led to trash 
demands tor constitutional reform, It is not at all surprising 
that promises and preparations tor reform tailed to check the 
nationalist move100nt. Partiall7 because ot the ta1luro ot 
tho'Netherlands Government to take more positive action on 
the 1asua or con3t1tut1onal ratorm, the nationalist movement, 
during the por1od from 1920 to 1927, began to acquire new 
and radical tendencies.· During this period the nat1onal1at 
movement fell under the influence ot communism; the islands 
were ripe ror communist propaganda nt this time as the 
Village, Which had been a social and economic Unit in 1tselt, 
was being broken up b7 the introduction of large-scale 
24Ib1d. See Rupert Emerson, "An Analysis ot Nationalism 
in Southea'iit'"Asia,• FGr Eaatern @Iarterlr, Vol. 5, February, 1946, pp. 208-215. lir. Emeraon soussea aom ot the char- 
acteristics of nationalism and the 1mp11cat1on or increasing 
nationalism 1n regard to the hope tor a peacerui and cooperat- ing world. This entire issue 01' the FAr Eastern Qµarterlt 
1s devoted to the Netherlands Indies and lnoludes nrticles 
on such subjects as natural resources, population problems, 
cross currents or culture, the problem or minority groups, objectives or the Japanese occupation~ as well as an analysis ot nationalism. 
European cultures. With the breaking up ot the village 
system, governmental functions becaJ12e more and more central- 
ized; whereas formerly c1v11 servants had kept_themselvea 
constantly informed on - local problems and grievances and 
had promptly sought their solution, under tho new central- 
ized a7atem, local grievances went unnoticed and uncorrected, 
The connuun1ats utilized and o.xplo1ted all of these local 
.grievances as r.ru.ch as possible. 
14 
' ... 
Following World \Var I a number of labor unions were 
established and t:rom 1920 to 1927 fostered a aeries or 
strikes 1n JaTa and Sumatra, During this period Dutch and 
native communists attempted to take over the labor unions 
and pol1t1cal.aociet1es. Within the span or a tow years 
they were able to secure the positions of leadership 1n. 
local chapters of Sarekat IalamJ however, they were defeated 
1n their attempt to take over control of the central leader- 
ah1p or the party. In 1925 the party ejected the communists 
and prohibited any ot its members trom joining th~ Communist 
Party. However, this victory tor the moderato3 was a hollow 
one; .the power ot tho leaders ot .[arekat Islam had been 
completely undermined and tho party never regained it~ former 
proatige or mambersh1p,25 - 
25For 
a history or Indonesian pol1t1ca, see G. McT, Kahin, ''Indonesian Pol1t1ca and Nationalism," pp. 73-196, in As1en Nationalism end the West, edited by w. L. Holland. 
Mr. Kahln deals with a-atueyo.r major Indonesian political organizations and their programs up to the transfer or sovereignty in part one or his article, In part two he 
covers the pol1t1cnl. developments since thG transfer ot sovereignty to May, 1952. 
l5 
A.rter their expulsion rrom the party, the doctrinaire 
radicals and communists went into the labor union movement 
end organized a rival society to SArekat Isla~. In addition 
to the rival soc1ety1'which was called Sarekat Rayat Merah 
(Red Proletariat League), the comr.mn1st leaders organized 
a Red Trade Union Secretariat £or Indonesia and this 
organization was apparently art111ated •1th the headquarters 
or. the Red Trado Union International at Moscow. Communist · 
activity caused a series or bitter •trikes and culminated in 
a number-or simultaneous armed and violent disturbances 
in Java and Sumatra.in November, 1925, and again in J~nuary, 
1927. · The Dutch, now convinced that· the radical trend in 
the nationalist movement was communist inspired, took steps 
to repress such movements by establishing an internment camp 
in the heart o~ New Guinea and by deporting to this camp 
over a -'thousand communists and their ·.rami11es ... It aeems to 
be quite probable that the suppression of the communist 
outbreaks definitely ended that trend in the nationalist 
movement which'sought atter and hoped tor aid 1'rom foreign 
sources.· Since 1927 the nationalist movement baa thrown 
otr outside 1n£luences and has aasu11»d a more purely nation- 
alist character.26 
Another phase ot the nationalist movement mant.tested 
1tselt in the establishment or so-called "wild schools"J 
these schools were nn1nta1ned by nationalist groups rather 
than ·by the government. The sponsor• ·quite underatandably - 
refused government aid in order to remain t:ree from ott1c1al . ' . . . ~ .. 
16 
regulation. The object or the nationalists in establishing 
these ac~ools was to provide a strongl7 Indonesian, nation- 
alistic training tor the people or the islands and to 
raise.the levol ot developmont ot tho masses. Quite obviously, 
students pla7ed leading rolos in the development and main- 
tenance ot this movement • 
. _Closely allied to this movement, 1n spirit at least. 
was the establishment ot study groups by Indonesian 1ntellec- 
~uals during tho m1d-1920•s tor the purpose ot discussing 
~octal and political questions. Some ot these clubs developed 
in~o new pol1t1cal.pn.rt1ea and acquired large memberships. 
Probably the.most prominent ot ~hese_ was the Bandung Study 
Club which, in 1927, became the Parta1 Nasional Indonesia; 
the fir.s.t leader or .this party ~as Sukarno, Who became the 
Prosident ot_ the Republic ot ~ndonesia two decades later. 
The basic principle of the party waa embodied in a policy or 
non-cooperation with the Dutch; the party's roothod or 
achieving its ends was largely built around nat1onal1at1c 
mass action. 
again threatenod .to go over to violence, and the Governor- 
General was forced to take action against the nationalists. 
As a result, the Netherlands Government dissolved the Parta1 
,!!&!1onal Indonesia in that year and arrested Sukarno, who 
waa then interned on the island or Flores and later at 
Benkoelen on Sumatra. In addition to Sukarno, the Nether- 
lands Government arrested and prosecuted several more leaders 
In the latter months ot 1929 the nationalist movement 
17 
ot the party. Thia prosecution rosulted in the ejection ot 
the Parta1 Nasional ·Indonesia trom the realm ot political 
activity, at least tor the time being.27 
In December, 1928,·the nJajor political parties, 
largely through the ettorts ot the leaders ot the Parta1 
Naston&\_ ·Indonesia, were organized ·into a federation ot 
nationalist societies. However, by the SUmIIJ)r or 1930 a 
major breach had developed between the Parta1 Sareknt Islam 
and the other tmmber ·a0ciet1es or the federation which were 
religiously neutral. The dispute became so bit~er that 
toward the end ot 1930 the Islamic soo1ety decided to 
withdraw from the tederation.20 
The rapid rise ot the nationalist movement in the 
East Indies produced a very de.t1n1te reaction 1n European 
circles. In 1929 this reaction manitoated itselt 1n the 
organization ot the Vaderlandsche £.!!!!?.which championed 
the interests ot the European population in the East Indies 
and also maintained the belief in the 1nv1olab111ty ot the 
empire. In 1932 the nationalist leader in the Vol~raad 
announoed'that the nationalist coalition had changed its 
objective t'rom the creation ot an autonomous Indonesia to 
tho creation ot an independent Indonesia.29 
p. 83. 27vandenbosch, .21?• cit., in L.A. Milla, 2.2• ,ill., 
28vandonbosoh, .21?• ..Q.!!., pp. 328-~30. 
29 Ibid., pp. 333-~34. 
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Aa a generalization, it mo.y be said that the nation- 
alist movement experienced a definite slowing down atter 
1930. This was caused, tor the most part, by two conditions. 
The first was the depression which gravely attected the 
economy or the islands as 1t did the rest of the world. 
The depression made nationalist activity extremely dii'ficult 
to carry on because or the lack of funds. The second 
condition was tho vigorous repressive measures which the 
Eaat Indies Government invoked against the revolutionary 
tendencies or nationalist activities. This action, or course, 
operated to koep many natives trom joining nationalist 
societies tor tear ot repr~sals, .However, by the m1d-l930'a 
• 
' the moveioont had been revived, but on a cooperative rather
than a revolutionary bas1a. The rise .or taso1am and national 
socialism abroad, and.particularly the. ever-growing threat 
ot Japan, had not gone unnoticed by the nationalist leaders; 
.. 
consequently, they began to see the advantages of cooperating 
with the Dutch.30 
In m1d·l936, however, the hopes ot the moderate 
nationalists tor evolutionary self-government received a 
sot-back. In 1936 a majority ot the Volksraad ho.d passed a 
resolution calling tor a ooni'erence to bo convened to discuss 
plans tor the evolutionary development toward aelt-government 
tor the Indies over a ten-year period Within the limits or 
the existing Dutch Constitution •. The Netherlands Government 
rejected this propoeal and 1n doing so d1s1llus1oned a number - 
30vandonboach, 
.22• ,ill., in L. A. Mills, .21?• ill•• pp. 83-84. 
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ot'Indone1ian1 who had previously maintained that a policy 
or·moderat1on and cooperation with the.Dutch prOT!ded a sure, 
if.slow, road toward self-government. ·Had not the threat or 
Fascism been so imminent, a str~ngly militant nationalism 
niight have developed,· Faced with the existing situation, 
the Ger!ndo, a new-party which had been rormed in l9J7 and 
had gained power rapidly to become the powerful lett-w1ng 
of.the nationalist movement, g~nerally cooperated with the 
Dutch,but;tm.de clear that it cooperation.between Holland 
and Indonesia ae;a1nst'Faso1sm waa to be et.foctive, it must 
be on the.baa1a or equality,31 
In'February, 1940, the Volksraad passed0the W1woho 
Reaolution'call!ng once again fO'!- selt-government within 
the .framework of· the· ~letherlands Cons ti tut1on, This 
resolut1on·proposed expanding the membership or the Volksraad, 
making department heads or the Netherlands Indies Government 
responsible to this body, r.nd a revising of the powers ot 
the Governor-General. 'The reply or the Netherlnnds Govern- 
ment, Tbich was not received 'until three months after the· 
German occupation or the Netherlands had taken place, stated 
that its 'general attitude was that no political reforms c'ould 
be considered until post-w&.l' restoration ot the mother 
countt'1ts eovettnment had·taken place, Shortly atter the 
rejection ot the Wiwoho Resolution the Netherlands Government 
not1tied the Volksraad, 1n answer to a question trom that - 
. ~~a. T. Kah1n, . Nationalism .!ill!! Revolution.!!! Indonesia, pp, 95-96, 1952. 
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bod7, t.bat'the acceptance b1 the Netherlands or the Atlantic 
Charter, which contained a pledge ot the right ot aelt• 
determination tor all people, 1n no way arreoted the relation- 
ship between the Netherlands and Indonesia. 
These two action• on the part ot the Netherlands 
Government re1ulted in a rapid break-down or the Indoneaian- 
Dutoh solidarity •h1ah had been·created by th• threat or 
Faaoiam. ·While a small number or 1ntluential leaders or the 
nationaliat movement remained convinced ot the evils ot 
Paac1am, the7 were not able to check the growing conviction 
ot the maasea that a Japanese invasion would actuall7 mean 
the liberation ot the islands. Consequentl7, when the 
Japanoae did invade 1n February and March or 1942, the7 were 
generall7 received with enthuaiaam.32. 
During the t1rat tew months or occupation, the 
Japanese operated under the illusion that the7 would 
encounter no real ditticult7 with the nationalist leaders 
and that the1, therefore, could exploit the countr1 to 
the benefit ot Japan•a war ettort without making an1 
concessions ·to Indonesian nationalism~· However, economic 
exploitation and the rrequent brutality ot the Japaneae in 
- their dealing• with the Indonea1ana began to break down the 
original enthusiasm and to replace it witn a strong antagonism. 
By the end or 1942 a rew srmll-scale insurrections had broken 
out so that the Japanese began to realize that Indonesian 
nat1onal1am waa a real· and power!\U. toroe with which some sort 
32Ib1d., pp. 98-102. 
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ot modus vivendi would have to be reached it they expected 
to.achieve even the minimum aims or their occupation. 
Consequently, the Japanese got in contact with the nationalist 
leaders. in an attempt to secure popular support tor Japan's 
war.ertorta. The Japanese promised that self-government 
would be.granted in tm~near. tuture e.nd, on 9 March 194:5,· 
sanctioned the creation of an all-1nclua1ve nationalist 
organization, known as . the Poetera •.. While the Japanese 
considered the Poetera pr1mar111 as a means or securing 
popular support tor.their war ettort, the nationalist leaders 
used it ch!etly as an instrument tor spreading end.1ntensi- 
ty1ng nationalist feelings among the.masses and tor securing 
concessions toward aelt-governme~t t~om the Japanese. The 
nationalist leaders used the Poetera primarily to work toward 
their.own long•term nationalist aims, and onl1 secondarily 
to achieve the Japanese war a1as. There seems to be little 
doubt that the act1v1t1ea ot this organization resulted in 
an increased political consc1ousne1s among the Indonesian 
masses, particularlr in regard to their desire tor.independence.33 
'" . 33see Australian Pape~ No. l, Dependencies~ Trusteeship !n the Pacific Area; this paper was prepared by 
a study group o'f°'the Au3tral1an Institute ot International 
Affairs in 1947. This group noted that "the Indonesian nationalists who collaborated with the Japanese in putting 
up the false tacade used the opportunity to strengthen the foundations or a stronger policy directed ultimntelr 
against both Japanese and Dutch." This paper deals with colonial policy nnd economic development, problems or 
aas1m1lat1on, Asiatic nationalism, and the effect or the Japanese occupntion upon the varioua independence movements 
ot Southeab~ Asia. 
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In September, 1943, a Japanese trained, Indoneaian- 
otticered military organization, known as the!.!!!• was 
established to help the Japanese detend Indonesia against 
Allied invasion. At the peak ot its strength, which waa 
reached in the middle ot 1945, the Peta numbered about .............. 
120,000 armed men. It waa·the Peta wb.1oh formed the backbone 
ot the army ot the Republic ot Indonesia. 
B1 the end ot 1943 the Japanese realized that the 
Poetera was ••rving the purposes ot the Indonesian nationalists 
to a tar greater extent than it was the Japanese war ettort. 
Consequently, they dissolved the Poetera and in its place, 
on 1March1944, set up a new organization, DJawa Hokoka!, 
which was :maintained compulaor1ly. Thia organization did 
not •in popular support, nor did an all-inclusive Islamic 
organization which was created aubsequentl7. 
In m1d·l944 the Japanese established an organization 
tar educated young men from about twent7 to thirty years ot 
age Which was closely controlled. Indonesians suspected or 
underground act1v1t1es were forced to assume positions ot 
leadership in this organization: in this way the Japanese 
hoped to curtail the activities or the major Indonesian 
leaders. However, in October, 1944, arter Premier Koise•a 
announcement that Indonesia would be granted its independence 
1n the very near future, Japanese policy underwent a change. 
The Japanese army relaxed its controls over the Hokokat and 
nationalist leaders were allowed to talk ot independence to 
a rar greater extent, and were required to in.ruse loss 
pro-Japanese sentiments in their speeches. In late 1944 
three Indonesians were appointed as residents in Java '2nd 
Madura and in tho remaining rGs1denc1es or these two islands 
Incones1an sub-re31denta were appointed. In actuality these 
residencies were administered by the Indon3s1an sub-residents 
rather than by the Japanese.residents. 
On 1tYarch1945 the Japanese sanctioned tho establ1Si- 
ment or the In~~st.1gat1ng c.omm1ttee to?' the PI'eparat1on of 
Independence ror Java and Madura, On 25 July 1945 a similar 
committee .was.set up on Sumatra. On 17August1945, two daya 
after the Japanese had accepted the Potsdam Agreement as a 
baais ror surrender, Suknrno and llattn met With the mombora 
or the Prep~ator1 ~omm1ttee ~~ dr~w up a declaration of 
1ndopendonce. Attar some discussion, the text was decided . . 
upon nnd the contents ot the declaration were broadcast over 
. .. , . 
the entire Indonesian radio a~d tel~graph network. The 
Indonesian nationalist movement was once more in tho open 
and moving towards its goo.l or independence.34 
- 
CHAPTER II 
THE REVOLUTION 
tTP 'l'O 
THE LINGGADJATI AGREEMENT 
On 29 September 1945 British troops landed in 
Batavia to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces in 
.. · 
accordance w1 th th~ provision!! or the Potsdam Aereemnt and 
to releas~i Allied prisoners e.nd personnel interned on the 
' ~ 
Lord Louis Mountbatten, "Allied Commander for the Southeast 
, . , islands.· Several weeks prior to this, however; on 3 Soptember, 
; . Pao1f1e Area, had charged the Japanese with the duty or 
tna1nta1n1ng law and.order as.well as" the duty' ot ma1~ta1n1ng 
> ti.> I I 
the status guo pending the arrival of British troops. In 
- ·1 , ~ • ' • 
implementation of this order, Mountbatten also ordered the 
Japanese forces t.o disband the Republic of Indonesia which 
had bocn proclaimed on 17 August 1945. By the time that 
this order was issued, however, the Republic was a functioning, 
if untested, organization; in addition, Japanese arms had 
been cr~ite widely distributed amon~ the population ~nd, as 
a consequence, extremists and lawless ele~nts had secured 
arms along with the rest of the nativea.l 
1nro~kings, Institution, Major Problems of United 
.§.tates Foreign Pol1c:r, 1949-50, pp. 359-360. - 
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· In general, the rapid establishment ot the Republican 
Government ma7 be attributed to the tact that the Japaneae 
were convinced (and the eloquent arguments ot newly-elected 
President Sukarno materially aided in strengthening this 
conv1ot1on) that any attempt to halt or auppresa the 
nat1onal1at1o independence movement and the rise ot the new 
government would inevitably lead to a bloody struggle. 
While the Japanese might have won the right, such a victor;y 
would have been achieved only at the cost or heavy caaualitiea, 
Consequently, the Japanese attempted to avoid a direct clash 
with the Indonesian revolutioni1ts1 aa a result, their policy 
prior to the. arrival ot Allied troops waa one characterized 
by uncertainty and e ompromiae. While the Japanese did take 
vigorous atepa toward stopping· the'.· growth ot Indonesian 
m111ta17 power they were unable·to halt the mas3 movement ot 
civilian 1'unct1onar1ea to the serv1cetf o.f'the Republic. 
The latter situation was, o.f oourae, due to the tact, noted 
in the previous chapter; that Indoneaiana had been installed 
aa residents and sub-residents on the islands or Java end 
Madura prior to the Japanese surrender at Potsdam.2 
While the British rorces came to the Indies tor only 
: .... two major purposes, both pr1mar111 military in nature 
( (1) accepting the •urrander·or, disarming, and repatriating 
some 2831000 Japanese troops and (2) liberating over 200,000 
Dutch and Allied prieonera of war and internee•) it rapidly 
became apparent that these aims could not be achieved without - 2 ' Ks.h!n, .21?• cit., pp. 138-139. 
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dealing with the pol1t1oal situation in the islands. 
Britain was raced on the one hand by a nationalistic reeling 
among the Indonesians which could easily become a militant 
moyement and on the other by the danger that British support 
or the as yet unrecognized Republic would almost certainly 
alienate Holland and perhaps provoke her opposition to 
Britain in the United Nations Security Counc11.3 
Aa it turned out, the attempts ot the British to 
maintain a neutral policy. in respect or the political 
relations ot these two groups, had the temporary etteot ot 
antagonizing both aides. The Dutch round the British policy 
toward the Indonesian leaders to be highly objectionable, 
Immediately upon his arrival 1n Batavia• Lieutenant General 
Sir P.A. Christison; Commander ot the Allied Forces in the 
Netherlands East Ind1ea·(A.F.N.E.I.), 11aued a proclamation 
stating that he intended, tirst, to aak the present party 
leadera tor their support and, second, 1n view of the 
extremel7 limited numbe~ ot Br1t1sh troops in the Nether- 
lands East Indies, to allow the preaent Indonesian leaders 
and authorities to retain respons1b111t7 tor the government 
1n areas under their control. This proclamation waa galling 
to the Dutch because ot the implied recognition of Indonesian 
authorities and part1 members Which it carried. The Dutch, 
ot course, did not want any type ot recognition to be extended, 
either ott1c1ally or unott1c1ally.4 
3charles Wolte; Jr., !h! Indonesian Storz, pp. 18-19. 
4Ib1d., p. 19. 
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The Indonesians, at t1rst,.d1d not oppose the landing 
ot Brit1ah·troops and, following the landings, cooperatsd 
with the British by running the civil adm1n1strat1on, public 
utilities, and by maintaining law and order. When Dutch and 
Ambonese troops, which had been interned on the islands 
during the war were released and attached to the Dutch 
contingent ot A.F.N.E.I., the nationalist leadors 1mmed1atel7 
~emanded that no new Dutch troops ahould be permitted to land 
,until the Republic .had been recognized. However, 1n the 
early part ot October, 1945, two small companies or Dutch 
volunteer combat troops landed and .they wore followed by 
personnel ot the hated Netherlands Indies Civil Administration. 
This action immediately touched ott a heated condemnation ot 
British policy by_the Indonesian leaders because the arrival 
ot Dutch ~roopa had been authorized b7 the Br1tish.5 
. To add to the grav1t7 ot the ~ituation, the British, 
prior to the landing of.Dutch troops, had stated that Nether- 
landa law would be applied and enforced by Netherlands 
administrative officers. Purther, General Christison declared 
thnt_Japaneae. troops would be uaed on a temporary basis to 
maintain law and order. The Republican leaders oont1nuall7 
warned the Br1t11h that the situation, pe.rticularly atter the 
landing or new Dutch troops, was.becoming cr1t1ca1.6 •In 
addition to the mere presence ot Dutch troops, the aot1v1t1ea 
ot these troops further incensed the population. Following 
5Ib1d~, P• 20, 
6Kah1n, .21?. ,ill. , p. 142 • 
- 
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the arrival ot the,Dutch General van Oyen, a number or 
"incidents" occurred which were caused by "trigger-hapPJ" 
patrols ot Dutch and Ambonese troops. Then too, the 
nationalists wore informed that any ou~break on their part 
would be dealt with immediately by.the occupying authoritie1.7 
·These eleJrBnts ot dissension operated to convince 
the Indonesians that tho1r.1ndependenoe was being threatened, 
Thia apprehension on the part or the nationalists culminated 
in armed attackes upon Dutch and British patrols and an 
1ntens1t1od ottort to secure more arms trom the Japanose.8 
On 4 ?lovenb er 1945, l3r1gad1or I;fallaby, the Br! tish. 
commander who had been negotiating with local Indonesian 
authorities, was killed 1n Surebaya. The British dld not 
havo su.!"t1c1ont .troop strength to undertake immecllate 
retaliatory action.~ On 9 November hcmever, Genero.l Mansergh, 
who had succeeded Mallaby, ordered the Indonesians to surrender 
their nrrns or the British would take offensive action against 
them tor the purposo ot establishing law and order, This 
action was 1n1t1atod tho following do.y as it was evident 
that the ultimatum would not be complied with by .the 
irregular arnod bands which were responsible tor the terror. 
The resulting Battle ot Surabaya co3t the British several 
hundred casunl1t1es (which included casual1t1es among Indian 
troops); however, sev~ral thousand of tha irregular nationalist 
7p. E. Crockett, "How the Trouble Began in Java." 1!arpar1s, Vol. 192, March, 1946, P• 281. 
8Kahin, .22• ill•, p. 144. 
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troops were kill~d. In Bandwig British losses were smaller 
becauso of the larger concentration ot British troops 
there.9 
As n part of the plan of battle against the Indonesian 
extremists, the Allied Command ordered Japanese troops, under 
Japanese co.mmnnders, to attack and recapture Indonesian-held 
cities. Thia action not only increased the 111-teeling ., 
which the Indonesians held against the British and Dutch, 
but also brought a storm of protest trom the rest ot th• 
world,10 
The Battle ot Surabaya served notice on the British 
that unless they were w1111n8 to undertake a major military 
campaign.in Indonesia, .they- would have to· establish some 
sort of a modus vivendi with the leaders or the Republic. 
Consequentl7, the British began to assume an unfavorable ·.' 
attitude toward the Dutch rerusal to doal with the Republic 
and the1 applied pressure on.the ·Dutch to negotiate some 
sort or a peaceful comprom13e.ll 
With tho beginning or the new 1eo.r the situation 
began to improve: On 10 FebruS.Z.,. 1946 the Lieutenant 
Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, at'ter a . -, 
' 
trip to Holland, began a new series ot discussions with the 
Indonesian del~gat~o~, which was headed-by tho Republican 
Prime M1nlater,'Sj~1r, The Dutch.had.agreed to negotiate 
~olr, za- ill~· pp. 22-23. 
lCL , . 
-Aah1n, JU?• oit,, pp. 144-145. 
lltbid. 
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even though they atill refused to·accept Sukarno and Hatta 
because ot their "collaboration" with the Japanese during the 
war.12 ' 1: . ;, '. ' . 
United Nations Action ·t, 
j 
The situation in Indonesia was first brought to the 
attention or the Security ~ounc.11 at. the second meeting or 
that body on 25 January 1946. At thia meting the .President ~ . . . ' 
or the Security Council brought to the notice or the Council 
a cornmun1cation trom the head or the delegation or the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic dealing with the 
situation in Indonas1a; the item was then included on the 
agenda.ls 
. 
The above-mentioned communication was brought up 
tor discussion at the 12th 1r0et1ng or the Council on 7 Pebl9UarJ' 
1946. At tho.t time the Ukrainian representative, after 
citing various newspaper reports as support tor his contention 
. l2wo1r, ~·cit., PP• 23-24. 
13seeur1tt Council, Oft1e1al Records, First Year: First Series, Number l, From the ~Irst Meeting (17 January 1946) to the Twenty-Third Meeting (16 February 1946). 
pp. 15-19. This letter, which was dated 21Janunry1946, 
atated that military operations had been directed against the Indonesian population tor a number or months and, that 
1n addition to regular British troops. "Japanese enemy . 
forces•• were also being used· 1n the operation. The Ukrainian 
Government was ot the opinion that this situation constituted a threat to the ma1ntenance·or international peace and 
aecur1t1 as described in Article ~4 or the Charter. that the 
Security Couno1l should carry out necessary- investigations, and that appropriate measures should be takon to put an end 
to the situation. (Securitt Council, Official. Records, First Yeari First Series, Supplement Number 11 Annex 4, P• 76. 
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that a dangerous situation existed, leveled tho chnrge at 
the United Kingdom that British troops, along with Japanese 
contingents, were being used to suppress Indonesian nationalists. 
The Ukrainian delegate did not question the right ot British 
troops to be 1n Indonesia, but he !lllintained th.at their use 
"tor the suppression ot the national movement ot the 
Indonesian people io 1nadrnissible.n Mr. Manuilsky then 
stated that tho appropriate thing tor the Secur1t7 Council 
to do, with the Indonesian quoat1on at its present stage, 
would be to create a special comm1as1on tor the. purpose ot 
conducting an on-the-spot 1nvest1eat1on mid re-establ1sh1ns 
the·peace.14 
In answer to this chnrge the Dritish representative, 
Mr. Bevin, pointed out that, because of an inadequate 
1ntoll1genee service, tho British had sent only a limited 
rorce to Indonesia. ne·rurther st&ted that the British, 
when the7 arrived in: Jl:lva nnd Surabs.y-a, never 1'1red a shot, 
but were tired upon end somo British soldiers were killed. 
lfr. Bevin then pointed out that Genoral Vi.a.llaby- had been 
assassinated while he was o1gning a truco with the leaders 
or tho nat1onnl1st ~ovement; such action (retarrins to the 
tl>uce) could hardly bo construed in such a mnnner ns to support 
the contention that British military authorities were attack- 
ing the Indoneatan movot1ent. Ile olosed by observing that, 
in his opinion, it tho United Nations wished to help settle 
the problem in Indone1ia, the proper approach would not be - 
178. l4sacurtt1 Council, orrtcial Records, op. olt,, pp. 174- 
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to send another connn1ss1on there, but rather to urge the 
parties alread7 in negotiation "to bend their energies to 
etrect a settlemont.nl5 
1.ht. van Klettens ot the Netherlands, a.t'ter noting 
the commission ot a number ot atrocities in the islands, 
deolare·d that the action of British troops could not ra1rl;y 
be termed to be a "mil1tar;y action", but was rather 1n the· 
nature .ot police protection. The Netherlands delegate 
maintainod that no s1tuo.t1on existed in Indonesia which 
endangered international peace, that no dispute existed, 
and consequently, that no case existed with which the 
3ecur1t;y Council was competent to deal because the matter 
was a domeatio issue .la · 
_-, At the following meeting on 9 Februar;y 1946 the 
'Ukrainian representative reiterated his charges concerning 
the·use ot British and Japanese troops as instruments for 
suppressing Indonesian nationalism. He insisted, on behal.r 
or his delegation, that the principle or self-determination 
Which is embodied in the Charter be-applied to the people or 
Indonesia and he requested once again that a special· comm!asion 
be created.17 
The Br1t1ah representative maintained that Holland 
was the recognized sovereign power 1n Indonesia and consequentl;y 
tho Indonesian situation constituted an internal matter with 
Which the Security Council was not competent to concern itaelr. - 
15 
178-182. Ib1!!·, pp, 
16Ib1d., PP• 182-187. 
17Ib1d pp. 188-193. -·· 
He declared that any other troatment ot the problem would 
set a precedent which would have repercussions over a very 
Wide f1elde Du.ring the course Of his speech he pointed 
out that at the Council or Ministers of Foreign At'fa1rs he 
' . ·,' 
had "suggested an enquiry into the troubles in Bulgaria and 
' . 
Roumania" but that the Soviet Government had stated "that 
they were sover~ign Powers and it was declines." Mr. Dov1n 
believed that the sana principle.was applicable in this caae.18 
The Netherlands delegate o.losed the session with a 
speech in which he questioned the Ukrainian delegate's 
reforonce to a "one-sided" war. He stated that, to tha best 
ot h1a knowledge·, tha nativo toroes included approximately 
ao,ooo men who were well-armed and equ1pp9d. Mr. van Kleffens 
•• t ... ' .. also .rea.t.ftrmed his ata~d that the Br! t1ah troops were not 
engaged in' a at1"1iggle··w1·th e Indonuian people but, rather, 
. .. . : , . . - . I . . . ' . 
were concerned with subduing armed bands Which were attempting 
to prevent Allied., ro.rcea tro~ carrying out their. orders .19 
The next day at the 14th meeting ot the Council, 
Mr. Vyshinsky, head ot the USSR delegation, supported the 
Ukrainian oral proposal far the creation ot a special 
investigating committee. He maintained that the rebuttals 
ot the British and Netherlands delegations were not supported 
by fact. The Soviet delegate suggested that British, and to 
a lesser extent Dutch, opposition to the investigating 
COmm1sa1on was based upon the fact that botb or these countries - 
lBib1d -·· pp. 193·196. l9rb1d., PP• 196-198. 
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have special business interests 1n Indonesia. In conclusion 
Mr. Vyahinsky stated that the use or Japanese troops was a 
direct breach or the agreement which had been reached b7 
the Alliea, under which General MacArthur issued the order 
for Japanese troops. to surrender uncondi t1 onally and be 
diaarmed.20 
The 15th meeting of the Security Council, also held 
on 10 February, brought nothing new in so tar as the various 
attitudes ot the members wero concerned. Mr. Bevin merely 
re-stated the tact that British commanders had been in contact 
with Sukarno in an attempted cone111at1on before trouble 
broke out between the Indonesians and British troops, while 
Mr. Van ltlettena again acknowledged that military action 
. was being carried on in Indone•ia. but denied·that it was 
being directed against the Indonesian nationalist movement 
as such; it was, according to Mr. Van IQettens, being 
directed against extremists over whom the nationalists, by 
their own admission, had little controi.21 
On 11February1946, the delegate representing the 
Ukrainian SSR, atter some debate upon his authority to do 
so, submitted a resolution calling tor the establishment ot 
a commission composod ot representatives or the United 
States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands. This commission would carry out an on-the-spot 
investigation in order to get a ractual picture of the - 
20Ib1d., pp. 199-209. 
21rb1d., pp. 216-219. 
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situation in Indonesia end it would then report to the 
Security Council on the result or its work.22 
Following the introduction ot the Ukrainian resolution, 
the delegate repl'eeentating the United·states, Mr. Stettinius, 
stated that, 1n view ot the tact that negotiations were 
already being carried on between the Netherlands Government 
and-the Indonesian leaders, the beat hope tor settlement 
would lie 1n the prompt mid succeastUl. completion ot such 
negotiations. 'Consequent1,.., the-Council should take no 
action wh1oh would introduce new·. complications which, 1n 
turn, -, might prejudioe or retard the completion or the 
negotiations, 'In the opinion ot tho United Statoa delegation 
the· appointment or a oc;·,.1aston such as the one propOsed b7 
the Ukrainian delegate Would have·the'arorementioiied 8rrect. 
Mr. Stett1n1us added; somewhat parentheticall1, that' the 
general view ot tha United States 1n regard to any tact- 
rtnding or 1nvest1gating commissions which might be created 
by the Council was that such bodies should be composed ot 
impartial. porsons chosen on the basis or· tho1r competence 
and Who would repreaent the Security Couno11 as an inter- 
national. bod7 rather·th411 their individual CQ.llltries. The· 
United Statea representative closed by saying that he 
believed it Would be appropriate ror the Council to express 
the hope that the disarmament and repatriation or Japanese 
troops might be promptly carried out.23 - .. 
· In general, the USSR, Mexico, and Poland were in 
favor of sending the comm!asion to Indonesia. The representa- 
tive or the United Kingdom flatly declared that "he would 
re.ruse to be a party to the commiasion." The Netherlands 
representative· ·maintained his view that he would not oppose 
creating a comm1es1on Which would deal only with the question 
ot the conduct of British troops 1n Indonesia, but that he 
would refuse to accept a comm1as1on "which would busy itselr 
with ·matters w1 thin domestic 'jur1sd1ot1on."24 
On 12 February the Egyptian delegate submitted a 
proposal, at the 17th meeting of the Council, stating, in 
ettect, th.tit under no circumstances should British troops be 
. ' 
used against the·Indonesian nationalist movement. It urged 
that the Br1t1ah troops be withdrawn t"rom Indonesia as soon 
aa their strictly limited objectives were aocompl1ahed. 
The.resolution also declared that the Council •1ahed to be 
1ntorimd ot the results or the negot1at1ona being carried on 
between the Indonesians and the Netmrlands Government. The 
Council, ot course, reserved the right to take such further 
action as it might deem necessary and proper.25 
The Indonesian question was considered tor the last 
time in 1946 on 13 Februa17 at the 18th moet1ng or tho Council. 
At that meeting the Ukrainian proposal was put to a vote and 
it was rejected as there were onl~ two votes in favor or the 
rneaaure. The representat1Ye ot:the USSR then submitted an 
.. 
24yearbook.2,! !!'.!!..United Nations, 1946-47, p. 340. 
25secur1tz Council, Official Records, .2.2• .!?.!!•• p. 251. 
AJllendment to tho Egyptian proposal calling tor the creation 
and dispatch of a comm1ss1on which would be composed of 
representatives ot China, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and the USSR.' Thia amendment was defeated 
With onl1 Mexico, Poland, and the USSR voting in tavor ot 
it.· The Egyptian proposal itselt was then put to a vote and 
it was also rejected as only two repreaontatives voted.26 
'As stated abova, in February, 1946, d1acuaa1ona were 
opened between the Indonesian delegation and the Dutch 
Lieutenant Governor General,. However, 1n addition to thia 
peacet'ul attempt to reach a solution, the Dutch also employed 
the ••rvicea or the now notorious Captain Westerling and 
ordered him to •pacJ.1'7• the areas 1n rebellion against the 
Dutch, Republican reports and thoae ot the Diitch d1t[;'er a 
groat deal aa to the number or caaualitiea intlioted b7 
Westerling, Republican authorities asserted that nearl1 
30,000 Indonesians, civilians as well as guerrillas, were 
executed b7 his tiring squads, or otherwise killed, On the 
other hand, orttcial·Dutch sources reported that only 4,000 
were killed. While tho Netherlands Government did appoint a 
commtasion to.look into the r..llegad brutalitiaa ot Dutch 
troops, no report waa ever published.27 
Although, aocording to the C1v11 Administration 
Agreement ot 28 August 1945, the Supreme Allied Commander or 
the re-ocouP1ing rorcea was authorized to exercise tinal 
37 
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26Jb1J!,, 
pp. 257-263. 
27vA~1 l "\.CU" n, .21?. c 1 t , , p • 45 • · .. 
local a~thor1ty over all branches ot the Netherlanda Ind!ea 
Government 1n matt~rs ot a military nature, .the Dutch 
Lieutenant Governor General retained h1s position as the 
top authority .in purel;y civil natters. Bia actions, however, 
were required to contorm to m111tacy ordera. The British· 
Commander-in-Chief waa empowered to 1ntorm the Dutch Lieutenant . . . 
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Governor General IVhen and the extent to which the mllitar;y 
situation would allow responsibility tor the civil ~dm1n1a- 
trat1on to be ~eaumed by the Netherlands Indies Government. 
Conaequentl;y, aa the mllitar;y oituatlon became relativel;y . 
quiet in 1946, the Dutch Civil Administration was authorized 
to a~s~ an inc~eaaed scope ot responsibility, although 
remaining ~ltimately re~pons1ble to the orders ,or the Comnander- 
in-Chiet".ot A,F.N.E.z.28 
.. As.a result or the •1tuat1on noted above, by Jul7, 
1946, 1 tho Dutch had almo~t comi:>le·t~ly re-establi1hed their . ~. - . . . . . . . 
control and authority in Borneo, the Celebes, and the islands 
east ot Java. With the return or tho.Dutch to these areas, . . . ' ~, . .. 
economic rehab111tat1on was undertaken and, in general, 
progressed quite .rap1dl;r~~9 , .. 
The Mal!no Conterence - ----- ------ 
In July 1946 a conference between the Dutch and 
representatives ot the islands east or Java~ area known to 
the Dutch As the Outer Ialanda--waa convened in Malino 1n the - 
28woit, .2.I!• o1 t., P• 24. 
29nrook1ngs 
Institution, .21?• cit •• p. 360. 
.. 
.. 
39 
Celebes. The purpose ot this conterenoe, which had been 
.. ' .. . . ' '. . 0 
summoned by Dr. van Mook, who at· that·t1me was Lieutenant 
Governor General ot Netherlands India, waa the inauguration 
,_ .... . . , ;. .. ~ . "'\ 
ot some term ot representative government in the Outer Island.a. 
Prior to·th1s time this area had been under direct or indirect 
Dutch adm1n1str.at1on.~0 
The results ot this conference were embodied in three 
principal decisions Wh1°ch wero unan1moUsly.adopted. The first 
ot these called tor the organization· or a United Indonesia, 
to be kliovm as Sarekat Indonesia, on a federal basis. Thia 
tederat1on.waa later to be expanded to include both Java and 
- . ·, . . . 
Sumatra. The second decision called for the r.a1ntenance ot 
lasting cooperation between Indonesia ~d the Nethorlands. 
The final dec1a1on stated th&.t·aelt-government was to be'· 
88tabl1shed within &11 ot the component units ot the tederat1oii, 
The tirat.and·third decisions ~onst1t~te ·at least partial· 
evidence· or the tear telt b;r the Outer Terr1torieo that the:r 
.- ~ . . 
and.their interests would be subordinated to those or Java 
. • ' I . 
and Sumatra in a United Indonosia established on an1 basis 
other than that or federalism. It was tor these reasons that 
Dr. van Mook, in his opening speech at ita11no completely end 
deliberately rejected the idea held by the Republic of a 
. ~°narbo.ra Whittingham-Jones, "The ira11no Conference 
and After,," ,Ih! Asiatic Review, Vol. XLII, October, 1946, 
P• 371. MJ.:u Whittinghal!l-Jones, 1n d1acus11ng the Outer 
Islands, etates that tho feeling of nationalism in that area 1a as deep and sturdy as that round in Java. However, the nationalism ot the Outer Islands is leas doctrinaire than 
its counter-part in Java and hence !a more realistic. The 
leaders from the Outer Ialands si;nc1t1call1 acknowledged the necessity ot cooperating with the Dutch, at least during the interim period prior to the transter ot sovereignty. 
.. 
unitarr State which would be ruled from Java. It was also 
at least partially because ot the Republican ideal ot a 
unitary- state that the Nstherlnnds considered the Republic 
to be composed ot radicals with whom negotiation was very- 
40 
d1tt1oult. 
In regard to the nature ot the relationship which 
Would exiat between Indonesia Sarekat and the Netherlands, 
the conference drew up a torma1 resolution which declared . . . 
that this relationship should be described and detined in 
. , . . . 
a atatutei this statute would alao include provisions tor ! • :. . • 
the .establishment ot separate constitutions tor the Nether- 
lands and tor.Indonesia. Another resolution was concerned 
with the problem aa to whether Indonesia would remain under 
' . 
Dutch hegemony or declare herselt to be completely sovereign . . . . . . . . ' 
and independent, . . . Thia problem was not solved, but a resolution 
• • ,. , • : 4 .. l ' 
was adopted under which a final decision on the natter was ., . 
postponed until after.a ten-year t~ial period or period ot 
transition. According to the ~esolution, during this time 
United Indonesia would be able to create the necessary 
Poli t1cal, ec onom1 e , social. and cUJ. tural, and governmental 
structures and institutions which would be necessary in order 
to make a "tree end independent decis1on~"31. 
While the great majority ot the delegates at the 
flalino Con.rerenco expressed a desire to remain within the 
Dutch Emp!re·aa an·oqual partner with the Netherlands, a 
minority maintained that the relationship should be established - .. 
41 
by treaty rather than by statute. This point of view waa, 
ot course, almost identical with the one which was held by 
the leaders of the Republlo.32 
Th~ British Withdrawal --------- 
On 15 October 1946 a truce was negotiatod between the 
'.· . . l '- ~ . "" ' . 
British and the Dutch on the one hand and the Indonesians on 
the othsr. Undar ~he terms.or this truce, which waa designed 
to allow the British to w!thdr~w their troops .from the islands, 
lines or demarcation were established around the bridgeheads, 
which now becamo Dutch tort1f1oat1ons as they had been 
I •" • • ' I I 
Dritiah. Neither side wao to conduct off0nsive operations . ~ . . 
beyond these lines J however,'· in practice, both sides violated 
. . ... 
this part or the agroeimnt. In addition, -, the Indonesians 
agreed to the ;J.anding of additional Dutch troops •. The 
maximum number was sot as that ot the total number or Dutch 
and British troops which had been in the archipolago on 
' 15 October when the truce had been concluded. In accordance 
with this provision, Br1t1s.h~.tra1ned Dutch troops arrived 
until the 92,000 joint total was reached; 1n addition, the 
. ;- 
British turned over. their surplus war materiel to the Dutch 
replacem~nts. On 30 November 1946, the last ot the British 
troops were withdrawn trom Batavia. Consequently, A.F.N.E.I. 
· 32Ib1d. Miss Whittingham·Jonea stressed the 
1mportance~the Mal1no Conference aa a step in the right direction, an importance which does not seem to have been borne out by later events. She gives most ot the credit 
for the eucceas of the Ma.lino Conference to Dr. van Mook, who was the guiding torce behind the Conterence. 
.. 
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was oftio1ally disbanded and military control passed over to 
the Dutch.33 
Events Leadin5 !g !h! L1nggadjat1 Agreement 
The negotiations between the Dutch and the Republicans, 
though they were protracted, finally led to positive results. 
There wero several factors which lod to the agreement between 
the Republic and the Netherlands to resume negotiation early 
in 1946. Among the more prominent was the tao t that 
Republican leaders realized that their leadership in trained . . . 
administrative and professional personnel was very weak; . . 
1n addition, they knew that there was not sutt1c1ent capital . ·\: . ' 
in the country to provide tor 1ts economic developmt!nt. 
.. ... - ' ' 
' . -~ ' . "';, 
Both aides realized that they stood to gain from a 1ettlement . . ' - . ' ·, . 
which would ensure the maintenance or good relations aa well 
as the continuation or Dutch technical and financial 
aasiatance.34 The Dr1t1ah, anxious to withdraw from Indonesia 
. ' ; ; . 
would be commenced by the end ot Novenber, 1946. 
- . . had informed the Dutch that the withdrawal of British troops 
In this . . 
and other ways the British exerted great pressure on the 
' Netherlands to como to an agreement w1 th the Republic. This .. . . ' 
" ~ ~ ., i ', ! ·. ::. . 
pressure, combined with th& attitude or progressive Dutch 
' ·' ,. elexmnts toward making realistic conoeasions to the Indonesians, 
led to the 1n1t1al1ng of the L1nggadjat1Agreemonton15 November, 
33wo1r, .22• .!tll•, pp. 24-2~. 
34Brookinga Institution, .21?• .!?.!!•• P• 360. 
.. 
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19461 by the' Dutch Commission-General in Indonesia and the 
Republ!c·~35 · ·,, 
The negotiations, which had been primaril7 carried 
on between Sjahrlr· and van Mo~k, were .. be~ in· earl7 1946. 
However, the dlaouasions were suspended when the Schermerhorn 
c~bin~t·. resigned on 21 Mar.- - Van Mook~ ot course, felt it 
neceasar7 to abstain from further formal negotiations either 
until he received a ne\Y mandate or until the new political 
l1ns-up·~nd policr in Holl~nd had been clarified. In June, 
. . 
1946, an attempted coup d'etat against the SUkarno-Sjahrir 
Government dela7ed-ncgot1at1ons still further. On 2 Jul7 a 
new cabinet was formed in the Netherlands Government; van Mook 
then proeeeded to convene the Via.lino Conterence referred to 
above • 36 On 13' August· Sukarilo 'a di: ta torship 1 ·which he had 
established in order'to combat ettectivel7 t~e attempted 
coup d'etat atter Sjahr!r1had been kidnapped, was ended 
. . 
and Sjahrir waa returned to tho post of Prime Minister aa 
the head of a new cabinet which included three more mombers 
of a atrongl7 rightist Islamic Party than its predecessor 
had. The ·Islamic Party tended to favor an antagonistic 
policy toward Dutch proposals. On 17 August the States- 
General of.the ?letherlands Government aet up a Commiasion 
General to represent it in the negotiations. This commission 
:55Kah1n, sa- cit., p. 196. 
~6 . . . . . 
-, The resolutions reached at this conterence were endorsed at the Pangkal PinangConrerence, which was held in October, by European, Eurasian, Chinese, and Arab racial m1nor1t1ea. 'Wol1', .!m• .!ll•• P• 41 
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was given tar reaching powers to negotiate and reach an 
v • ' .. 
agreement without having to refer back to the Hague, aa . . ' \ 
van Mook had been required to do. One of the most important : . . . . 
events which preceded the initialing or the L1nggadjat1 
Agreeme~t.was a trip into the interior ot Java b~ a semi- 
official Dutch m1as1on.' This trip, which lasted from 15 . . . 
September to 20 SeptetJber, was Illlde at the invitation or the 
Republic. The report on conditions in the interior which 
was l!E.de by Dr. P. Ji.Koeta, the chief ot van Mook's cabinet 
and head or the mission, was very favornble to the Republic~ . . 
Coming as 1t did on the eve or tho reswnpt1on or negotiations, 
thia report was a major tactor !n creating the improved 
• • I • • • 
atmosphere which prevailed at that time.37 
• • " • f ~ • • • 
. ··. Though -the dra1't ·Agre.ement was initialed ··at L1nggadjat1, 
• I I; ~ · ' • I " , • • • , •• 
it was. not ~ormall;r. ai~ed .by ~he Governments o'!' the ?Tether- 
. . 
lands and the ~epubl1o ot Indonesia until 25 March 1947.38 
~. ..... . . 
Before it was adopted, however, the Agreement encountered . ,. ' . ' •' 
sti!t opposition trom both the Dutch Government and tho 
I . ; . ·: : •· . 
Government ot the Republic.39 
The Linggadjati Agreement (al;~ kn~ as t~8 Cheribon 
I ' • • '- ., I '• ' 
' • .I. • ~ •' • , 
AgreetnGnt) provideda . ' 
1. 'l'ho.t the ?letherlands Government recognize th9 
Republic as the~ facto authority 1n Java and SumatraJ40 
37w err, .21?. ill•, pp. 39-43. 
3EL . 
-.Kah!n, .21?. ill•, p , 206. 
39nrook1ngs Institution, .22• ~., p. 361. 
40see Soebandrio, "De Facto Status at L1nggadjat1," Far Eaate?'ll Survey, Vol. XVII, February 11, 1948, p. 29. Dr. Soebandrlo discusses tho implications ot de facto 
recognition and its effect on the interim status or the Republic. 
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. . 2• That the Netherlands and Republican Governments cooperate toward the setting up of a sovereign democratic federal state, tho United States or Indonesia, to 
consist ot three states, the Republic or Indonesia, . embracing Java and Sumatra, the atate·or Borneo, end the Great East~rn StateJ 
3 • That tho Netherlands and Republican Government cooperate toward the forzmt1on ot the Netherlands- Indones1an Union, to consist of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands--including the Netherlands, Surinam, and Curacao--and the u.s.1., which Union would have as 1ta head the Queen of the NetherlandaJ · 
. .. 
4. That the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the u.s.1. be tormed not later than January l, 1949, and < 
that the Union aet up its own ageno1es tor the regulation 
ot imtters or common interoat to tho member states,· · spec1t1oally foreign attaira; ·defense, and certain 1'1nanc1a~ and economic po11c1esJ 
5. Finally-, 1 the Agreement provided tor a mutual reduction in troop strength and a gradual evacuation 
ot Dutch troops trom RepublieAn areas as quickly as possible consistent with the maintenance of law and 
order, and for th• recognition by the Republic ot all claims by 1'ore1gn nationals !'or the restitution and · 
ma1ntenanc& of the1r.r1ghts41nd properties within areas controlled by the republio. · 
) . ~ .. ···The Agreement embodied two mjor detects which were 
~ . the cause or the rap14 break-down or Dutch-Indonesian rela- 
tions during the pertod between· 'the co~clusion ot negotiations 
in Uovamber, 1946, ·and the final ratification or the Agreement 
on 25 March 1947. The t1rat 01' these la1 in tho tact that 
the Agreement referred continually to 'cooperat16n between 
the two parties. Untortwi.ately, there were strong !'actions 
on both aides that were not ready for such cooperation. 
Readiness tor cooperation was lacking because of a mutual 
distrust in the sincerity and trustworthiness of the other. 
•~olt, .2:2• e1t., pp. 43-44. The complete English text or the L~ggadjatl Agreement may be found on page 175 ot this book. 
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In the second place, tho Agreement called tor a federal 
United States ot Indonesia which was to be composed ot 
three semi-autonomous states. This carried the implication 
ot an equality ot areaa··which has 'not been, is not, and 
never will be a taot.42 · 
Even at the time of the signing.~~ .the Agreement, 
both or the parties openly placed different interpretations 
upon the terms "cooperation" and "federal". For the Dutch, . . . : .. 
i 
coopsration meant continued leadership and sole resp~1b111ty 
for tho tornnt1on or the United States ot Indonesia, while 
the Indonesians took it to iman joint responsibility and 
. . . 
consultation in the formation ot the proposed federation. 
'· 
A similar d1tterence existed in the interpretation or the 
term "federal". The Netherlands held that it meant equal 
states cooper~t1ng.w1th the\Metherlands, while the Republic 
~ . ·~ ~ . 
maintained that a federal United States of Indonesia would 
not deny the Republio'ita po11t1on ot superiority among.the 
ialands,·based upon its superior political and economic 
wealth and its maturity.4~ In view of the exiatenoe ot such 
a situation, it 1a not d1tt1cult to ••e wh7 the relations 
ot·the Republic and the N$therlanda·aurtered a rapid 
deterioration in the months immediately following the torma.l 
aigriing ot the L1nggadjat1·Agreenent. 
42Ib1d~·, PP• 44-45. 
43Ib1d. P• 46. _, 
•• 
CHAPTER III 
L!NGGADJATI TO RENVILLE 
With the aig?ling ot the L1nggadjat1 Agreement on 
25 March 1947, optimism pervaded tha atmosphere in Batavia. 
, . , ' . 
This outlook waa, however, doomed to a short-lived existence. 
During the two months which followed the signing ot the 
Agreement alleged violations and breaches or the "spirit 
. . . or L1nggadjat1" increased 1n n'limber, although both the 
Netherlands Government and the Republic continued to pay 
lip service to the ·,Agreement.l · ~ 
• 1 ... ~ ' 'I oi I t Failure 2t_ Negotiations Following L1nggadjat1 
' . . . ; \, 
As not8d 1n the preceding chapter, the L1nggadjat1 
Agreement lett mny problems unsolved •. Among. the more 
important ot these were_(l) the question or the power to be 
exercised b7 the Crown as head of the Netherlands-Indonesian 
Union, and (2) .the controversy.between the Republican and 
non-Republican Indonesians. New diaputee arose concerning 
tho trade and commerce restr1ot1ona imposed on Indonesia by 
the Dutch and tho.presence of Dutch troops on Republican 
terr1tory.2 The situation was .t'urther aggravated bJ Dutch 
lwolt, .21?• ill•i P• 106. , . ·• 
2Brook1nga Institution,~·£..!!., P• 361. 
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support or the movement toward autonomy in East Indonesia 
and Borneo, and by the 1ncraaaed program ot foreign relations 
on the part ot the Republic. The Indonesians, or course, 
considered any step toward the establishment of an autonomous 
East Indonesia or Borneo as a direct violation ot the 
L1nggadjat1 Agreement; the Dutch considered the increased 
foreign relations or the Republic as evidence that the 
RepUblio did not intend to live up to its commitments under 
the L1nggadjat1 Agreement.. ·In addition to these issues, 
numorous violations ot the cease-tire truce agreement or 
14 October·l946 took place and, tollowing Linggadjat1, a 
number or "plots" wero discovered which, according to Dutch 
allegations, involved Republican leaders. These "plots" 
were supposed to have.been·des1gned tor the purpose of 
creating disorder and instigating aabotag$ in Eaat Indonesia.3 
' Failure to rGcono11e these d1.tferences reaul ted in 
a.complote·impasse. After the Republican cabinet had 
rejected an agreement. which had been initiated by both 
partiea, calling tor the establishment or a joint police 
force, tension 1ncreaae.d and v1as nnrked by the burning of 
brid~ea and other struotures by tho Republ1cana.4 
In the course of negotiations following the a1gri1ng 
ot the L1nggadjat1 Agreeimnt, Mr. Sja.hrir, realizing that 
.the Dutch were quite prepared to go to war 1.r their domo.nds 
were not accepted, agreed to a number ot major concessions. 
3wol.f, .2.2• c1ti, pp. 106-114. 
4Brook1nga Ins ti tu ti on, .21?. ill• , p • 361. 
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The more important ot these concessions included (l) acceptance 
ot a Dutch-dominated interim governmnt. (2) recognition ot 
the ,S.! Jure position of the Crown's representatives in such 
a government, and (3) aoquiesce~e 1n the control ot Indonesian 
foreign relations b7·the Netherlands Government during the 
interim period, The 1mmana1ty of these concessions operated 
to weaken Sjahrir•a political support in the Republic. The 
' internal situation grew steadily worse until, on 27 June, 
Sjahrir notified Sukarno ot his resignation as Prime 
1iln1ater,5 On 3 July- a new cabinet was formed with r.tr. Amir 
Sjar1.tudd.1n as Prime Minister. This new cabinet went even 
further in its concessions to Dutch demanda than had Sjahrir, 
but the Dutch were not placated. They- continued to demand 
the establ!ahment of an Indoneaian police torce which would 
be jointly manned and controlled and which would operate 
' inside ot the Republic. Thi' demand waa rejected bf 
Sjar1tudd1n and the rest·o.t the Republican leadera.6 
On 18 July- discussions were broken ott and the 
already heated atmosphere approached the point ot combustion. 
On 21 July-, at the recciDmende.t1on ot van Mook, Dutch troops ... 
moved to launch an all-out attack designed to destror the. 
Republic.~ The Dutch "police action•• was also a1med at 
securing possession ot the connnarciallr moat prot1table 
regions nt Indonesia, whose posaeiaion and control the 
5Kah1n, .21?• ~.,PP• 207-208. 
6 . ~.. pp. 209-211. 
7. . ' 
Wolf, .21!• ill•, P• 126. 
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Netherlands had not been able to obtain through the 
negotiations which had produced the Linggadjat1 Agreement. 
The fact that Dutch economic resources were verr low while 
their mi11tar7 strength was at a peak was an important 
consideration in the Dutch decision to resort to a "police 
act1on.n8,, .. \ . .... '. 
J, .. 
. . : .In instituting military action ths Dutch or1g1nall;r 
maintained that, by. t!:iftir action, the7 wero not abandoning 
the L1nggadjat1 Agreement. The so-called "police action" 
was, according to the Netherlands Government, ot a temporar;r 
nature rendered neoessary by the inability_ ot the Republic 
to maintain law and order.· Further, the Dutch maintained 
that Republican activity, "eapeciall1 the holding or Dutch 
hostagea,.had not been regulated under·the L1nggadjat1 
Agreement and that the arbitration provision ot that 
agreement therefore did not apply."9. From the beginning, . . ., however, a divergence or opinion was apparent.· On 21 July, 
in a memorandum to the Republican Governmont, Dr. van Mook 
stated that the Netherlands Government had resumed its 
treedom ot action and no ~onger considered itself bound by . . .. . . . the L1nggadjat1 Agreement. On 26 August van Mook recognized 
East Borneo as a new "autonomous" state and prospective 
. 8F. Kennedy, "Truce:· in Indonesia," !.!.!:, Eastern Survez, Vol. XVII, March 24, 1948, P• 65. See c. M. Morrell, '"fndonea1an Survey," !h2. Asiatic, Review, ver., XLIV, April, 
1948, pp• 206•212 •. Mr, .Morrell diSQU3S8S the signing of the L1nggadjat1 Agreement and then defends the Dutch "police action" ot July, 1947. 
9Brook1ngs Institution, .22• .21!•• · p. ~61. 
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member or the United States or Indonesia. Dr. van Mook 
also expressed the "hope" that action ot a similar nature 
might take place in West and East Java, the Palembang area 
in South Sumatra, and the Medan area or the northeast coast 
ot Sumatra. The 1mpl1cat1ons or.such a statement were quite 
clear in light or the tact that these territories were 
recognized as being under the .2,! taoto jur1ad1ct1on ot the 
Republican Government under the L1nggadjat1 AgreemGnt.10 
': · In general the Dutch advance was very rapid and th11 
progress.enabled them to capture large stocks ot export 
goods •. Moat or the3e goods hnd been stockpiled in the 
Republ1o·because ct. the Dutch blockade which had been 
imposed upon the islands shortly after the Japanese 
surrender. B7 capturing the export goods the.Dutch were 
able to attain one ot their mor~ important aeoondar7 object- 
1vea, which was to secure export1 gooda 1n order to help 
relieve the economic situation in the Netherlands.11 
~ubm1as1on !£? Jm! Seourity Council . 
• ! 
By letters dated 30 Jul11947 the acting representative 
or Australia and the permanent liaaon officer ot the Govern- 
ment ot India brought. to the attention ot the Seour1 ty Council 
the renewal or host111t1ea in Indonea1a.12 
10wolf 
I .2J? • ill• I p • 130 • 
llKahin, .21?• £!!., P• 214. 
12seour1tt 
Council, 0ff1e1al Records, Second Year, Supplement Number 16, Annex 4o, p. 149, and Annex 41, P• 150. 
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The Australian communication stated, first, that hoat111t1ea 
were in progress in Java and Sumatra between the armed 
forces ot the Netherlands and the Republic ot Indonesia, and, 
•eoond, that his Government considered these host111tie1 to 
be a breach of.the.peace ·under Article 39 ot the Charterf 
he urged the~Council to take imnediate action to restore 
interna t1onal peace and secur1 ty. ·· The oommun1oa t1on t"urther 
proposed that.the Council order both partiea:to cease 
host111t1es immediately and to 1nat1tute arbitration under 
Article 17 ot the Linggadjat1 Agreement. The letter concluded 
with a request that.a imeting or the Securit1 Council be 
called immediately to consider this commun1cat1on.13 
. . ' . 
.~. . : ... The communication from the Indian Government al•o . drew the Council'• attention to the Indo.n~sian s1~uat1on, 
under Article 35 ot the Charter; the Indian Government was 
. ' ~ . , ·. . . . . . 
or the opinion t.hat the situation constituted a danger to . . ' . -. 
the maintenance ot international pea~e.and s.ec~1ty aa 
detined in Article 34 or the Charter, and it therefore 
requested the _Council to take the.meaau~ea,neoesaary.to 
bring the crisis to ml end. In drawing the Council's 
· attention to the Indonesian s1 tuation, the Indian Government 
noted that the Dutch torcea had attackad the Indonea1an 
people without warning "at a time when ~.delegation ot the 
Indonesian Republican Government.was aotuall1 at Batavia tor 
. ~ . . 
negotiations with the Du~ch authorities on the implementation 
ot the. Lin~adjat1 Agreemont.14 . ' 
13~ •• Annex 40, pp. 149-150, 
14rb1d., Annex 41, p. 150. 
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· Following the submission of the Indonesian question 
to the Security Council, that body considered the question 
at length tor several meetings. In general, there were 
three problems which received the greatest amount or attention: 
(l) the question or the legal status ot the Republic ot 
Indonesia, (2) the question ot the method and machinery to 
be used to bring about a ceiaation or ho.st111t1es, and 
(3) the question ot the competence ot the Security Council 
to deal with the Indonesian question. 
171at Meeting,· 31 Jul:r 1947 ·· 
The Indonesian question waa brought up tor debate 
at the l7lat meeting of the Seourit7 Council which was held 
... J ' ; .. '· • } ' .. ' . . .>. >' { ' ' : ' ' • ' • s . • 
on 31 Jul7 194~. Upon t~e invi tat1on or ~he Pre~ident_. the 
·'. . • i-, • '· 
representatives or the Netherlands.and India were invited 
' I ' • ' " ' " ' ' •: . , .~ ' ' ' •; 1- !_'; • t -,_ .... 1' \. f ; • ' • ~ ' ., 
o.s.s.R. r~1aed the question o~ _e~tending an invitation to 
' • •- 4 • • 
taking their places at the Council table, Mr. GroL'lY'kO ot the 
' ) ' • ' I ~ '. ' 
to take part in the d.1aoua11ons •. Upon theae two representatives 
,> 'r . ' . I ' ' 
participate to the ~overnment or the ~epublio. Mr. van Klettena 
objected on tha grounds that the admiaaion or Republican ...... ; .·. '. . ·' ·.. . ' 
repr~aontative~ wou~d, in ettect, prejudge the whole question 
... 
before the Couno11-·the question ot the logal status of the 
~o~e~nt ot t~e Republi.o ot Indoneaia.15 
Colonel Hodgson, ~he Australian representative, 
stated that, in ,view or the fact that~ facto recognition 
•• 
15seourit~ Co~c11~ Official Records, Second Year, Number 67 (17lat f~eting, 31July1947), PP• 1516-1619. 
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had been extended to the Republic end aince the L1nggadjat1 
Agreement called for the President or the International Court 
ot Justice (a judicial body.before which only state• may be 
a part~ to a case) to nominate the chairman of ~A arbitration . ,,. 
body, Indonesia was a state in international law-. Mr. Hodgson 
then aubm1tted a dra.t't reaolution which called tor an 
. . 
immediate oe11ation or host111t1ea and tor aettlement ot - . 
the ._dispute by_arb1trat1on under the proviaiona or the 
L1nggadjat1 Agreement.16. The Chinese representative .. . •' . ... .. . 
propoaed an amendlmnt to the Australian resolution adding 
"other peaceful meansn.to arbitration.as a means ot settle- . - . ' . . .. ,,· ' ~ 
ment •. The,Auatral1an delegation accepted the amendment.17 
/ With the d1acuaa1on centering around the legal 
atatua or Indonea1a and whether an 1nv1tat1on to participate 
in the d1souas1ons should be extend~d to that body, the . . . ... . .. . . . . ,,, . .. .. . 
Netherlands representative reiterated· hta Government'• 
• I 
poa1t1on that a legal state or war did not exiat'in Indonesia. 
The Dutch ·delegate maintai~ed that th~ ·disturbance was · . 
caused by lawless bands of natives w~o were not controlled 
b7 the Republican Government beoause 'that Government waa 
corrupt and consequently unable to secure obedience trom ' ( ~ . 
• • t • l . 
those under it•~ facto authority. lYr. van Kletfen1 
concluded by po1nt1ng.out that co~s1derat1on. or the matter 
by the Secur1t7 Council might upset negotiationa between the 
.. 
l6Ib1d., pp. 1623-1626. 
17Ib1d., PP• 1639~1648. 
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Netherlands and·the Republtc.18 
At the close of the· m3et1ng,· Mr. Johnaon of the 
United States delegation in.formed the Council that hia 
Government, being ver1 much concerned with the existing 
a1tuat1on 1n Indonea1a, ·had ottered the· parties the use ot 
!ta good otticea.19 'In general, SJria, Colombia, and China 
supported the Australian.resolution.· The French delegation 
felt it would be dangerous·to adopt a resolution without 
further information and debate.on.tho 1ubstanoe of the 
question. The Soviet and Indian delegations favored an 
immediate· decision in regard to cesaation of host111t1ea, 
but the7 telt that the rnatter ot arbitration needed further 
atud1.20 : 
l72nd ~ 173rd Meet1nes, 1 Aufi;ust 1947 
At the 172nd tmet1ng on_l.August tho representative 
or thB United States, atter pointing out that the legal 
ques~1ona relating to.the_ atatua: ot the Republic ?Ould be 
aettled later, aubmitted an amendment to the Australian 
' - '. 
reaolutionJ this amendment called for a ce1sation ot host111t1ea . . . ) . : . . ' 
and the settlement of the dispute by arbitration or other 
. . ... ' ' 
peaceful Jneans. Mr. Johnson stated that, since the amendment 
I . ,:. • • 
made no mention or an1 article or the Charter and contained 
. lSibid., PP• 1639-1648. 
19Ib1d., P• 1648. 
20united Nations Yearbook, 1947-48, P• 365. 
• • 
56 
no commitment regarding Netherlands' aovere1gnty over the 
region,,, the amondimnt would leave the question ot sovereignty 
to be aettled at a later date and hence would allow the 
part1ea to make uae ot the United States• otter ot good 
offices which, earlier 1n the day's d1acuss1on, the Nether- 
land•' delegate had accepted on behalt ot his Government~21 
Following submission ot the·United States amendment, 
Mr. Oromrko, atter discussing the~ taoto recognition 
extended to the Republic by the L1nggadjat1 Agreemont and· 
the dangers inherent in negot1at1ona conducted between 
occupying a.nd·occupied countries, submitted an addition 
to the Australian re1olution providing for the immediate 
Withdrawal ot the troops ct both,aidea to the poa1t1onl.Wh1ch 
the7·had held prior to the,beg1nning.ot mil1tar,. operationa.22 
On the· afternoon ot 1 Augu.at, .at the 173rd meeting 
ot the Council, Mr. Parodi ot the French.delegation, attar: 
atat1ng that he did not teel the SecuritT Couno11 to be 
competent to deal with the Indonesian que1tion, introduced 
a reaolut1on'wh1ch (1) reserved entirely the question ot 
the Council'• competence, and (2) called upon the parties 
concerned .. to bring hoat111t1e1 to an end.23 Mr. Lange ot 
Poland suggested that to the United State1 amendment there 
ahould be added the phraae "and keep the Securit7 Council 
21secur1ty Cou~oil, Official Rec~rds, Second Yea;, 
Number 68 (l72nd and l73rd Jleetinga), l August 1947, pp. 
1655-1659.' 
22Ib1d., PP• 1659-1665. 
23~•• PP• 1676-1678. 
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informed ot the progrea1 • ot aettlemnt."24 The United 
States representative informed the Council that he wa1 
willing to incorporate the French amendment concerning the 
competence ot the Council into his own proposai.25 
The Council voted upon the proposal, paragraph by 
paragraph. The preamble ("Noting with concern the host111t1ea 
in progress be_tween the arn'_l9d force• ot the Netherlands and 
ot the Republic or Indonesia •••• ")was adopted by a vote ot 
7 to 0 with 4 abstentions. The second part ot the preamble, 
•hich embodied the Prench suggestion concerning the competence 
or the Council, was rejected by a vote ot 5 to 0 with 6 
- abatentiona. The remaining three paragraphs, which called 
tor (1) cessation ot host111t1ea,-(2) keeping the Security 
Col1nc1i i~ormd ~r pi-og~e~.,-. and-· (3) settlement ot the 
'. \ ;· dispute by arbitration or other peaceful means, 'were all 
. , -'. . 
adopted.by identical vote• ot 8 in ravor, none oppoaed, and 
3 abatent1~n• (Belgium, France~ United Kingdom).26 
The Council next acted upon th& Soviet resolution 
- . 
calling tor th~ 1mmad.1ate withdrawal ot troops~ Mr. van 
l . . ~ Kletrens of the Netherlands cautioned the Council that, 
ah0uld this re•olut1on be adopted, "terrible acts ot 
l .. ~ 
:retaliation" against "a great number of people belonging to 
, • -' ~ ' ~ - Cr '- '• I ( '. ' • ' 
various racea" would tollow the proposed withdrawal ot Dutch 
' ~ .. .. . . 
troopa from the areaa which they had occupied 1ince 21 Jul1. 
~4Ib1d.~ P• 1686. 
2sib1d~ P• 1ea1. _, 
26Ib!d~, PP• 1699-1703. 
• • 
Mr. Johnson ot the United Statei•was ot'a •1m11ar opinion; 
he maintained that chaos and disorder would follow the 
withdrawal ot the Dutch civil 'adm1n1strat1on.27 Following 
the veey br1et debate; the u.s.s.R. resolution was rejected 
by a vote or·2 to none, with 9 abstentiona.28 
Reaction '.Q! !h! Disputants ·!2 ,!!!! Cease-Fire Order 
By a letter dated 3 August 1947, tho Netherlands 
Government informed the Preaident ot the Security Council 
that, while it, the Netherlands, tmintained ita attitude in ... ' ., . 
regard to th> jurisdiction or the Council, the Lieutenant- . . . 
Governor.aeneral had been instructed to get in contact the 
• ~ ~ ~ : ! ~ "\ .... 
authorit1ea or the Republic tor the purpose ot reaching an 
. . . ~. . . (' . .. . . - ... '\. : . . ... : . ;. ' . 
agreement concerning a oeasat1on ot host11it1ea. A cable 
. ' • - ' •. ~ . ;. . ~-.,- l ... ~- ', ~-. . . .. ·..... ~ · .•. ·• ~ \·· 
trom the Deputy Prime Miniater ot Indone11a, Mr. Gani, did 
... • ' -.' .. ' '. '· • > • • • . ' ~ • 
not indicate what attitude ar aot~on would be taken by ~e 
.. 
Republic; the Primo r41n1ater had. Just b~en re~eaaed trom a 
concentration camp and, in addition,. d1tt1cult1ea in trana- 
m1aa1on had delayed h1• receipt of the telegram concerning 
United Natio~s action in regar~ to ceaaat1on or hoatilitiea.29 
The attitude or the Republican Government waa trans- . . . . 
mltted to the President ot the Security Council by means ot 
a cablegram dated 6 August 1947. This commun1cat1on contained 
2'1Ib1d _., PP• 1704-1705. 
28Ib1d., P• 1710. 
· 29secur1 tz C ouno 1 l, Otf 1o1 al ·Records, Second Year 
1 Humber 69 (174th .i1Ioetlng), 4 August 1947, PP• 1716-1717. 
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tho tollow1ng prov1a1onsi (1) 1n compliance with the Council'• 
reaolut1on or 1 August, Indonesian armed forces would cease 
hoat111t1ea at 2400 houri, .Indonea1an standard time, on 
Monday 4 AugustJ (2) the Netherlanda' delay in the tran1- 
mias!on or the Security Council resolution.to the Republic 
was noted and the Council was a1ked to consider the t'aot ·: 
that serious teehn1cal d1t"t1cult1es, caused b1 Dutch •act• 
ot aggression", had to be overcome in executing the ceaae- 
t1roJ (3) ~he Republic_ pointed out thnt, in contrast to the 
t1rat cease-tire issued in connection with tho truce or 14 
Ootober 1946,· no definite l.1ne ot demarcation could be 
trac~d; (4) t0he Government of the Republic expressed grave 
concern' 'over the tact that unle11 the eeaae-t"ire were "to be 
-~ ~ . , . . aupeM1aed by a third party, ·there would be no guarantee ·- 
that auch ari order 'would not be unil~terally violated by the 
\ • I • ' • •. . ' 
Dutch torceaJ (5) the ce11at1on ot hoat111t1ee ahould apply 
to all klnds or action directed b7 the Dutch .military and 
c1v11 ~uthoritiel' agai~t the civilian population} and 
(6) a cea1aticin ot host1litlea· should be tollowed by a 
Withdrawal ot Dutch arnsd torcea to the demarcation linea 
t1.xed bJ both sides on 14 October 1946.30 
The Government ot the Republic, by a cablegram dated 
7 August 1947, not1t1ed the United States Goveniment that it 
was tull7 prepared to submit to the deciaion or th& Secur1t1 
Council, wh1ch.deo1e1on recommended arbitration as the pr1:ms.rJ 
30secur1t;t Council, Ottic1al Records, Second Year, Number 72 (l78th Meeting), 7 August 1947, footnote on page1 1941-1842. 
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meana or settling the dispute. The Republic alao accepted 
the United States otter or good offices and requested that 
Government to use its influence to secure the immediate 
dispatch ot:an 1nternat1onal arbitration commission to 
Indone11a. 'Mr• Senor India put the Indones1an·auggeat1on 
regarding an 1nternat1onal arbitration comm11s1on betore the 
Security Council at !ta 170th.meet1ng on 7 Augu2t 1947.31 
178th Meeting, 7 Au~st 1947 
Following Mr. Sen•a speech in which he presented the 
Indone11an requeat, Mr, van 1Uerren1.once again prese~ted to 
the Council the reasons for the Dutch "police act1onn. In 
' I• 4 • 
. . general these reasons were (1) that the Re!'11.blto wa1 still 
. . ' •, . . .. ' .. ,, . .. . \ . . .. . ' ~,, '· 
holding hostages contral'J' to the L1nggadJat1 AgreementJ 
' ' ' ~ . . .. . .·. . . :; . . . . . .. , ',', ~. ' ~ '· .. .. : . ' . . ' . ' . 
(2) that the territories held by the Dutch had had their 
' ' I • ·\~ • ~ " I .·' ',• 
·aupply or toodsturta cut ott, also contrary to the AgreementJ 
. , ... . . . . ,.. 
and (3) that host111t1ea had not ceaaed in accordance with 
the proYiaions· ot LinggadJat1.~2 
' .... 
lAOth and 1Blst Meet1nva, 12 A~eust 1947 
The Indonesian question'was not brought up tor 
d1acues1on again until 12 August, When Colonel Hodgson or 
.the Australian delegation, noting the United States .ofter ot 
good ott1cea, atated that h1a Govemment had ottered to join 
31Ib1d., p. 1847 end footnote. 
32Ib1d., p. 1848. 
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the United States aa mediatora and arb1tratora.1n the dispute, 
and, ·further, that th11 otter had been accepted by the , 
Government ot.the Republ1o. The Australian representative 
then· aubm1 tted a dratt ·resolution tor· cona1derat1on b7 the 
Council. . Thia resolution called tor the estab11•hment or.· 
a comm1111on whose dut7 it would be to report to the Security 
Council "on the a1tuation in Indone1ia following the resolution 
which the Council had adopted on 1August1947."33 In- 
propo11ng auch a commiasion, Colonel Hodgson aa1d that hi• 
re1olution·deliberatel7 rerralned trom naming the represent&• 
t1Yes who would compo1e.the membership ot the comm11s1on 
because he felt 1t would be better if .. the members were 
appointed b7 the Couno1l·once the partiea had begun 
negot1at1ona•~":Iniregard to the atatua ot the·oomm1aa1on· 
membera, the Auatra11an·delegat1on·relt that auch member• 
aa would be appointed b7' the Co'1no11 should be con11dered 
aa agents or the Council who would aot a1 observera·and- 
help atab111ze the general 11tuat1on until negotiations were 
under way.' Aa.agenta or the Council, the repreaentat1vea 
would report directly to that bod7 and thua enable 1t to 
have access to the true tacta.34· The remainder or the l8l1t 
meeting waa taken up by d1scu111on ot the Pol1ah representa- 
tive•a proposal'that the representatives ·or.the Republic or 
~3secur1ty Council,· Official Records, Second Year, Number '14 · (180th and l8lat lr!eetlnga J, 12 August 1947, · · 
PP• 1917-1918. The text or the Australian resolution ma7 be round in the footnotes .or these pages. . . . .·. 
. 34 . . . . . . " - . . . ... . - . ··- 
, .~. • • 
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Indonesia be invited to participate in the discussions. The 
President or the Council read a. letter trom ?.tr. SJahrir, the 
Indonea1an representat1ve1.1n which the Securit7 Council was 
advised that it an invitation to participate were extended to 
the Republic, that Government accepted in advance, tor purposes 
ot the dispute, the obligation• ot a member ot the.United 
Nations. 1-tr._van Klettens. opposed this suggestion on the 
grounds that, since the letter trom r.tr. SJ&.hrir olearl7 
indicated that the Republic baaed 1ta request on Article 32 
ot the Charter, the Republic had no legal grounds tor ma.king . 
. auch a request in view ot_the tact that 1t was not a sovereign 
and independent nation. After several repreaentat1vea 
expreaaed points ot Tiew, pro_and con, on the matter ot 
Indoneaian sovere1gnt7, .Mr •. Johnson ot the United States, . . ·. ·- . .. . 
while stating that_ h1• Government "eXpreaal7 .takes no . 
position" on the legal 1tatu1. or the.Republic, as1erted 
that the representative• of Indonesia should be invited. 
He then pointed out that such an 1nv1tat1on could be extended . . 
through rule 39 or the rulea or procedure it that rule were 
given a liberal'interpretation. ·Since, under Article 40, 
' ' 
all decisions are without prejudice to the legal rights ot 
the parties concerned, extending an 1nv1tat1on to I~doneaia 
Would be a matter or Simple justice and WOuld,1n no Way 
'· ' • .. • .t '" confer upon the Republlo.an7 international status to which 
it waa not 8.lready entitled.35 The President or the Council ,. •· .. - ··- ~ . 
closed debate ~n the_propoaed invitation to Indonaaia b7 •• 
35Ib1d., pp. 1918-1933. 
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a ta ting that such an invi ta ti on ·"would no t bind any s ta t·e 
to recognize the independence or aoveroignty ot the Indonesian 
Repuhl1cn but,· rather, "would be extended simply in connection 
with the work ot the Security Council."· The proposal was 
. . 
adopted b7 a vote ot 8 to 3. ·Although both France and Great 
Britain voted against the proposal, the President stated that 
thla matter was a procedui-al point and, therei"ore, declared 
the measure adopted.36 Mr. van Klet'tens tn~in raised the 
question ot inviting representatives ot East Indonesia and 
Borneo •. Several.of tha.Council member3 questioned whether 
the p'os1 tions ot East Indonesia and Borneo were tho aaln9 
' '• ' ' • ',. I ' as that of the Republic in· view ·ot the taot'that no fighting 
' . ' . 
waa taking place in these area·a. As the applica.tion or the 
Ph111pp1nea ·tO. partici,p~te ~1n.tb0 d11cu1s1ons was already 
b~tore the Council, no'actlo~ could0be :t~en on the Belgian 
suggestion that the question 'be put to:a vote.~7 
.. . . . 
l84th Meeting,· 14 · A.ugust '1947 
.The Philippine ~equeat ~aa acted upon at the 184th 
meeting which waa held on 14 August 1947 •. The queat1on or ... '· ' ' .. . 
~h1~1pp1ne part1c1pa~_1on: .•as put to: a vote ear11.1n the mee.ting 
~a th:ere was verr. little d1acus11on .on .the subject. The 
proposal was adopted b7 a .v~te or 9 to none with Poland and . 
the u.s.s.R. abstaining. F~llowing thB vote, General Romulo, 
36 . 
~·,. p. 1940. 
37Ib1d., PP• 1942-1943 •. 
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representative or the Philippines, wa1 invited to take a 
seat at the conference table.~8 
, . The .next item upon which the Council acted was the 
Belgian proposal to invite East Indonea1a end Borneo to 
participate 1n the work ot the Council •. Thia pro~oaal had 
, ' .. 
originated with Mr. van Klertena ot the Netherlands but was 
aupported by Belgium in view or the fact that the Nethorl~nde 
waa not, at that time,_a ~m'ber_.o:r the Council s . In general, 
~ose in favor or the propoaal ba~ed their attitude upon the 
assumption that extending an invitation to these territorie• . . . ' . \ 
would be the only equ1 table thing to do.. Colonel Hodgson 
ot Australia stated that his Oovernt!lent wanted to admit 
t~e representatives _or Ea~t _Ind~nesia an~ Borneo, but under 
rule 39 or the rule a or procedure and not under Article 32 
ot th.a Charter. The reason ror this attitude wa1 the tact 
that the Reptibl1c had been granted-2!, facto recognition by 
1even countries, including the Netherlands. the United 
. . 
Kingdom, Australia, and the.United States, whereas East 
Indoneaia and Borneo were recognized as possessing~ taoto 
• . . . f . 
status· only by the Netherlands. ·· The rest or the debate· on 
thia topic centered around the viawa concerning the appl1cab111t7 
- ot Article 32 or rule 39. .. lJr, Gromyko produced a telegram, 
dated 6 August, trom the Prime Minister.of the East Indoneaian 
Government to Ur. ·v_an Klettena in which Mr~ lie.dJamoeddin, the 
. . 
Prime Minister, intoned llr. van Kletfens that the East 
Indonesian Government "expreased 1 ts agreement with the decision • · 
39 . . 
Securitx Council, 0tf1o1al Record1, Second Year, 
Number 76 Cl83rd fllld l84th N.eetingaf, l4 August 1947, · pp. 1979-1980. 
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ot·the·Netherlands Government to initiate police action 
against those element• of the Republic which obstruct the 
execution ot the L1nggadjat1 Agreement." Mr. Grotny"ko 1tated 
that he broueht thia telegram to the attention ot the Council 
·"in order.that we m8.7 be clear'as to-whom the Netherlands 
Government reoommends u1 to 1nv1te'to the Seclll'ity Councll.•~9 
The Belgian proposal was rejected by a vote ot 4 1n tayor, 
none againat,-and · 7 abstent1ona. <iO .: The rem1ndel9 or the 
meeting waa devoted to a speech by Mr• Sja.hrir or Indonesia 
in"which he briefly,traced th$'h1storj or the development 
or· the nationalist movemnt in Indonesia, concentrating : 
particularly on the happenings 1lnce the landing ot Allied 
troops following the end ot World War II.41 
': .'. ' ;·. .. ·~ f' • " ' . -, .·, ~ ~. . ., . ., . . . ~ . 
185th Meet!ne;, 15 Aup;u•t 1947 
) . 
The following day, at the 1S5th7moet1ng~ Mr. van Kletrena 
answered Mr. 3jahr1r•a version ot tha history ot Indonesia. 
In the course ot hl1 1peech,·the Dutch representative atated 
that-the:Republio•e acceptance of;the'otter ot good ott"ice1 
made by the United Statea,waa so weighted with conditions 
and reservations· that it actually did not amount to an 
acceptance at all. 42 ' ;. •: r . I 
. · , ' .. : :59Ib1d., PP• 1901-1992. - Tbs text or the telegram 
trom the Eaat Indone11an Prime :M1n1ater may be round in the tootnote·on·page 1991.' · 
40Ib1d., P• 1~92. 
41Ibid~, PP• 1995-2003.' '.' I 
"'wnber 42secur1tn·counc11, Official Records, Second Year, 
u 77 (l85th eeting), 15 August I~47, pp. 2006-2014. 
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Following Mr. van Klettena• apeech, Uir. Katz•Such7.or 
Poland submitted an amendment to the Australian resolution 
which had been introduced at the l8l1t meeting. Wherea1 
the Australian resolution had called tor the creation ot a 
comm1aa1on whose onl1 dut7 would be to report to the 
Securit7 Council on the a1tuat1on 1n Indonesia, the Po11ah 
amondment provided that this comm1as1on should aot aa a 
mediator and·an arbitrator 1n the Indonesian d1aputa. 
Mr. Alitz...Such7 noted that; had the Securit7 Counail taken 
action on the Indonesian question 1n January, 1946, the 
problem would not have developed into the aerious situation 
with which the Council waa faced in August, 1947,43 ..... 
l87th Meeting, 19 August 1947 
•• • ' ..., '># - ~ • _, At the'l87th meeting itr. Gromyko, in d1acusa1ng the 
proposed commission, stated that the United States waa 
I ' ~·~ .~· r .. - , -, '; ~,' i =. 
at to-opting to force 1 ts good offices upon tho Indonesian .. . . 
Republic) in view or the 1'.aot that the Republic had requested_ 
,.,,·,. ~ ~ .. , ~.. .. ,. 
the Security Council to set up its own commission tor 
arbitration and mediation, t~ Soviet delegate tm1nta1ned 
' that insistence by the Unit~d States upon use ot its good 
offices indicated a lack or re1pect not only tor the 
Indonesian Government and the Indonesian people, but e.la;o 
tor the ~ecur1t1 Council •.. Mr. 'arolllJ'ko suggested that the 
. 43Ib1d~, PP• 20l4•2017. The text or the Polish •• 
amendment may be found in Securiti Council, 0tf1o1al Records, 
Second Year, Number 79 (l87th and 188th Meetings), !9 . 
August 1947 in a tootnote on page·2osa •. · 
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insistence ot the United States was baaed, at leaat_part1al17, 
upon her large economic interest in Indonesia. The Russian 
"' . ; - .. ... ... 
representative concluded by expressing the hope that the 
' - .. ·. ~~ . 
Council would compl7 with the Republic's request for the . ~ . '" .. . ' . . . . . . 
creation of an arb1tral commia11on.44 
Following.Mr. Gromyko's speech, Mr. Ts1ang ot China 
ottered another amendrmnt to the Australian ernrt resolution. . . 
This amendment noted that the Netherlands intended to· 
requelt the career oon1ula stationed in Batavia to.submit 
joint reports on the situation in the Ropublio.and to propose 
to the Republic.the appointment or an impartial atate to 
j • • ' • 
enquire into the a1tuat1on and to supervise the cea1e-tireJ 
.~. J ~ each or the two d!aputanta were to designate a atate and 
these two states would· the.; aelec.t the state. whose ·dutiea 
were -defined bf the amendment. The ~n1eti.dment resolved' that 
the c~~ular b.ody at Batavia end ·the impartial state ahould 
be requested to torw'ard. copies ot: their reports to the . 
Secur1t1 Counc11.45 ·Colonel Hodgaon of.Australia maintained 
that the ettect or the Chinese ~mendment would be .to· take the 
. . ~ . matter outside ot the Secur1t7 Council since it referred 
only ·to 'reports b7 the consular body at Batavia and did not 
even 1ay to whom that bod7 was to reports in addition, the 
amendment said nothing about whether the consular bod7 waa 
to be appointed by the Security Council or was to be subject 
44 . : ' . Seo~r1tx Council, Offioiaj Records, Second Year, Number 79 (l87th and l88th Meetings , 19 August 1947, • • 
PP• 2058-2063 • . . 
•5Ibid•, P• 2067. Tho text ot the Chinese emendment ma7 be found in the footnote ot page 2067. 
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to that body's jurisdiction in any way,46 In adjourning 
' .... 
the meeting, the President ot the Council suggested that the 
representatives of Australia, China, and Poland meet toBather 
and try to tormul~te a compromise propoaai.47 
' . 192nd and l93rd Meetings, 22 AU:1?;Ust 1947 
On 22 August 1947 Mr._van Klettens, in the !irat 
speech of the da1, declared t~t anyone who voted in favor or 
the Australian resolution, even were.it to be modified by 
the Polish and Chineee.armndmontai would be implicitly . . ~ . . . ,. . ~ . 
atat!ng that the Council had jurisdiction in the dispute. 
In view ot this tact, according to th~. Ne~herl:an~s representa- 
tive, it the Council were to adopt the Australian resolution, 
an important.precedent would be set in regard to Security 
' . . . .... . .. 
Council intervention in matters ~it~in the dome.atlc jur1a- 
d1otion of sovereign States~ Mr •. ~an ~ettena, ot course, 
regarded the Indonesian question aa a matter or domestic 
.concern and he maintained that 1~ ~a~ "pure illusion to 
think that the Government. or the Re~~~\·~~ ~e;resenta anything 
but itself."48 
. Mr. ,Pillai or the Indian c!elegat.1~n spoke in support 
·or the Australian .draft resolution, subject ~o the Polish 
a'!Mndment. The Indian delegate (1) opposed the Chinese>.· 
46 rsre, , p • 2 072. 
47Ib1d., P• 2075. 
48seour1ty Council, Official necords, Second Year, Number 82 (192nd and i93rd Meetings), 22 August 19471 PP• 2144-2147. 
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amendment on the grounds that it virtually took the matter 
out of the Council's hands, (2) insisted that the troops ot 
both sides must return.to their original positions, and 
(3) considered undesirable the involvement or consular 
orr1c1a11 in ~est1ons or this kind, particularly in view or 
:the circumstances or the Indonesian situation. 49 The 
Colombian delegate, Mr. Lopez, .wa~ of the opinion that the 
Security Council should accept the respons1b111t1es which 
logically followed from its cease-tire orderJ the Council 
should first decide whethor to ask the parties to revert to 
their original military positions and, next, whether to 
appoint a commias1on or. to follow the Netherlands proposal 
regarding the selection ot an impartial state to uupervise 
the cease-tire.50 
On·the afternoon ot 22 August 1947 the first matter 
to be considered was a draft resolution presented by the 
representative ot Belgium. Thia resolution called tor 
extending an invitation to participate in the work ot the 
Council to the representatives or East Indonesia and Borneo. 
Though a similar proposal had been rejected at the l84th 
meeting, the President decided to put the new resolution to 
a vote because the rules ot procedure contained no speo1t1c 
provision prohibiting rejected resolutions being put to a· 
vote a second time. The Belgian proposal was rejected by a 
vote· ot ., in-favor~· none against, and 7 abstentions--the aame 
49Ibtd •• P• 2156. 
50Ib1d., P• 2160. 
•• 
. "10 
vote as was registered ~gains~ the enrlier.proposa1.5l 
. ' Tho Australian represontat1ve briefly reviewed the 
resolutions be.tore tho Council. Colonel liod.gson stated . 
that, 1n compl1anoe .w~th the requ~st or the President, he 
hsd.lmt with the reprasontativea from the Chinese e.nd . . . } . 
Polish delegations in an a~tempt to reach a compromise on. 
the .resolu.t1on. ~ubmitted by- Australia en d the amendments 
su~nlitted.theret~ by Ch~n~ ~d Po~and. The Chinese end 
Australian representatives came to an agroeroont whilo the 
• • • ~ • • • • z 
Polish reprosentat1ve mn1nta1nod one reservation 1n rego.rd 
to .the composition ot the colilll!1ss1on. The Austral1an- 
Ch1neso Joint resolution requested the Go·rnrnl'!len ta which. 
' ' • ' I . 
wore members or the Security Council and which hnd career 
. ... .... .. ' . ... ......... 
consuls in Batavia to,instruct tho1r consuls to prepare 
. ., ~ . . . . ; ·~ . 
Joint r~ports.on the situation in Indonesia following tho. 
. . . ... 
Security Council resolution or 1 August. Those reports were 
to cover.tho observance or the ceaae~t1re order and the 
conditions prevailing in areas under military- occupation 
and in areas .from which arned tore es 1nieht be w1 thdrawn by 
~greement between the parties. ,The resolution further 
requested the Nothorlanda Government and the Government of . ' . . ~ 
the Republic .t~ grant .to these consular ~epresentat1ves all 
tac111t1es necessary tor tho '. etfect1ve ful.t"illment ot their 
duty.52 
51tb1d., 
PP• 2170•2172 • 
. 52Ib1d., PP• 2172-2174. The text ot the joint Auatralian-Chlneae resolution may be found in the footnotes on page1 2173-2174. 
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Colonel Hodgson then referred to the second Australian 
resolution which dealt with a proposal ror arbitration. 
While this resolution was vecy similar to the Polish amendment 
to the original Australian resolution, the dit:t"erence laj ·_ .. 
in the :t"act that the Polish amendment called tor the appoint- 
ment or three arbitrators by the Security Council, while the 
Australian resolution envisio~ed the appointment of one 
arbitrator each by the Governments of.the Netherlands end . - . 
the Republic end by the Security Counc11.53 In.conclusion, . . 
the Aust.r~1an del~gate noted. the advance~e.nt b7 the United 
States of a resolution b7 which the Council 'llOuld resolve . 
to tender its good otticea to the parties in diapute. The 
American resolution also provided that, it the parties ao -· . 
requested, the Council would a1siat in the •ettlemant through 
' -. • • • -#. . 
a committee composed or three members ~.the Counc11J each, 
•• J • • • • 
of the parties _to the dispute would •elect one or the 
committee mambera and these two would then select the 
third.5,4 
Mr. Oro1t11ko opposed the. var1~us proposal• tor the 
creation ot an arbitration commission and the creation ot a 
consular commission on the grounds that (1) .the consular 
comm!aaion VDuld be biased in tavor ot the Netherlands 
because, or the five el1g1~le career ~onsuls 1n Batavia, three, 
the United Statea, the United Kingdom, and France, were 
53Ib1d., P• 2174. The text ot the Australian re•olution m~ be tound in the footnotes ot this page. 
' . 54Ib1d,, The text ot the United Stntea reaolution may be touiid'l'ii the footnotes on·page •. 2179. 
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tavorable·to,the colonial point of view, and (2) the propoaed 
comm1as1ona ot e.rb1trat1on would. put the solution ot the 
Indonesian problem into the hands or. one, two, or three 
nations rather than 1nto the hands of the Security Council 
as a whole.55 
l94th Meet1n~, 25 August 1947 
Mr. Sjahrir ot the Republic ot Indonesia, speaking 
. . . 
at the l94th meeting on 25 August 19471 noted that (1) the 
. . . ~ 
military 11tuation in tho Republic was dally growing worse . . 
. . . . . . . despite the l August cease-fire order, (2) the Council should 
. .. condemn aggression and should require the withdrawal ct 
- , ~ • 1, • • • . . . ' . ~ 
Netherlands troops to the positions which they occupied under 
. . 
.• 1' .,.. 
tho terms or the 14 October 1946 truce, and (3) the Republic 
. ' . . ~ \ waa willing to accept e.ny resolution or impartial arbitration, 
• ~ • • • • ~ • • • J • . ' 
provided that the Security Counc11'wouid riot be by•paased.56 
' ' ' . : .,, '.. 
The Belgian repre1entative, Mr. van Langenhove, 
. . . brought to thB attention or the Council a drart reaolut1on 
requesting the International Court o~ Justice to give an 
• '~ I advisory opinion on the question or the competence or the 
Security Council to de~l with th~ Indones1~ queatlon.57 
' . . .. , . ~ 
Mr. Gromyko then submitted an amendment to the joint Australian- 
Chinese resolution. Thia amendm8nt proposed the om1sa1on ot 
55 ' Ibid., PP• 2179-2183. - 56se~u.r1t~ Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 03 (194th Foet1ng), 25 August 1947, pp. 2190-2191. 
57Ib1d., p. 2193. The text or the Belgian resolution may be touiid"i"n t.bl footnote on thla page. 
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the paragraphs dealing with the establishment ot the consular 
comm1es1on and in·1ta place proposed.the creation of a 
commission wh1ch would be composed ot the states which 
were Members or the Secur1t7 Counc11J the dut7 of this ·, 
commission would be to supervise the:1mpleimntat1on ot the 
Council's l August resolution. ~The amendment was rejected 
by a French Teto, the vote being 7: in tavor, 2 aga~at . 
(Belgium, Franco), end 2 abatent1ons (China, United Kingdom).58 
Following the vote on the Soviet amendment, Mr. Katz- 
Suchy of Poland submitted an amendnent to the United States 
resolution end the Australian resolution which called tor 
, . . ~. the establishment or a commission consisting of eleven 
! ~ , 
members. ot th~ Seour1.ty Council whose duty it would be to 
act as imcllatora· end. arbitrators 1n the. indone~1~n dtspute.s9 
. ' 
<(I • ~ .. ;_'. "'. - • '. • • ' ' • 
by a vote of 4 in favor, 3 against, with 4 abstentions. 
. ' . ' .. The Polish omendment to the Australian resolution was rejected 
·. .. .· 
Immediately after the vote on the Polish amendment, the 
I . : •, ',. 
Auat.ral1an resolution was· put to a· vote. It. railed ot 
adoption, the vote being 3 in ravor, none against, and a 
abstentions. The tin.tl vote ot the· da1 was taken on the 
:. -. I : . • : . · · : .' ·1 i •' ·_ •. . · .., · 1 ~'. · ; · ; . United States draft. resolution calling tor the cr~ation or a 
,_ 1o f . 
Committee or Good Oftice1. Thia proposal was adopted by a 
:, ' ':, ,, ", ' ,_/ v- '• I 
vote ot 8 in tavor, none against, with 3 abstentiona.60 
58Ib1d., P• 2200. - -~9 ~., pp. 22~3"'.'~204. 
'.60Ibid";, P• 2209 •. • • 
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The d11cu1sion now turned to consideration or the 
Belg1an,propo1al to aak the International Court for an 
adviaorr opinion on the question or the Council's competence. 
Mr. Gromyko attacked the proposal as being designed to divert 
the attention ot the Securit1 Council and the United Nations 
trom the aubatance or the que1t1on and "to draw attention to 
' ··. .. . .. 
legal considerations or secondary importance which properly 
should never even have a~i~~n. n61 · 
l95th Meeting, 26August·1947 
Consideration of the Belgian proposal was continued 
at the 1S5th neeting which wa1 held on 26 August 1947. In · 
general, the opponent• ot the proposal epoke ot the tims 
whioh would probably be neceasary to.obtain an advi•ol"J" 
opinion trom the CourtJ this delay would ottaet any value 
which might be derived from such en opinion. When put to a 
vote, the Belgian reaolution waa not adoptedJ the vote on 
the zmaaure was 4 in tavor, 1 against, and 6 abata1n1ng.62 
The Polish reaolut1on, dated 25 August, reminding 
the Uetherlands and.Indone•ian Governments or tho Council's 
cease-tire order or l August and calling upon those Govern- 
nenta to adhere strictl7 to that resolution waa considered 
next. The d1souaa1on ot this proposal centered around ceaae- 
tire violation and whether the Republican Government was 
61 . . ' ' . 
Ibid., PP• 22~0~2211. 
62segur1tt Counoll, 0ttio1al Records, Second Year, Number B4 (l95th and 196th Meetinga), 26 August 1947, pp. 2214-2224. 
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actually capable or maintaining law and order in the area 
under its jurisdiction. At the cloae ·or this debate the - 
Poliah resolution was adopted by a vote or 10 to O with l ·: ' :· 
abstention.63 
Interim Report ss: !h! Consular Com.m1sa1on 
An interim report from .the consular repreaontativea . .. , . . 
at Batavia, dated 22 September 1947, was included on the 
agenda of the 205th m;,et1ng which was held on 29 September. . . . 
The Comm1as1on's interim report waa baaed upon visita by 
its members to eleven different Netherlands and Indonesian• . . . 
controlled areas in Java and Sumatra. The report.noted that 
• -, -, • .,• ) \' ' C•' 
IP 
August had been in the nature of.spearheads. and aomo fighting . - .. . ._ . .. . .. . . ,. 
the advancea ot Netherlands troops between 20 July and 4 . . . . ' '. , . . . . . . . ~ 
had occurred. While the main bod1ea or Republican troops . . ,,,. .. ' . • .. ,, 
retreated betore the Dutch advance, considerable numbers 
"remained between the spearheads 1~ 1ome areas end guerrillas 
·. 'J,/"·,/ 
rena1ned in all areaa." During and after the Dutch advances, . ... ; . 
the Indonasiana pursued a scorched-earth pol1c1: looting and 
. . \ . ' 
other disturbances also took place along with heavy loss ot 
' . . . ' 
lite, particularly &mong the Chinese, during thia period. 
On 29 August the ~etherlands. Ea.st. Indie_a Government announced 
its intention to acoompliah "complete restoration or law and 
order and the complete d1ao.rmo.ment and winding up ot all 
armed organizations~ which.opposed the author1t7 of the East 
•• 
6Zib1d.:. 
PP• 2224-2232 •. Tho .. te.xt ot the Poliah· resolution may be found in the tootnotea on pages 2224-2225. 
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Indies Government. The Dutch set the demarcation line tor 
the area in which they proposed to re-eatabl1ah law and order 
at th& point or their most advanced pos1t1ona. The Republic 
did not accept this 11ne or dermrcation and consequently 
considered Dutch patrol action along this line to be hostile 
action.· The result or this ai tuat1on waa9\ quite naturall7, 
a continuance or patrol clashes and an1p1ng 1n spite or the 
Council's cease-tire order ot 1· August. · The Comm1as1on 
further noted that the situation described above was not 
only the cause or the continued cont'lict, but also the major 
obstacle in the path of etfeot1ve 1mpleimntat1on or the 
cease-tire order. · The Commission reported that no practical 
interim meaaures had been discovered which would more 
effectively 1mplenent the 1 August resolution or reduce 
·casualitie•. The report concluded b7 stating that the 
Comm1as1on hoped to complete a written report on or about 
30 Septent>er.64 
By a letter dated 30 August the Netherle.nd:t representa- 
tive not1t1ed the Secretary-General that his Government's 
,• ; 
attitude concerning the competence .or.t~ Security Council 
. ~aa unchanged, but that the tendency of the Council's 
·resolutions ot 25 and 26 August was acceptabl$ and the 
• ~-·of • ' • • ~ ~ , t; . 
Netherlands Government would provide the career consuls at 
Batavia with the nece11ary tac111t1ea.65 
64secur1ty Council, Otf1o1al Records, Second Year, Number 91 
65secur1t1 Council, 0ft1c1al Records, Second Year, 
Number 92 (206th i1eet1ng), l October 1947, P• 2481. 
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Five da1s later the Netherlanda delegate notified the 
Secretary-General that hia Government had invited the Belgian 
Government to serve on the Committee or Good Offices and the .. 
invitation had been accepted.66. 
The Preaident or the Council was not1t1ed ot the 
aelection ot the other members ot the Committee b1 lettera 
dated.18 September. The Republic ot Indonea1a selected'the 
Government of Australia to serve as 1ta repreaentativeJ 
the representatives or Australia and Belgium jointl1 selected 
the United States to serve aa·the third member ot the· 
Committee •67. · 
.The Australian Government appointed Mr. Justice 
Kirby, a judge ot t.ne Australian Cormnonwealth Court or 
Conciliation and Arbitration, aa 1te representative on the 
Committee and the Government ot Belgium aeleoted tormer 
Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland.ea 
207tb Meeting,~ Ootober 1947 
Mr. Evatt ot Australia opened d1acuas1on at the 
~· ~October meeting or the Secur1t1 Council on the interim 
report ot the Consular Commission by noting the tact that the 
cease-tire was not be1n~ observed; in view ot the graT1ty or 
the situation, the Australian delegate submitted a resolution 
•• 68seeur1ti Council, Official Records, Second Year, Numbe~ 93 (2o7th 7eetlng),.3 October 1947, pp. 2483-2484 and footnotes. 
.,8 
. ' requesting'the Secretary-General "to act as convenor·or·the 
CoMmlttee.or Three.and arrange tor the organization or its 
work" and~ further, that the Committee be requested to proceed 
with its work."w1th.the utmost dlspatch".69 
. · Immediately followinc; Mr~'· Evatt'• speech, Mr.· Gromyko 
declared th8.t the interim report clearly 1nd1oated that th.8 
SecW.it~ Counc11's.decta1on waa being ignored. ·The Soviet 
delegation considered it to be'the SecU1'1ty Council'• duty 
to rectify thia situation end, accordingly, aubYnttted a 
re1oluti0n calling for the 'wt thdrawal or"· both Netherlands· 
and Indonosian troops to the.pos1t1ons'.wfl1ch they had occupied 
be tore· tba beginning ot · Dii.11 tary ·operations. r~. Gromyko 
subm1tted·th1a·resolut1on because he telt the Australian 
resolution to be ·1nsutr1cient ·;and useloaa in view ot the 
existing s1tuation~70 ' : : - · .. : · · · · · ~ 
.. Mr. van Klertens concluded t.f:v) 'day's apeeohes by 
presenting the Netherle.nda' reasons tor opposing the with- 
'I »: drawal of troopa. . ' The primary reasons were (1) the inadequac7 
and corruptneaa ot the Republican administration in areas 
I''· • , · •.• 
between the Dutch troope, and (2) the danger to hosteges and 
. ,,. .. \ . ! . . . . . . ' . ~ • 
the fear or reprisals in. a:t>ee.s. from which Dutch troops would .. 
be withdrawn. In the course or his speech Mr. van JQ.effena. 
alluded to a cablegram, dated 29 September, from Mr. A.G. 
'· 
Gani, Deput,-, Prime Minister, ot the Republic to the President . . ·. 
69Ib1d.1 P• 2488. The text of this resolu~ion ma.7 be found on page 2503. 
70rb1d., pp •. 2488-2491. The text ot the Soviet resolution may be found on page 2491. 
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ot the Security Council. Mr ... Gan1 atated that the Dutch 
advances amounted to penetration,,not occupation, and th~t 
auch pene~rat1on did not conter upon.the penetrators the 
right to regard~areas between their conv~rging lines a• 
occupied.territory., The Indonesian ott1c1al also.declared 
that the Netherlands was attempting to "divide and conquer" 
by "making preparations.tor tbe.eatabliahment.ot a puppet 
atate with other qu1al1nga, ••• wh1ch in tact )JJ!)ana a continued 
ettort. by_ the . Netherlands to a_trangle the ~epubl1c politic ally ••• " 
Mr. van Kletfens maintained.that .. this telegram preaented_a. 
distorted picture·and then proceeded with a description or 
the inadequacy ot Republican adm1n1atrat1on and evidence• . . ... ' 
ot lack ot good tai th on the. part of. the. Indonesian lea.dera. 71 
Before .. the meeting wa1 adjourned, a vote,. was. taken on the ... 
Australian r,eaolut~ons J. thia propoaal. waa ~dopted by a vote 
ot 9.in ta!or, none agatnat, with 2 absta1n1ng.72 
208th Meeting, 7 October 1947 
Diacuaaion or' the' interim report ot the Con1ular . 
Co~11aion was continued at the 208th DBeting.' ~Tr, Pillai .. 
ot I~d1a, the ~itiaf speaker ot the day, aupp'orted th~ 
.t • • ~ • 
Republican point .. ot view that the e1tabli1hment ot apearhead1 
did not constitute effective occupation. -- .. . . .. The Indian delegate . - 
pointed out that the Ne~herlanda ,Government.had 1et it• own 
71Ibid -·· cablegram may be 
72Ibtd.' 
PP• 2492-2502. The text or Mr, Gani'a round.in the footnote on page 2494. 
P• 2503. 
•• 
so 
demarcation line and had. evidently expected the Republic to 
accept th1a aa a!!.!! aocomp11. In regard to the alleged 
.. atrocities, Mr. Pillai auggeeted that very probably such 
accuaat1ona could be justifiably made against both s1~ea. 
. . . ~ ' '.,, 
In.view or the circumstances it was natural that the Republic 
1hould regard the Dutch attempt to restore law and order 
'behind the ·ao-calle·d "van Mook line" aa a continuation ot 
hoat111t1ea. Consequently, the Indian representative was ot 
the' opinion that the t1ghting 'probabl7 could not be •topped 
until .th~ armed ~orcoa of both aldea.were withdrawn to their 
ante-bellum posi tiona.'l3 
Mr. Palar or Indonesia apoke atronglJ in tavor or 
the withdrawal ot Dutch.troop• to the poa1t1ons which the1 
had held.under the truce ot 14October.1946. The Indonesian 
delegate maintained that the d1fticult1ea noted b7 the 
Consular Commiasion in !ta.report were all cauaed by the .. · 
presence ot Dutch troops in Republican terr1tor7. The 
Republic, while gratetul.to the Council tor the otter ot it• 
good ottices, wanted a guarantee that an7 solution reached~ 
would be binding upon both parties. In conclu11on, Mr. Palar 
noted, at length and with numerous examplea, 1naccurac1e1 in 
the speech given at the previous meeting by the Netherlands 
..... 
repreaentativ•. 74. · 
. . . ''ms~curi t~ Couno u. O.t'f1o1.al Records, Second Year, 
Number 94 (208th )~et1ng), 7October1947• pp. 2506-2509. 
-- 74Ib1d.,· PP• 2517-2523. 
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209tb Meeting, 9 October 1947 
Speaking at the 209th meeting on 9 October, ?4r. Auatin 
. . . . . ,. t 
ot the United States ~xpreased the opinion that the interim 
. . 
report of the Consular Comm!1s1on did not supply the Council 
.. t ; • ~ • .... ... • . ~ . .. .. with adequate information concerning the proposed withdrawal 
1 . , . ~ 
ot troops and the consequence1 or such an action. Consequentl7, 
. ,.. . 
the United State• delegation felt that the parties. to the ,.. . ~ . 
dispute should seek to conclude an agreement, with the aid 
' • '. ' • I .. or the Committee of Good Offices which waa about to commence . 
work.75 
: .. 
210th Meetin3, 11Ootober1947 
'.Colonel Hodg1on took issue with the United State•' 
point or Yiew at the next meeting. ·~ Tha representative or· 
Australia disagreed with~the opinion that no tacts existed 
which warranted withdrawal ot armed torcea b7 atat!ng that 
the existence of continued hoat111t1ea and the tact that . 
the Security Council order •a• not being obe1ed constituted 
auttic ient evidence upon which to base the . withdrawal. ot · 
troop1. Colonel Hodgson also opposed the Soviet re1olution 
becauae he telt that·1t was impractical since it did not 
·provide for a lose of contact between the armed torcea ot 
". - 
the two part1e~. lle ~hen aubd tted a ·proposal ·calling· upon .. · .·· .· .. 
the Netherlanda and the Republic to withdraw their armed 
. 75seour1tR·counc1l, Official Records, Second Year, 
Number.95 (209th eeting), 9Octob~r1947,·pp. 2526·2528. 
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torcea to a point at least t1ve kilometre• behind the 
posit1ona 'Which the7 had held prior to the ceaae-t1re 
order ot l AugUa t. 76 - · - \ . ~ 
Sir Alexander Cadogan ot the United Kingdom noted 
that it would be extremel7 d1tt1cult tor ·the Couno11 to 
ascertain the poa1t1on ot the troopa ot both aide• as ot 
l AuguatJ consequentl7, 1t 1D uld be extremel7 d1tt1cult ·· 
to 1mplemont the Australian roaolution •. With the purpose 
'• or remed71ng this situation in mind, the British delegate 
1ubmitted a dratt resolution stating that the first atep 
toward ensuring observance ot the cea1e•fire order should 
be the eat~b_l~1ah~e.nt_ ?~. _a proviai,~;~&:l . demrca tion line•. The 
resolution alao requested the Committee ot Good Offices to 
' i ' ' • ·,,:. • . J , .. ~ l ~- ........ : ~~, : ~. ~ \. ~· :. . . ~ 
make thia 1ta first object1Ye and to instruct the Consular 
J . • . • 1 • ~ ': • • )-# . ,. . \, . ~ ~: • . • • ·-. • . , .. - .. :. ) • • ~ _._ " . ~ 
Commission to make proposal• tor establishing such a line.77 
, 1 , I _ • -; • • 4 , • 1 : •. , , • , , • ~' 
Mr. de La Tournelle ot France went on record as 
being detinitel7 opposed to the Soviet resolution on the 
't., • • I 
grounds that the withdrawal or troopa might even extend the 
area or conflict. The French delegate felt that the 
Australian proposal wa1 not aui table because t.he_ troops in 
:··.. ·: 
question did not occup1 olearl1 detined and •table positions; 
- ' "'\ ~ . ,. . . 
France did, however, support the proposal ot the United . . ' 
Kingdom. 78 
· 76secur1t~ Council, Ott1c1al Reco~ds, Second Year, Number 96 (210th~et1ng), ll October 1947, pp. 2552-2555. 
The text ot the Australian resolution may be round on .. 
page 2555. 
· 77ll2.1Ji. ," pp. 2556-2558. The text ot t.h.9 British reaolut1on may be found on page 2558. 
78~., PP• 2559-2560. 
• • 
. The;.A.ustralian delegation felt that the United 
Kingdom resolution would be 1nettect1ve in getting the 
troopa to break contact whereas their own resolution was a 
positive attempt to secure thia objective. The Netherland• 
representative maintained that the Australian resolution 
was too simple to provide tor a practical solution to the 
problem~ preventing future violations or the cease-tire 
order, but he aupported the Br1 tish proposal as being baaed 
upon "pure common aense.•79 
2llth Meeting, 14 October 1947 
··On 14 October at the opening or the 2llth meeting, 
. ' ·. . the President or the Council, Sir Alexander Cadoean, drew the 
attention or that bod7 to a cablegram dated 11October1947 
trom the Consular Comm11sion. This communication contained 
a summary or the 1111 in points or the complete e onauler 
report. It pointed out, first, that cease-fire orders had 
been given but there was no confidence on the part of either 
part7 that the other aide would obe7 themJ no attempt had 
been made b7 either side to reach an agreement tor the 
purpoae of implementing them. Second, the Republican 
Goveniment had ordered its troopa "to remain in their 
poa1t1ons and ceaae host111t1e1J" the Netherlands East 
Indies Government had considered it necea1a17 to continue 
with the restoration ot law and order within the limit• ot 
the "van Mook" line. Third, the Dutch troops continued · •• 
79Ib1d _., 
84 
mopping-up operations in areas occupied by Republican troops 
which had been by-passed during rapid Dutch·advance; Indonea1&n: 
troops were ordered to defend themselves and "to oppose 
movements within Netherlands-held territory.~ Fourth, a 
considerable amount ot banditry, murder, and araon was 
1 t1 ll be 1ng e arr1ed on by irregular bands. . Flf th, the 
population suffered cona1derabl7:before the police action 
and scorched-earth pol1011 thi• au.tter1ng had been 1ntens1• 
tied during and atter the police action.· Sixth, adm1nia- 
trat1on arid cultivation waa being carried·on under emergenc7 
conditions in both areaar in the Net~rlands area tears of 
band1tJ"7 and or future Republ1can·repr1sala ex1ated,.wh1le 
1n the Republican area wide-spread ahortage1 caused bJ the 
cessation o~ normal export and import trade had become 
apparentJ the. rood •1tuat1on in the Republic waa good, but 
might deteriorate· in a tew months· time. · Seventh, the · 
1ntluent1al claas ot Indonea1ana,:wh1ch numbered not more 
than 5~ or the total populat1on,·all sought independence,. 
while not neceasar11J supporting the RepublicJ ~there ia 
little hatred ot the Netherlands, whose assistance in 
rUnning tha countr,- 11 recognized aa essent1a1.n80 
The reprosentat1vea of Poland end the U.S.S.R. both 
atreased the need ror 1nnm.diate Securit7 Council _action in 
view of the tact that the Dutch were continuing with their 
· ·· · · 80seour1tPo Council~ Ott'1c1al Rec.ords, Second Year, 
Number 97 (2llth~et1ng), 14 October 1947, pp. 2569-2570. 
The text or the Comm1as1onta cablegram mar be found in the footnotes of pagea 2570-2571. • • 
~mopping-up" operations wh11e the Republic had ordered 1ta 
troopa to remain in their positions and cease host111t1es.Sl 
Mr. El-Khouri ot the Syrian delegation, 1n d1scusa1ng 
tha proposals betore the Council, stated that he did not 
believe that the Consular Comm1aa1on would be able to.draw 
the·line or dennrcation proposed bJ the Dr1t1sh resolution 
I 
as 1 t would be a ver7 c.Urr1cult job and vo uld require: the 
aerv1cea ot experts. The Syrian delegate did not believe 
the Australian propoaal to be practical or likel7 to achieve 
good results becauae he did not think it correct to a1k 
troops which had not.advanced at all.to withdraw still 
farther. · ·.MJ'. El-Khouri considered the Soviet proposal to be . 
a practical re1olution,·11noe it was baaed on the line ot 
demarcation accepted by.both •idea.two or more years 
prev1ous17. ; In order to ott1et the Dutch· contention that· . 
withdrawal ot troops would lead .to repr1aals and retaliations, 
he submitted an amendment to the Huasian r••o1ut1on calling 
tor the release ot hostagea and the declaration ot a general 
amneaty in tavor ot persons guilt1 ot political crimea.82 .. 
213th Meeting, 22 October 1947 
At tho opening or the 213th imeting on 22 October 1947 
' _.j 
. the President stated th:it the complete report ot the consular 
~ ~ t 
Comm.1s~1on had.been receiv~d.83 Thia report went into great 
.. Sl . Ibid,, PP• 2572-2580. -. I • • 82 . 
~., PP• 2583-2585. 
. 83sa~~r1tn Coun~11, orr1~1a1 Records,.Sec~nd Year, Number 99 (2l3th:ieet1ng), 22 October 1947, pp. 2597-2598. 
86 
detail on such DBttera as the differing interpretations ot 
. 
the cease-tire order, the van Mook line, allegations ot 
breaches ot the cease-tire order; and the general condition 
ot the areas :occupied by the reapect1ve toroes of the 
Republic and the Netherlands ... The complete report merely 
empbaa1zed the tact that the d1tter1ng interpretations 
placed upon the ceaae•tire order precluded the etrect1ve 
operation ot the Council'• l August resolution. Economic 
rehabilitation had been.started on the·east coast ot 
Sumatra, but in the absence or agreement between the Nether- 
lands and the Republic, great d1tt1cult1ea would continue. 
The report alao noted that.trade in general, and particularly 
exports, had been "hamstrung" by the blockade and the 
general 1natab111t1 or t~e ~~t~.a4 
.. - - .. ' ' . ~ ·• 
Mr. Auatin wa1 ot t1:-e opinion that the major problem 
- . tac1ng the Council had to do with the long-range settlemant 
or the dispute. In an etfort to,solve this problem, the 
. . ~· . 
United States representative submitted a dratt resolution 
. . ' ~ . . '· . 
calling upon both parties to consult with oach other tor the 
. ' purpose or implementing the cease-tire order and, ponding 
. .. . ' . -· . ·"' 
the conclusion ot auoh agreement, to cease any activ1t1ea 
"which directly ~r indirectly contravene .th.at resolution;" 
the resolution .fUrther called upon the Committee ot Good 
0.t'ticea to assist the parties in reaching the agreement 
mentioned above and also requeated the Conaular Commiaa1on . 
· - : 84secur1t;y Council, Ott!cie.1 Reoorda, .second Year, 
Special Supplement Number 4, "Report by the Consular 
Commiasion at Batavia to the Securitr Council," pp. 65-66. 
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and 1ta military assistants to tmke its services aYailable ·· 
to the Committee.85 
Ur. van Kl.ettens stated that neither the amnesty 
proposed by Syria nor the Indonesian guarantee or ma1nta1n1ng 
peace e.nd order would be etrect1ve·as the Republican Govern- 
lmnt was'not capable'of entorelng such a guarantee.86 ·aeneral 
Romulo ot the Philippine delegation· expressed· the op1n10n 
that the second·inter1m report'ot the Commission was unduly 
favorable to the Netherlands, citing examplea in support or 
th1a argument.87 
214th Meeting, 27 October 1947' 
Commission, Mr. Pillai or India, speaking at the 214th 
. ' - . - ' ' - •.·. . . ~ . ' . . . ' ·- . . \ . . .... ; .- 
... , J. 
Atter studying ths complete report. ot the Consula~ .... '. 
• .. •. _.' 
JOOeting of the Council, declared that this report gave 
, ,- . .r . • •. • • .~ .•. . ·• . ... • I ·.. . . \ ~, ~ . ,; : 
added support to his 1tatezm,nt made in connection with the 
. • 1. . 
Comm1es1on•a first interim reportJ naimly, that the reapona1- . ~ . ' . . . 
b111ty for the continuance ot hostilities in Indonesia should 
be plac~d ~~.the ~etherlan~~ Go~e~ent.89 ~o· United -, State1 
representative held that the full report or the Commission 
., . . t : t . • 
indicated that it would.not be w1ae tor the Security Coun~11 
' . • • ... j> • • ~ . ... - ... . . 
to attempt to solve ta, complicated military problem: thla 
' . { ' . . . ·, '. . ' ~.: . . ·' 
light ot the.roport's disclosure that d1tter1ng 1nterprcta-. 
matter should be given to the Committee of Good Offices.· In 
·: . ; .-, .. , . . . . ~ 
85socur1tl Council, orr101a1 Records,· Second Year, Number 99 (213th lieetlng, 22 October 1947; PP• 2602-2604. The text or the United States resolution may be found on page 2604. 
86Ib1d., pp• 2606-2507 •.. 
. 87Jbid., P• .2598~ . - . ~ - 88seour1ty Council, Official Records, Second Year,Numl:e~ 100 (214th Meeting), 27 October 1947, P• 2624. 
•• 
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tions ot the cease-fire order were the cause ot the trouble, 
Mr. Austin submitted a revision to the resolution which•he 
had aubmitted at the 213th meeting. The reviaed.reaolution 
contained an additional paragraph advising the part1ea·to ·. · 
the dispute .that the Council's cease-tire order "should be 
interpreted aa not permitting the use·ot the armed torcea 
or ~!the~ ~~tr by ~111tary action to alter.substantially 
the terr1to17 under ite control on 41August 1947."89 
At the next neot1ng 81~ Alexander Cadogan withdrew 
the drat~ resolution concerning the establishment of a line 
ot demarcation which he had submitted at the 210th meet1ns 
because that resolution was covered b7 the broader United 
States resolution.90 Mr. Katz-Suchy of Poland, in a length7 ~ ... ' . . . 
- . speech directed against ~he Netherlands, objected to the 
' . United States resolution on the grotUtds that (1) it recognized 
territorial gains acquired by rorce, and (2) it was conducive . . 
to further misinterpretation, particularly the meaning ot the . . . . . 
term Rsubata.nt1al." In consequence or h11 indictment or the 
. . Netherlands, the Polish delagats submitted a resolution . . 
(l) stating that the Netherlands had been gu1lt7 ot-railure 
to compl7 with the Security Council reaolut1on or 1 August 
and 27 August, (2) calling upon the Dutch Governzoont to · 
withdraw all troops and civil administration trom Republican 
' f • ~ 
terr! tory end tor the Consular .Comm1seion to supervise the 
89Ib1d., PP• 26(0-2544. The text ot the revised United States resolution nay be found 1n the rootnote on 
page 2644. 
90seeur1t~ Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 101(215th1'4eet1ng), 29 October 1947, P• 2648 •. 
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complience ot both parties with the above provisions, 
(3) requesting the Committee ot Good O!'fice1 to take·' into 
consideration the !'act that the Netherlands Government had 
not complied with the Council's resolutions, and (4) calling 
to the attention or the Netherlands Government the tact that 
failure to coDply with the provisional measures would create 
a a1tuat1on which mie;ht lead to.the necess1t1·or appl11ng 
en!'orcement measures.91 
216th ~ 217th Meetings, ~1October1947 · 
On 31October1947, the representative of Chl~a, 
Mr. Tsiang, proposed en anendment to the United States dratt : . . . . . \ . . . . 
resolution. This amendment, in regard to the resolution's 
provision concerning a~n3ultat1on betwee~ the pa~t1es, added 
a phrase calling for 1uch consultation to take place either 
L • ' • 
directly or through the Committee ot Good Offices. The 
amendnent also added a phra•e calling tor cessattom or incite- . . . 
ment to act1v1t1es which would contravene the resolution and 
. . . 
tor appropriate measures to be taken for sate-guarding 11.te . ... . . . . . ~ ' 
and property.92 Colonel Hodgson or Australia noted the 
Belgian a?mndtmnt to tho revised text or the United States 
\ I •: - ~ • i •. • '• 
dratt resolution which stated thnt nny substantial alteration 
, • . I:. 
ot the territory occupied b7 the parties on 4 August would 
. . 
be.1ncona1stent with the Cou_"lcil's resolution Qf l.A~lgU3t. 
91Ib1d~, PP• 2660·2662. The text ot the Polish resolution may be round on pages 2561-2662. 
~ . Secur1tl Council, Otf1c1al Records, Second Year, Number 102 (2l6th and 217th Meetings), 31October19471 p. 2683. 
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In etteot, this amendment nerel7 changed the wording ot the 
last paragraph or the United Stat~a resolution from a 
negative to a pos1tiYe atatement.9~ 
• ' ~ . : ' Mr. Gromyko ot the U.s.s.R. drew the Council's. 
attention to a letter, dated 28October1947, from Mr. Thamboe, 
repreaentative ot the Republ.1c ot Indon~sia, addressed to the 
P_rea1dent of the s.,curity Council. In thia letter the 
-Indoneeian delegate stated that the ~ly aituat~on und~?' . . . ' ~ 
which an understanding could be ?'eaohed would be complete . ,' . . . .. 
had occupied after 21 July. The Republican Government again 
.. ~ ' • • t • 
Withdrawal or.Netherlands forces trom territory which they 
• • •• • . ' • 1·• 
called upon the Security Council to appoint an international 
' .. . . . ·- . ' ' . ' ·, ~ . 
commia11on composed or representatives or .the Securit7 
• l • •• '• ·.1 • .'. ' 
Council; the dut1ea ot thla comm1as1on would include observing 
•. ' • ·.' • ·:• ' • •. • ... ' ' '' l ' • " -" ' ~ • I ,. ' ' 1 ,! • •' t 
and 1nveat1gating conditions.in and auperT1a1on or the 
• , ~ r • '• 
1 • • I ·"' • . ·j • "'• ,. \ "' ' ' 
territories evacuated b7 Netherlands forcea.94 
On the afternoon of 31 October, at .. the 217th Dl')eting, 
Mr. Muniz or Drazil declared that the report ot the Consular .. . ._, . . . . ' . . . " 
Commission clearl1 indicated the impracticality or attempting 
' ' ', ' ,.... .. •• • • • •• -. .-4 • ·! ,. . .. . ~ '. 
to supervise a ceaae-tire without direct contact w1 th the .- _, ' . . 
situation. The Brazilian delegate oppo~e~ the resolutions 
•ubmitted b1 .the u.s.s.R., Australia, ~nd _Poland on the. 
ground1 .that the7 adopted too theoretical an approach to 
' ·, . . •. .. 
the proble~. He.aupported the United States resolution and 
may be 
. •· 
9.3Ib14., P• 2684. The text ot the Belgian amendment found in the footnote or this page. 
94 . . 
Ibid•, PP• 2689-2690. The text or th1a communication 
tound In the footnotes on pages 2689-2690. 
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was ot ·the opinion that the proposed functions were within ·' 
the competence or the.Committee'ot Good Otticea.95 
Sir Alexander Cadogan of'the United Kingdom also 
opposed the Ruas1ari and Pol1sh·resolut1ons because· of the 
serious disorders which might result from the withdrawal 
ot troopsJ he felt that the Australian resolution was 
impraotical a1noe there were·pockets of Republican troops 
which were situated well behind any line which could be · 
drawn in the territory held by Dutch troops.· The British 
' . representative supported 'the United States resolution ' · 
generally, but thought that it could be improved by the 
Belgian and Chinese amendments.96 · 
· :. Since the 1111 t ot speakers in gene.ral discus a ion 
was exhausted, the Pre1ldent put the:Soviet resolution, 
calling tor withdrawal of troops, to a vote. The resolution 
was rejected aince it tailed to receive·· the attirna t1ve vote1 
ot seven member11 the vote on the measure waa 4 in·· favor, 4 · 
against, and 3 abstentions•· The Australian dra.tt resolution 
waa next in order of priority. Defore the resolution was 
put to a vote, Colonel Hodgson accepted an amendment 
submitted b7 Mr. GromJko changing the diatance or withdrawal 
ot troops trom five to twent1-tive kilometrea. The Australian . . 
reaolution wa1 not adopted, tb~ vote being 5 .in favor, 1 . ~ ' . ~ ; . . ~ . . 
against, ~nd 5 ~b~tentione.97 Following the vote on the 
95Ibid., .... -- - ' - ., . ' .... ~ ..... _..,. - ~ PP• 2691-2693. 
96Ib1d., •• PP• 2693-2696. - 97Ib1d., PP• 2698-2699. 
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Australian resolut1on, .. Colonel Hodgson submitted an·amendment 
to the United Statea proposal which would change the wording 
ot the last paragraph or that resolution to "a positive , 
atatement of the clear intention ot the Counc11."9S · 
Mr. Austin, United States·representative, proposed 
the establishment or a small sub-cOlttl!l!ttee· to study the 
. United States dratt resolution·and the Chinese, Belgian, . 
and Australian amendment• with the purpose ot reconciling. 
the di.fterent texta. Thia resolution was adopted b7 a vote 
ot 7 in favor, none against, with 4 · aba tent1ona. Following 
the vote, the President suggested that thia sub-committee be 
oompoaed or the representatives or· the United Statea, · 
Australia, Belgium, and ChinaJ the Council approve~ thia 
suggestion by'avote·or "I in tavorl'none against,·and 4 
abatent1ona. The Co'1nc11, however, rejected a Prealdential 
I' proposal that· 'the 'terms. or reference or the aub~omm1ttee 
be broad enough to include the United States and Pol1ah 
dratt resolutions on an e'qual tooting tor purposes or 
exam1nat1on~99 
218th arid 219th·Meet1nga, 1November1947 - 
The aub-comm1ttee submitted a dratt resolution at 
the 218th meeting on 1November1947. This resolution called 
upon the parties to consult with each other, either d.1rectl7 
gs . . . 
l,2g.' pp. 2702-2703. resolution may be round on page 
99 ' · Ibtd., PP• 2706-2717. 
The text or the Australian 
2703. ; l ' •• 
or through the Committee of Good Ott1ce•1 tor. the purpose 
ot giving effect to the cease-fire order, to cease an1 
aot1v1t1ea or incitement to activities which would violate 
that order, and to take msasures to provide for safeguarding 
life ·and propert7. The .. resolution f'urther advised .the 
parties that the cease-fire order should be interpreted aa 
,roh1b1t1n3 "the uae of.the armed torce1 or either party 
by hostile action to extend its control over territory not 
occupied bf it on 4 August l947J" the parties were also 
invited to conclude •greementa'aa to the withdrawal~ot \ 
troops in - the event ths. t aueb ec t1on should appear _to be .- 
neces1ary and the'Committee or Good 0tf1ces was requested. 
to aid the parties in reaching an agreement while the 
Consular Comm1as1on waa requested·to make its aervicea, 
and its m111ta17a11s11tants, available to.the.Committee ot 
Good Oftices.lOO The President.announced that all proposals 
betore the Council which had been submitted by the delegations . . 
of China, Belg1Wll1 Australia, and the United States had been 
w1thdrawn'1n favor ot .. the·reaolution submitted by the aub- 
comm1'tte.e .101 · · ( · ' ' · '.: 
Mr• Pillai.of India felt.that the.new resolution waa 
to-o weak in that 1 t ·did not express regret or di•approval in 
regard to the tact that the Counc11t1 cease-tire order had 
not be~~ ·1~1.e~nted, ,t~11~· l~-: Gromyko wai ·or the. opinion~ 
' ' - • ' ,." " • • i ~ • 
that the. reao_lution could not pro~oe satisfactory .resulta 
100seeur1ty Council, Off1c1~1 Records, Seoond Year, •' Number 103 (2l8th and 219th i'etings}, l November 19471 
pp. 2723-2724. 
lOllb1d., P• 2724. 
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•ince it did not provide for the withdrawal or troops. 
Mr. Gromyko also noted that the resolution would have the 
ettect or legalizing the control of the Netherlands over 
te~1tory occupied bJ Dutch troops on ( A~6ust.102 At the 
219th meeting, Mr. Lopez ot Colombia, tm1ntain1ng that 1t 
would be a very aerioua matter for the Council morely to 
note that the l August resolution had been disregarded, 
proposed an amendment to the aub-comm!ttee•s resolution 
1tating that the Security Council expected to see the 
. .• 
l AugUs't resolution fully and tat thtully complied with b;y 
the .two ~ove~menti.103 Thie emendment was not adopted aa 
it tailed to receive the attirmative vote or •even member• 
ot the Councit.104 
The sub-committee resolution was adopted b;y a vote ot 
7 to 1 with~ abstentions. The Pol1ah resolution waa 
rejected, 2 votes in tavor, 4 votes againat, and 5 
abstent1ona.lOS 
At the 222nd meeting or the Council on 9 December, 
the President noted receipt ot a commun1oat1on from the 
Committee of Good Offices. This cablegram, dated l December, 
stated that. the Netherlanda and the Republic had agreed to 
hold d1scusa1ons on board a •hip ot the United Statea Govern• 
ln8nt. if such were available. The United States Government 
102Ib1d., PP• 2725•2730~ 
l03Ib1d~, pp. 2746-2747. The text of the Colombian amend.men} niay"Oe found on page 2747. 
04Ib1d., P• 2749. 
105Ibid., PP• 2750-2751. • • 
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had notified the Committee that it ~ould put at ita diapoaal 
' ·~ . 
the u.s.s. Renville, a dut1 trans~rt.106 
229th Meetin3, 17 January 1947 
. .• 
On 17 Janua17 1948,·at the'229th meeting,the 
P~a1dent,'· Mr. van' Langenhove,"' read to the Council a cable• 
. . ,· gram, dated 17 Januar7,· trom the Committee or Good Otrice1. 
This· comnnm1c.at1on stated that the goverrimente or the 
N'etberlanda and ot the Republic ·or Indonesia would sign a 
' . truce agreement at 1430 hours on that da7 on board the 
u.s.s. Renville. Two hours atter the signing or the agree- . . . 
Jll)nt identical cease-tire orders and regulations were to be. 
aent out to the armed toroea ot both 'parties .107' ': ·- . . 
·The trlioe agreement·pi-ov1ded tor the 111uance or a 
a·tand-ta1t 'and ceaae.:.r1re: orde~ ·to the troopa or both · 
partiea. These order1 were'to appl1 along the •yan Mook 
line" which had been described in the Proclamation or the 
Netherlands Ind! ea Government on 29 Augua t 1947, and 
demilitarized zonea were to be ••tabl11hed in general 
con.torm1ty with th1a line, without prejudice to the rights, 
claims, ·or position ot the'partiea.108 
.. ,• 
'The Renville Agreement set torth a list ot twelve 
. . . 
political pr1no1plea which were to goyern the relat1oneh1p 
. . , . lOOseouritx Council, Official Records, Second Year, Supplement Number 20, Annex •7, PP• 171-172 • 
. 107 . . 
Seeur! t_y Council, Ott1c1al Records, Number l~llS · .· • • 
(226th-240th Meetings), 6 .ranuary-4-Pebruary 1948, P• 128 •.. 
·lOSunited Net1ona Yearbook, 1947-48, P• 376. 
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between the two parties, plus six principles upon which 
. i further negotiations were to be based. 
or principle a·~~~ 'not ·aoc~pted b:y both ;~rti~a until 
. . 
The latter group 
'. - 
19 Januarr; Th~ twelve political principle• provided tor 
I • ~ ' . ' "continuation ot the Committee's asaiatanoe, civil and 
p~i!tical 11bertlea, ~·h~ges in,. th~· a~dm1~1~trat1on o~ . 
territory to be made "only.with the full and tree consent 
. •" : '. . . ·-~ . . '., , . .. . . . . ._ ' .· or the population, gradual reduction or arnmd torces, reaump- 
tion or trade,·· transport, mid commun1c.at1ona~ the holding 
ot free elections after a period or from six to twelve . . . months, aelt-determination by the people or their political 
relationship .to. the United States ot Indonesia, the convening 
; ' . ' . . '· _; \ 
ot a constitutional convention, tha possible observation b7 
. ' . ,, . 
a United Natione agenc.y or conditions between the .. ~1~1ng 
• l ~ -~ • • ·- ' 
ot the agreement and the transter ot aovere1gnty to the 
United States or Indonesia, the independence or the 
Indonesian peoplo and cooperation between the people ot the 
Netherlands and Indonesia, a sovereign tederal state under 
a constitution to be arrived at by democratic prooeaaes, 
and union of the United States ot Indoneaia and other parts 
ot the Kingdom ot the Netherlands under the King ot the 
Netherlands."109 
The six additional principle1 contained the following 
provi11onsr (l) "Sovereignty throughout the Netherland.a Indies 
lhould remain with the Kingdom or the Netherlands until, atter 
a atated interval, th! Kingdom transferred ita aovere1gnt7_to • • 
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the United States ot Indonesia:" (2) "the Republic ot 
Indonea!a should be a state within the United States ot 
Indonesia;" (3) "all states would be ottered ta1r representa- 
tion in any prov1a1onal federal government;" (4) "either 
party might request cont1nuence or the Committee's services 
during the interim periodJ" (5) plebiscites were to be 
held ftunder international observation to determine whether 
l 
the people• ot the various'territoriea or Java~ Madura, and 
Sumatra wish their respective territories to. torm part ot 
' ' ~ . . ' "' . ; . .. ~ . ' 
the Republic or Indonesia or another atate" and that "there 
. . 
be a constitutional -convention in which the vnr.ious atate1 
. • ·~ • . ' . ' • , • -_ ' .. ' ~ • _: , # " ~ ..... 
would be represented in proportion to their poplilationa J" 
(6) "any -•tat~ could,· 1n~tead ·or r~t-1ty1~g the. cons ti tut1on, 
negotiate a special rela t1onah1p ~1 tt1 tho United Sta t~·s ot 
Indonesia and the Kingdom ot the,Neth~rl~nds~•llO . . . 
I t 
llOib1d., P• 377. 
CHAPTER IV 
RENVILLE TO THE SECOND POLICE ACTION 
The signing or the Renville Agreement, at least 
partially in response to pressure trom the United States 
Government, caused a break-down in the internal politic• 
·' ot the Republic• On 16 JartUD.%7 1948 the large at ot the . 
political parties, the Maajumi, withdrew trom the cab1netJ 
on 23 Janll8.17 Sjarituddin resigned aa Prime Minister. 
President Sukarno appointed Mohammed Hatta, who was then 
Vice-President, to torm a new cabinet. The reason tor 
this choice was that Hatta, aa V1ce-Prea1dent, atood above 
part7. · A new cabinet was tinally formed on 29 JanuarJ" 
with Hntta as Prime Minister and the Masjurni and Indonesian 
I 
Nationalist Parties as the dominant tac'tions •1 
Th~ New cabinet took immediate steps to implement 
the Renville Agreeimnt, including recognition ot the van 
Mook line. By 26 February approx1matel7 35,000 men ot regular 
Republican army units had withdrawn trom their pockets 
be7ond the van Mook line into Republican-held territory. 
Within a week atter signing the Renville Agreement, the 
Dutch unilaterall7 conducted a pleb1ac1te on the island ot 
Madurai the purpose ot the plebiscite was to determine the 
1 . 
Kahin, sa- ill•, PP• 230-234. 
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, • • t i ' c. ~ status or that area as between the Republic and the newl1- ·. 
cre.ated Interim Federal ·Government.: Thia ·action was violative 
or the Renville Agreement in that (1) it wa·a not ·conducted 
under the.observation or the Committee ot Good ort1cea1 
(2) the Renville Agreement had provided that no such plebiscite 
' , I ·. • should be carried out until at lea.st aix months after the 
signing or the Agreement, and (3) the conditions stipulated 
by the Renville Agreement under which such plebiscites were 
. l ·. . . . ·• •, 
to be carried out (freedom or speech, as.semblJ, and publica- 
tion) were not observed. On 21 Janua17 van Mook recognized 
• .. 
the "State or l)tadura" .2 
In West Java, Dutch activity followed a Ve'J:7 similar 
' . ·'· •• .~ " ' • t -•' • •• 
p&ttem. On 12 October to 19 October 1947, the Dutch had 
·-·~· ... ,···1 ·, '·~-·-~·· .. ~ .. ~ 
convened two conrerencea designed to eatabl1ah an independent 
: ' ,... ._-.., ~. . . "' ' I ' : ·.c 
1tate. The second or the1e conterencea bad provided tor -. the 
'· ~ . - ·' . '· . . .. . •. . . .· ~ . . - .. - ~ 
calling ot a third, to meet on 24 February 1948. Despite 
~ .,· • • \< 
Renville provisions to the contrary, thia conference was 
convened 1n Bandung on 23 February. The result or this 
conference was the birth or the new State or West Java. On 
9 March the creation or an' interim federal g0\femlne11t waa ·. 
' f, . announced by van MookJ th1agovernment was· to function until 
a·United States ot Indonea1a was establ1ah~dJwh1ie the 
Republic was invited to join 1n thia goveni~ent, the ~toh 
.. 
established aa a condition.or acceptance the negotiation or 
a tinal political settlement between the Netherlands and 
the Republic. On 27 May a tederal conterence was convened . ' 
2 ~·, PP• 235-238. - 
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at Bandung b7 the Dutch and thia action seemed to constitute 
add1t1onal proot, in the c1es ot Republican leaders, ot. 
unilateral Netherlands activity in violation ot the prino1plea 
of Renv1lle.3. . .... 
'•I 
~ Interim Report ~ !h2 Comm! ttee 2I.. ~ Otf!cea. 
•. < 
On 10 Februar1 1948 · the c'ommi ttee of Good Otf1cea 
submitted 1ta tirat interim rep.ort t~ tho Sec~1.·tJ Council. 
In general, thia report, which covered the· activities ot 
the Committee through Januar7, 1948, dealt with a review ot 
. ' the Comm!ttoe•a work, tha work ot special committees which 
had been eatabliahed to implement the Council's resolution 
~ i . • . • . '· .. 
ot l November 1947, and a description ot the negotiations 
4 ' • ' . ~ . ' ' . , • '! • ' . ~ which lead to the algning ot the truce agreement and acceptance 
,( I ' • \ of the political principles aa a basis tor further political 
negotia~tiona. 4 
. J.. ~ 
247th Meeting, 17 February 1948 
)_,I-' 
. The Securit7 Council resumed consideration ot tho . 
Indonesian question on 17 February.1948 at its 247th meeting. 
Arter the Council approved a request b7 the Australian 
represe~t~tive ~hat his Government be 1~v1ted ~o participate 
Zibid~, pp.' 238-247 •. .· __........_. ' . ' . . 
·.. 4socur1tI Council," Oft1o1al Records,.Th1rd Year, 
Special Supplement Number 1-;-irtrnlted·Ilatlona Securit7 ·· 
Council's Connn1ttee or Good Offices on the Indonesian I. 
Question: First Interim Report of the Committee to the 
Security Council," pp.· 1·16. 
101 
:.in the discussions,. Mr, Frank.Graham ot the United States, 
Chairman of the Committee of Good Ott!cea, preaented the 
' . ~ . Committee's report to the Council. ; .. ~ Thia report was pr1mar117 
. . . ' 
concerned with a description or the historical background ot 
the Indonesian problem and ot the course of negotiations 
.which had culmlnat~d in ~he Renv·~'{1~ ~~~m~n~.5: ·~. ~stioe 
~ ' .· ,.... . ! J • • , • ~ 
Kirby, Auatral1an reprosentat1ve on the Committee of Good 
. - . 
Otticea, auggested that in the future the Cor.mdttee should 
make its suggeations to tho parties without necessarily 
waiting for an invitation from both parties to do so. He .. 
also advocated an,informal rather than a formal approach 
. , • ' • .. . .: .i • • f 
on the part or the Committee and a greater d1aplar of 
• . : .! ~ • 
initiative than the a1tuat1on in the p~st had allowed. The 
:-r : • .. 
Netherlands repre·s-entativ~, while' welcoming. tho agreementa 
• • , , •' , ., ' ... ~# I ~ "", •' :. ' 
7 
: ~ t, \ • , : \ ., · : I • • 1 J t • .,• d ~· 
which had been reached, noted that continued political 
I - • • ~' •'. , 0 • ' ' 
d1acuaa1ona would involve such ditticult problems a1 the 
. • . ~ . r . ' ,. . . • . ~ .. . relat1onah1p between the Government of the Republic and 
I - • 
the interim tederal government, the constitution or tho 
United States ot Indonesia, and a det1n1t1on ot the relation- 
ship batwean that bod7 end the Governm~nt ot the Netherland•.6 
·~ ~ 1 
· 5united Nations Yearbook,· 1947-48, p. 376. The text 
ot t~ Auat~al!an letter requesting en Invitation to partici- pate in the d1sousa1on1 may be found in SecuritI Council, 
Ottic1al Records, Third Year, Supplement for Januar7, 1''ebrua17, 
~h 1948, Document S/674, P• 29.- · · 
•• 
6Ib1d., P• 377. - . 
102 
248th Meeting, 17 February 1948 ·. 
Later in the day• at the 248th meetingt the Indonesian 
~ . . delegate expreased the opinion that the Committee ot Good 
Offices should be granted powers beyond the mere rendering· 
. ' ... · ·' . .•.. ' . . of good otf1cesJ he emphasized thia point particularly in 
regard to .the ~oblem ot con.ri1oting interpretation• or 
. . ' 
provisions or the agrearmnta. Mr. van Zeela.,d of Belgium~ 
while urging the parties to 1mplelll9nt ooncrotelr thct '·eighteen 
. ' principlea of the Renville Agreement, laid atress upon the 
need tor replacing the provisional arrangement• or the truce 
with a lasting agreement. The Australian repreaentat1ve 
felt that a baaia had been established tor a "just and 
enduring ae.ttleimnt," but believed that the Committee 
should have mors poa1t1ve tunet1ona 1n order to bring.about 
moro ettectively tultillment ot the Renville Agreement. 
The delegate trom Belgium disagreed w1th·th1a point ot view• 
maintaining that the Committee ahould not go beyond the 
restricted power• which it posseaaed at:_that timo.7 
249th Meeting, 18 Februa;rx 1948 '. 
• I ~ 
The following day, at the 249th meeting, the Soviet 
delegate noted that Netherlands troops continued to take over 
' { 
more and more Indonesian territory. He also stated that the 
Comm! ttee had forced the Republic to accept what he termed . . . . . 
a Netherlanda ultimatum embodied in the Renville Agree~nt 
•• 
7 ; .: . ~·•PP• 377-378. 
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and that this agreement waa designed, not in the interest 
or the Indonesian ~eople, but for the purpose ot continuing 
colonial dominance. In view or this situation, the representa- 
tive or the u.s.s.n. held th.at the only solution was adoption 
ot the Soviet proposal tor the Withdrawal or the troopa or 
both aide•. Following th1a speech, the Canadian delegate -· · ~, 
1ubm1tted a draft reaolution which (1) noted with aat11taction 
that the Truce Agree?mnt had been signed, (2) commended the 
Co:nmittee~tor its aaaiatance, and'(3) requested both the 
parties to the dispute and the Committee to kaep the Council 
Wormed aa to the progress - ot the political' settloment.6,.,. · ~ 
' . 
25lat Meeting, 20 February 1948. · --- 
.. ~ ... ~ 
The United Stat•• representative, at the 25lst 
~. ; . 
meeting, noted the great achievement 'Which the parties had 
·, ... made in that they had reached an agreeimnt and brought about 
an end to host111t1ea. The ·Indian and Chinese deleg~te~, 
. .~ •· . . . . .. .... however, both expreaaed the opinion that the cessation ot 
' < ·.. . '· .. . host111t1tea, while a a1gnif1cant aucceas, had been achieved 
\ . . ' 
largelr through the concessions of the Republic and its faith . \ .: 
... l. ' . .. ' { -:·. in the Secur1tr Council. The repreaentat1ve of the Ukrainian 
s.s.n. repeated the charges ~r the Soviet delegate as to the 
•· • • ~ : J • . ; • ' • ~ ' .. 
part1al1ti.or the Committee towards the Netherlands and ita .. 
adherence to the colonial polnt of vlew.9 
-! • - 
8 
~·• P• 378. 
9Ib1d•, pp. :578-379. 
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252nd .Meet1ne;, 21February1948 
At tho-next'1meting, held on 21·Februa17, the 
Indonesian representative accused the Netherlands ot intending 
to establish new states1in West Java, ~!adura, end East Sumatra 
without the plebiscites called tor in the Renville Agreement. 
He reiterated hia request that the Committee ot Good Otticea 
be given the power ot arbitration. The Colombian delegate 
subm1 tted amendments to the Canadian reaolution which . 
(1) added an invitation to both parties to attempt to reach 
an early and f'u.11 1mple1TJ9ntat1on ot the political principles, 
· (2) suggested that· the parties use the Comc1tteo •a aervicea 
to adjust dittcrenoes in the 1nterpretat1on·and application 
of these pr1iic1ples, and. (3) requested the Committee to :. 
continue to aaa1at the parties.to attain the above goala. 
The delegate from Auatralia nl10 submitted an amendment 
to the Canadian resolution. Thia s.mendment atated that the 
matter of ottering suggestions to the parties in an attempt 
to help them roach a political settlement without nece1aaril1 
waiting tor thf> parties to request such action ahould be left 
to the discretion of the Committee itaelt. The lletherlanda . 
representative opposed th1a point of view; he maintained 
that publication ot proposals without ~~e previous consent 
of both parties would c onst1 tute a means. or applying preaslire 
to the pnrt1ea a~d such a a1tuat1on_would not~· compatible 
with the funotion1 or a good offices committe~~lO 
• • 
10Ib1d., PP• 379-380. 
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256tg Meeting, 26 Februn:r;r 1948 
The Indonesian question was not d11cuaaed again 
until 26 Februar7 at the 256th meeting. At that time the 
rep~eaentative trom'the Republic or Indonesia charged the 
Netherlands with interpreting unilaterally the Renville 
Agreement b1 their promotion o£ the "popular movements" 
1n West Java and Sumatra.· While supporting the Colombian 
and Australian amendments, the Indonesian delegate relt 
tha.t unilateral action 'on the part 0£ tho Dutch threatened 
to break dc:mn tho Renville Agreement in tha aamo wa7 similar 
act1c~ had ruined the· L1nggadjati Agreement. The 3oviet · 
delegate opposed the Canadian resolution on the ground.II that 
1t approved ot the Renville Agreement and tho u.s.s.a. telt 
that that Agreement was not aol1c1toua or the rights or the·· 
Republic •11 · 
259th Meot1n5, 28 February 1948 
.. The Philippine representative agreed with this 
point or view, speaking at the 259th meeting, by ttn1nta1nlng 
that the Republic had been forced to abide by a detmrcation· 
line which had been establ11hed bf torce, contrary- to the 
Council's resolution or l .. Auguat 1947. Tha Chinese delegate, 
noting the great importance ot the events in Western Java 
and !!adura, subm1tted·a-dratt• resolution requesting the 
• • 
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Committee ot Good 0tt1ces .to pa7 particular attention to 
the political events in Western Java and Madura and to··. 
report to the Council on such event• at trequent intervals. 
This resolution waa adopted b7 a vote ot 8 in ravor, none 
againat, with 3 abstaining. In view or tho "debate in the 
Council and the stntenent by th$ Chairman or tho Committee 
or Good Ottices, the Australian representative did not reel 
it necesaacy to urge adoption or, h1a amendment to the - 
Cenadian resolution. The Security Council then rejected 
the Colombian amendment to the Canadie.n resolutionJ the 
Canadian resolution itself was adopted b7 a vote or 7 in 
favor, none e.ga1ns t 1 with Colombia, S7ria, Ukrainian S .s .n., 
and the u.s.s.R. ab1ta1n1ng.12 _.. ).- 
: ··~ I • '• ( . .: 
2nd- Interim Report ~ Special Reports l£2!!! !b!, Committee ss: 
Good Oft!ce1 - ................... 
- ' :; '. •.. 1 
B7 a letter dated 19 March 1948, Mr. Palar, representa- 
tive or t~ Republic of Indon~aia, intormod the Socurit7 
' • ~ 1 ' ~ I,.' ; .. ~ • ' . i ~ '· Council- that.his Government considered the establishment ot 
' ' . th8 State of Eaat Sumatra, which had been promoted by the 
1 • • • '-, I :. t .') ,. ~.- " • •" 
Netherlands, to be a violation or the Renv11ie A~e~ment.1~ 
On 1 May the Council received the report of the Committee ot 
Good Offices on political developments in Western Jnva. ·For 
- ' the most part, this report dealt with a resume ot.th~ three 
12Ib14~ 
13secur1t1 council, Official R~co~ds, Third Year, Supplement for January, Februar,., end March 1948, Docwnant 
S/701, P• 40. 
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conference9 held 1n Western Java e.nd a presentation or the 
opinions or each or the parties, tha Netherlands and the 
Rspublie.14 On 26 Mny the Committae submitted a report on 
the pol1t1oal·developments·1n Uadura and also its second 
1nter1m report. The report on the political development 1n 
Madura dealt pr1tnr11y with a description of the plebiscite 
which had been held on 23 January tor the purpose or deter- 
mining the status o:t Madura. : Like the previous report on 
ti/ostern. Java, this report presonted the contlicting opinions 
ot the two parties a3 advanced by the respeotlve partiea.15 
The second interim report doscribed the work ot the varioua 
aub-comm1 ttees. · The report noted that pol1 t1cal d1aouss1ons 
had begun on 15 ·~en; ~'bmi~aion and cUsou111on of working 
papers b1·both parties indicated that there was.substantinl 
·agreement on a good many points• .The.report also.stated, 
however, ·that no Wlderatand!ng had been reached on the 
following po1ntsi . (l) "Mse.sures tor cooperat1on.:dur1ng the 
interim period ••• J" this point included the transfer ot 
governmental·tunot1ons trom the.Netherland• to the Republic; 
'(2) the date ot the pleb1sc1teJ. (3). terr1tor1ea to be 
involved in the pleb1ao1teJ and (4) the atatua ot New 
Guinea.16 ' ' .. 
l4seour1t:r Council, Official Records, Third Year, 
. Supplement for June. 1948, Document S/'129, PP• 11-24 • 
. l5Ib1d., Document S/786,. pp. 25•41. 
l.6Ib1d., Document S/787, pp. 41-72. Ii • 
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~16th ~~et!n~, 10 June 1948 
'. The Secur1 t7 Council resumed· d1aouss1on ot the 
Indonesian question on 10 June. ·Mr. 'Palar, the first 
speaker, ecouaed the·Dutch· ot attempting to.el1m1nato the· 
Republic by c1rcurnvent1ng.the actual negotiations, While 
crit1c1z1ng·the Dutch .for the1r·1ack o!' sincerity in 
negotiating and for their continued. m111 tary' action,'. 1.!r. 
Pa.lar strongly ob jeoted ·to the·· dela1 ·by the Security Council 
and cited the poas1b111t7 of the'Counc11 becoming no more· · 
than a registering agency tor events which have happened in 
the past. The Indonesian delegate mentioned six spec1t1o 
events as.the cause ot~"tremendous d1stru1t on the part ot 
. ',I the Indone1ian Republic." These events werea (1) the 
establishment or the "Provisional Federal Government tor 
Indonesia" b7 the Netherlanda.on 9 March 1948; (2) tho 
holding or the Dutch-sponsored Bandung Conference; (3) the 
•• • .. ( • ' • I - ' • ' ' ~ 
banning by the Netherlands ot a counter-conference which . . . . ' . ' . ' 
waa to have been held in Jakarta, Batav1aJ (4) the amendment 
. . ·, 
to the Dutch Conat1tut1on regarding Indone11a1 .(5) the 
~ . ·. .. '~ \..r'' ... 
events in 1tiadura; and (6) the events !n Weat Java.17 Mr. van . 
. "·~ . . ' '.• . . . { '. . 
Klertona of tho Netherlands countered bf declaring that a 
~- : • i • . .. . . . ~ ~ . , . 
negative Republ1c~_att1tude in rega~d to previous agreements 
tor a tederal Indonesian State and for a Union ot the Nether- 
.- . • '. .1 ... ,.. 
lands end United Sta tea ot Indoneaia. waa the underlying.. . . 
17seour.1.t;r. Coune11,- Ot'f1c1al Records, Third Yenr, 
Number 02 (3l6th and 317th Miet1nga),"1o June 1948, pp. 2-24. 
. ' . ; •, 
• • 
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rea1on for the inability or the Parties to come to a tull 
agreement.· The Dutch representative also noted that the 
opposition or non-Republican Indonesians to a un1ta17 state 
which would be headed by the Republic was a major stumbling 
block. Mr. van Klettens .. ma1nta1ned that the. Council should 
not devote its time to.d1acuas1ng "incidental questions ot 
. . ' 
1econda17, impo~tance;" he 1'urther suggested that the Council 
let the Committee of Good Otfioea work with the problem 
rather than carry on periodical debates itaelt aince such .. 
debates 1eem to "estrange the part1ea rather than conciliate,· 
them." The.Notherlanda delegate also expressed the hope 
that the Council would·not support any augee1tion1 aimed 
at mod1f11ng "the nature, competence• or procedure ot the 
Committee· ot Good Ot"tioea •••• ~ls. ;, ·. '. 
1'_eport .2!l ~ Federal Confereme .!! Banduns · . 
The report ot the Committee ot Good Otticea on the 
Federal Conference which opened in Bandung on '27 May was 
included on the agenda or the Z22nd meeting which was held 
~n 17 June.19 . '~.' . :•. . · .. ' , ... : •.- ~ - In general, this report contained only the 
. .... ~ ' 
torinal docmnents 'relating to the conterence and a· presentation 
: ' ' . '•. .' ' .. . '. ' ' . 
ot the contl1ot1ng interpretations ot the two parties in 
regard. to th~ motive behind. the Conference. rather than any 
' .. \ ., . \ ' ,, ', : 
concrete obserYations on the part ot the Committee. itaelr.20 
lBibid., .PP• 2S·3•. 
19seaurit1 Council~ Official Records, Third Year, Supplement for June 1948, Document S/842, PP• 91-118. 
20z<ah1n, .21!. ill•, pp. 246-247. 
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322nd and 323rd i~et1nga, 17 June 1948 
Mr. Tsiang or China disagreed with Mr. van Klefrens• 
contention that the Republic of In~onos1a WQnted a unitary 
state and had·diaplayed a negative attitude in regard to a 
union with the Netherlands. The'Chinese delegate maintained 
that th<t real quostion· in Indonesia was.not a·choice betwaen 
tedcrali1m end unitarianism, but rather, whether such a 
tederation would be "an Indonesian federation created through 
democratic methods or through Dutch control and manipulation." 
lfr.~Ts1ang then 1uggested that, .1n view or the Republic's 
oppos1 t1on to the new a ta tea of Madura and Western Java, 
fair and 1mpart1al·pleb1sc1tes should be held in those areaa 
unless the parties should voluntar11,. agree to some othor 
torm or settlement. The Chine19 repre1entat1ve closed b"1 ,. 
expressing the hope that the Renville Agreement would not 
be followed by a "police action" as the L1nggadjat1 Agreement 
had been.21 
On the bas1a of the reports betore the Council, 
itr. Pillai ot India charged th~ Dutch with numerous and 
flagrant violations ot th& Renville Agreement by the1r 
act1v1tie1, which he described as 1nc1t1nc dlasidence and 
eng1near1ng separatist movements, in West Java and Madura.22· 
Mr. Malik once again charged that the Committee or 
Number 2lpeour1tI Council, Otticial Records, 86 (322nd nnd 323rd Moet1nga), l7 June 
22 . 1.2,!g., pp. 4-13. 
Third Year, 
1948, pp. 2-4. 
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Good Otticea, through 1ta report1, had supported Dutch 
• '. • r ~. 
colonial interests and were not objective. In referring to . ' . . 
the report• on political developments in Madura and West 
Java, Mr. Malik atated that the former could be more 
accurately described as "a report on the erb1trary organiza- 
, \ . ·~ . . . t1on by the Nethe.rlanda ·author! tie a ot a pleb1sc1 te in 
Madura," while the latter should be entitled "a report on 
the establishment by't?ie1 Ne.therlanda authorltiea ~r·a · 
puppet State in Weatern Ja~a.• ·The Soviet·delegate concluded 
b7 declaring that the po1101 ot the Netherlands Government 
1n Indonesia ··stood in contradiction to the basic· princ1ple1 
ot the Un1t~·d Nations Charter.23 
' . . . .... ., . ~ . ' ' Mr. van JO.ettens read a proas release or the Committee 
' . .~ ... . . . . ' . .. . .... ·- - .. •. .. ·: .•. ot Good Ott1cea, dated 16 Jwie; which •tated that'the Nether- 
landa delegation h~d no.tit1e'd the Comm.1ttee that, In view ot 
-· •· ... ..... . '·' ' ' the publication ot a atr1ctlr confidential document, it 
would discontinue negot1at1ona, ·except ro·r diaousaiona 
regarding 1-aP1ementat1on or the. truce agreement, pending 
receipt ot new 1nst~t1ons.24: 
At the· 32Zrd meeting, Mr~ Tara1enko ot tho Ukrainian 
s.s.R. ch&rged the Committee or Good Ottioea •1th a lack or 
object1v1t11 he noted particularl1 the t~ct that American 
oil compan1ea were hold1ng'oonveraat1ona with the N~therlanda 
Government concerning oil conce1aion1 1n Indonesia. The 
. , Ukrainian delegate alao reiterated the charge that the 
2Sib1d·., pp; 14-21; 
24Ib1d~, PP• 24•27 •. 
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Netherle.nd1 was attempting to torce Indonesia back into the 
1tatu1 of complete colonial dependence upon Holland.25 -~ 
326th Meeting, 23 June 1948 
On 23 June the Couno111n1t1ated d1scu1s1on on the 
Federal Conference which was being held in Bandung. Mr • 
. ,, .. : .. : . 
Palar or Indone11a examined th• report Which the Committee 
' •' 
ot Good Otticea had submitted on this Conference against 
a background ot the roports on Weatern Java and Madura, 
and arrived at the conclusion that the Netherlands had 
intentionally m111ntormed the Council in regard to the report . . . ' . . . 
on West Java. He al10 atated that the Republic had complatel7 
. ' l ' . . ... 
accepted< the idea ot a tedera t1on, but not one c~eated , 
. ... . ,, ' 
through the uae of imthoda auch aa had been emplo7ed in Wast 
' . . • \ t. •. ' ' ' .. . 
Java and Madura, •ince a federation create~ 1n such a 
manner would benetit the Dutch and not the Indoneaian people. 
The Indonesian representative concluded that the Federal . ' ' . . .. 
Conference waa a unilateral attompt on the part or the 
Dutch to sot up a federation which could be_dominnted by 
• • ~ .._, I ' : ,. } ; • • 
them.26 _Mr. van Kl~ffens, of course, objected to Mr. Palar•a 
version ot the Bandung Conference. He stated that "the 
• '• ' ~ # •• 
Republic has neither ths monopoly nor priority to diacuas 
the problem ot·tederat1on with u3 or with the other states 
who are going to form the United 3tates ot IndoneaiaJ" 
25~b1~.~ pp.-40•46. ' - ' 
26seeur1t~ Council, OtN.cial Records~ Third Year, 89 (326th ~.feeting}, 23 June 1948, pp. 2•14. 
I•· 
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since the Bandung Conference in no way threatened inter- 
national peace and security, the Dutch representative t'elt · 
that it should not take up eny more ot the Council'a tim&.27 
General Romulo ot'the.Ph111pp1ne·delegat1on decried the 
' l . f • attitude or some Council ~mbers who were afraid that any 
action on the pQrt'or the Council would disrupt negot1at1ona. 
He emphasized tha~ the Council had interfered to the extent 
ot' requesting ~eporta on the.situation in Weit.Java and 
Madura end that these reports clearly indicated that Holland 
~ I .. '~ ' I \ 
was responsible tor the separatist m01ement in Indoneaia.28 
t. . ' '• ., - ' • \... 
Mr. Malik, after again accusing the Netherlands or nttempting 
• t_, •. 
to set .up puppet states while econom~cally destroying the 
Republic by a blockade, noted that tha Council.had received 
• ~· l • • 
a cablegram rrom the Committee or Good Otrtces in.which the 
I • .._ ;> ~ • • • •· • ' I \. 
United 5tatea and Australian deleg&t!ona expressed concern . . , . . . 
that no substantial progress had been mado towards settling ., . . . ' 
the dispute• Consequently_ these two delegations had jo1ntl7 
aubmitted a working papor tor consideration b1 the parties. 
·' . . . . 
The NGtherlanda.delegation~ however, reru~ed to accept th1a 
paper aa an agenda 1tsm •. Thia cablegram also stated that 
' ~ . . ; ~ . 
the Committee had been notified on 22 June that the Nether- 
landa GovertmJent waa prepared to resume d.1scusa1ona.~9 
27I'b1d., PP• 14·1~. 
28Ib1d., PP• 16-21. - 
29Ib1d., PP• 23-29. The text ot the cablegram t'rom the Commit~o.f.Good Otticea may be found in Security 
Council, Off1o1nl Records, Third Year, Supplement tor June, 
l94a, Documents s/~50 and S/850/Add. 1, pp -. 147-150. ' 
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By a cablegram dated 29 June, the Committee or Good 
Ott1cea not1t1ed·the Securit1 Council that no agreement had 
been reached.under which the Australian-United States working 
paper could be' cons1deredJ in add1 tlon, the Netherlanda . 
Goveniment stated that·1ts decision not to consider th!a 
working paper was tina1.:50 · 
3rd futerlm Roport ss: lb! Committee .2! Good Offices 
The Committee ot Good 0tt1oes transmitted its.third 
interim report to the President ot·the Seourit1 Council by 
a letter dated 23 June• Thia repor~ noted the "evacuation 
i .lo. or 35,000 Republican combatants to Republican-controlled 
territory trom behind forward poa~t1ona 'or Netherlands · 
- troops" and the"relea•e of.a "cson•1derable proportion or 
pr11oner1 held aa pri•oner• ot war~q In regard to the Dutch 
blockade on the islands, the Committee reported that a number 
or important agreement• had been reached in principle; but 
that it waa unlikel1 that auch agreement• would be erteotivel1 
1mplemented'unt11 'a·pol1t1cal aettlaIJDnt had been raachedJ 
1n consequence ot ·this s1 tuation,· 'no aubatant1al ·increase· 
in the nepublic '• import and export· trade had taken· place •. · 
According to report• or the Connnittee•a m111tar1 aaaistant1, 
the shortage ot medical supplies and, 1n •ome instances, or 
food conat1tuted a major probl~~· ~o~ the Repub~ic. The 
report alao noted that ditfering 1nterpretationa·ot the Renville 
·_30secur1ty Council, ·orticlal Records, Third Year, Supplement for July, 1948, Document S785a, pp. 11·12. 
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Agreement and of. the pr1n~1ples which it contained wa~ the 
cause of mu.ch misundarstan~ng and d1sp~te. In regard to 
this gap in th~ positions or the part1~a, the Committee 
stated.that ta1luro· to 1mke s1gn1t1cant progress in bringing 
. .•. ·. ' . . - . . . 
the ~rtie1 to en understanding operated to creat9 an 
Munwholeaome effect upon the atmosphero.n31 
•' .. ~ 
328th lleetine, ,1 July 1949 
On l Jul1 Mr. Pillai or India auggeated that the 
•· '• ~ . 
Dutch refusal to consider tho Australian-United States . . 
working paper seemed to destroy t:he hope that t_he ~ether- 
landa had not reall7 intended to break oft negotiations when . ~ .. . . ' " :· 
they had announced "auspension".or negotiations upon the . . . .. ~ . . -~ . . , . . . ,. . 
alleged publication or this document.32 ~. . . . . ' ~ ; . 
The delegate ot . the. Ukrainian S .s .n. 1 J11r. lianu1lalq, 
.•' .... 
attaolm d the work of the Comm! ttee ot, Good ort1ce1, a ta ting .. . , . ·. ... . .. . ' 
that 1t had not acted 1n the 1ntereata.ot the Indonesian 
. . 
people, but rather had favored the 1ntereata.ot Government•. 
. . . . . . .. ·. . . .· . . . . ' 
which were "carr,ing out a policy or colonial expansion." .. ,,· . .. . . .. 
Mr. Manuilaky alao accused the United States ot aupporting 
. ' ' .. . . 
the division ot Indoneaia in order "to penetrate more deepl7 
.• ~ ' • • • ' - i. '. : • • 
Number 
into Indonesia and_ ~o wrest economic advantagea.trom the 
Dutch!~3 Following this epeech, Mr. Taiang, the representative 
· Zlsee~tt:r c~~~-ii, .. orrie1~i R.ec~~ds·, Thi~d Yea~,· 
Supplement ?or June, 1948, Document S7848/Add. l, pp. 122-147. 
32secur1t~ Council, Oft1o1al Records, Third Year, 
91 (328th :.eetlng), l JUly 1048, pp. 5·7. · 
33Th.1d.·, .PP• 10-14. 
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ot China,:renewed hii:request 'that the President aak the· 
Committee or·aood Otticea~to transmit to the Council the 
Australian-United States working paper. The Chinese 
proposal was put to a vote, but tailed ot adoption: the vote 
on the measure was 8'in'tnvor, none against, with 5 abstain- 
ing.34 
329th Meetin3, 6 Julx 1948 
. I 
· Speakine at the 329th meeting,· MI-. ·Palar stated that 
the Dutch were continuing their economic and political 
wartare-against the Republic in an attempt to destroy that 
Government. The Indoneaian representative described the· 
Dutch blockade ·and questioned whether' this action could be 
legally carried on by the Dutoh'·1n'~1ew ot the _tact.that 
the Renville Aereement was in.toroe.~5 The representativea 
ot Austral1a,·Ch1na, V.S.s.n.,·and Syria all indicated· · 
aupport tor a proposal requesting th• Committee ot Good· 
Ott1cea to rmko a report on the Netherlands blockade imposed 
upon Indone11a.36 Mr. Taiang of China submitted a formal . 
resolution calling upon tho Committee ot Good Otticea to 
transmit to the Security Council •an early report on the 
e.x!atence or restrictions on the domestic end international 
trade ot Indonea1a and tho reasons tor the delay in the . 
. :54 . . . . 
. ·· .!W• 1 'PP• 14-15, 34. 
~5secur1ty Council, Otficial Records, Third Year, Number 92 {329th Meeting), 6.Jiily 1948, PP• 10-15. 
36Ibtd., PP• 16-19. 
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1mplenentat1on of article 6 ot tho truce agreement."37 The 
Council adopted this resolution by a vote or 9 to none, with 
2 abatentiona.~8 
Breakdowq.!n Negotiations 
On 23 Jul7 the Committee of Good 0tt1ces notified 
the Council that, in view of the stalemate in political 
negotiations, the Republican delegation had decided that 
their presence in Batavia would serve no useful purpose 
and, hence, the1 decided not to return to that city after 
23 JulyJ onl1 those delegates required tor work connected 
with implementation or the truce agreemsnt would return to 
Batavia. The Netherland• repreaentative had stated that 
the formation of a new cabinet in Holland had ms.de it . . . 
impossible to obtain an7 new inatructio~•· The Committee 
concluded that discussions, which had been suspended since 
the end of May, directed toward a political settlemnt could 
not be resumed "until one party or (the) other comes forward 
With (a) complete and concrete programme tor (the) establish• 
ment ot (a) United States ot Indonesia based upon 1ubstantial 
concesaiona to (the) point ot view of (the) other part7."39 
37Ib1d., P• 2a. The text or the Chinese resolution 
ma.1 be round on this page. 
38Ib1d•t P• 30. - 
39securitt Council, Offioial Records, Third Year~ Supplement for Ju 11948, Document S/QlS, PP• 69-90. 
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Reports .2!l !h!, Qutch Blockade 
In accordance with tho Council'a resolution or 
6 July, the Committee of Good Ott!coa submitted a report on 
. . . 
the Dutch blockade on 24 Jaly, The _repor~ cited the arguments 
advanced b1 the Dutch for imposing _the blockad•·-•uch aa to· 
limit illegal trade, to control movement or m111tarr suppliea, .. , 
' • '• • • • ' J. ' • 
e.nd "to protect Indonesian producers nnd consumera against 
. . 
exploitation by middlemen Bnd foreign tradera"--and the 
contentions of the Republican delegation that the blockade 
' I ' • . • 
was 1llogal. Thia. report reached substantially the eame .. 
conclusion as that contained in tho Committee•s third interim 
report; the Committee felt that, in the absence or an agree- 
ment restoring the_ politic.al. ~d •c~nomic unit7 ot Indonea1a, 
"the economic plight ot_Republ1can-controllo~ terr1tor1~s 
cannot be subatant1all;r ameliorated until a. way 1a tound to . 
relax ex1at1ng regulations.• The report noted that such 
relaxation "would require basic improvement in the attitude 
ot the ~rt1es,n40 
On 28 July the Motherlands Government submitted to 
the Acting Secretary-General its comments on the report 
of tho Committee ot Good Offices on trade regulations. Th.11 
communication stated that any shortage or materials in 
. . . 
Republican-controlled territories wa1 caused by faulty 
. . Republican organization rlh.ich hnd not prevented Chinese 
• • .~ • ' • ' ' I ' > • ~ •' • I .. ,~ •• 
merchants trom draining orr large quent1t1e1 ot produce 
. . ' • • 
40ib1d., Document S/919, pp. 90-106. 
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through private channela. The Netherlands Government stated 
that the Republic itself had destroyed many foreign planta- 
tions and Chinese rice milla through their "sc~rehed-earth" 
policy during the police action. This destruction was, or 
course, very detrimental to the foundations of the economic 
syatem.41 The nest day the.lletherlands Government submitted 
an addition to the above comment on the report or the Committee. 
This addition pointed out that (1) the Committee•• report 
might cause misunderstanding since it seemed to indicate 
that the shortages of goods and lack or economic develop- 
ment in the Republic was caused by the Dutch trade regula• 
tiona1 the Netherlands GoVernment felt that this was not 
the casei (2) no blockade existed in Indonesia; the Dutch 
maintained that the Republic used tht "blockade" to cover 
up def1c1enc1ea in their Government'• organization and, 
consequently, that the "blockade" existed only 1n Republican 
propaganda.42 
34lat .!ru! 342nd Meetings, 29 July 1948 
The Security Council resumed diacussion of. the 
Indonesian question on 29 July. Mr. Palar or·Indonesia., 
noting that political negotiations had been at a complete-· 
standstill since the middle or June, maintained that the 
Dutch had rejected.every atte~pt to secure a settlement. 
41seour1 tt Council', Otficial Records, Third Year, Supplement for Ju 1 l948, Document S/926, pp. 113-119. 
42Ib1d., Document S/926/Add. 1, pp. 119-123. 
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The Indonesian repre1entat1Te supported the report of the 
Connnittee or Good Ott!ce1·which had labeled the butch 
aot1v1ty 1n Indone11a a blockade.43. r.tr. vo.n Klettens 
answered the Republican charge• that the Netherlands wa1 
deliberately attemptlng·to keep negotiations at- a 1tandst111 
bf po1nt1ng out that the delay was caused• r1rat, by the 
tact that a new government wae being formed in the Nether- 
lands as a result or n' ·general ele'ot1on, and, ·second, by 
the res1ene.tion of the United States repr9eentat1ve on the 
Committee or Good 0ft1ce1 because ot 111-health, 'The Dutch 
delegate then dealt with the.problem or the Dutch trade 
regulations b1 quoting several reterence1 on international 
law Which defined ·the term "blockade•, and he concluded 
that the trade regulation• did. not r~t into any or the 
r., ( ; . ' ,, • -... °' .... I 
categories. descr!bed.44 ... , 
Following th11 excha~e, the Chinese delegate submitted 
-.f • • ~ , ·, • ' • 
a draft resolution which ~alled upon th~ partiea "with the 
. '.: , : ~ 1 ·' ~ 
aaaistencs ot the ~ounc111  Committee ot Good 0tt1ces, to 
•· I .' ,_ t. •· •• , , .,, 
maintain strict obs·~rvanoe or both the military and economic 
• .' , . •. ': ", ! . , ,.• t •' .( _:' • " • .. ·• • ,, ',, , I . • 
article1 ot ths 'Renville' 'l'ruoe Agreemont,.end to implement 
, • ·.". • • ' > • • ~ • ., ,f I 'f,,t , '.. 
early and ~ully the twelve 'Renville' pol1t1cal pr1no1ple1 . ' . . '-. , ' . .. 
and th~ ai~ additional principlea."45 
J •• 
Number 43secur1ty Council, Otf1c1al Records, Third Year, 99. (341st and 342rid Meetlnga), 29 .JuI7 1948, pp. 1-9 •. 
44Ibtd., PP• 9•22. - 
45Ibi4•; P• 22. The text or the Chineae resolution tound on this page. • • ID87 be 
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At the 342nd meeting itr. Mal1k_quest1oned the 
Netherlands' contention that their act1v1 t1. did not. 
conatitute a blockade. He also went on record aa oppo11ng 
the Ch1neae resolution on the grounds that.1~."would not , 
onl1 lead to no improvement and ensure no solution furthering 
the ·legitimate intereata ot .the Indonesian Republic ~d. 
people, but would again be ,exploited b7 the Netherlands 
Govemment and;author1t1es to further their colonial 
interest•••• .n46 The.Ch1neae reaolut1on was.then put to .... 
a vote and was.adopted, the vote being 9 in favor, none 
against, with 2 abstentiona.47 
.!h! Communiat Revolt ... : . 
Foll~wing the breakd~n _..ot politlcai negotiation• 
bet~een the Netherlanda and the R~publ1c~ the internal 
11 t~atio~ in Indonesia became v~ry pr~o~rious ~ · The 
Indoneaian people were trustrated by the Dutch violation' 
~ ,. ! ( • ' I l I • • , • • • l ot the Renville Agreement·ana b~ the ta1lure ot tha United 
. . . . ... 
States Government "to honor what Indonaaiana conaldered 
to b~ it• i>romiae .. tb, ~vera~. I the implem~nt~tio~ or the 
Renville pr1nciple1 •••• "48 Two t~ctora in particular·· 
pla;red major r~le~ '1n ·1~~-t.ig~tlng - the communist .revolt ln 
·, •· T 
September,.1948. The f1rat ot these was the economic blockade 
46Ib1dei PP• 29-34. · 
···.'7Ib1d., P• 38. : .: 
48Kah1n I J!l? • .!!!,! • I p t 254 • • • 
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imposed by the NetherlandaJ the privations caused by 
a.~ortagea ot many ditterent goods, including toodatutta and 
1JJ19d1cal supplies, made communist propaganda and promiaea '. 
seem enticing • .'The second factor was the increased 1ntereat 
which the Soviet Union evidenced 1n Indonesia and all or · 
Southeast AaiaJ th1e factor, or course, operated to push 
the Indoneaian problem •till further "into .the arena or 
big-power confl1c ta. "49 ·, 
.... The Cor:mnm.iot Party of Indoneaia initiated 1ta revolt 
against the Government ot the Republic on 18 September 1948. 
While'the etm or the attempted coup waa originally the. 
overthrow ot the Republic, by 20 September the communists 
had shifted their position by maintaining that _their action 
waa only an attempt to eliminate ."colonial and teudal , .. · ~ 
elements~ trom the Republican Government. By 30 September 
government troops had driven the communists trom allot the 
major cities which they had previously heldJ the communiata 
were, however, able1to withdraw from the town• betore being 
surrounded by eovernmont troops. Such withdrawals were 1n 
keeping with.the general po11c7 ot the communists to avoid 
battle and retreat to mountainoua terrain more auited to 
guerilla wartaro~50 During t~e month o~ October guerilla 
wartare took place at trequent 1ntervala until, on 28 October, 
.• I , ~ I 
the last m~jor communiat military torce waa captured and' the 
·•9v. Thompaon and R. Adlott, "The Communiat·Revolt .. 1n Java,"?!£ Eastern Su:rvex, November 17, 1948, vol. XVII, Number 22, P• 257. . . . . ·: . .. . · · • 
• • ' 1 
·. ', · 50a. M. Kahin, "The Cr11ia and Its Attermath," 
Far Eastern Survez, November 17, 1948, vol. XVII, P• 261. 
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rebellion was. for all practical purposes, ended. ·On 15 
December, the emergency grant to Sukarno - ot "tull powers,• 
which had.been granted on 15 Soptember,,term!nated and it 
was not renewed.51 
.There were aeveral reasons tor the tailure of the 
communist revolt, the maJor.ons being the tact that the. 
coup wa1 attempted betore the commun11ts were actually 
prepared for auch an action •. Other rea•ons were:. (l) attack- 
ing the Republican leadera, part1cularl1 Sukarno, waa 
tantamount to en attack on the Republ1o:1tselt, tor these 
leader• s7mbol1zed nationalism for the rmas ot thet, Indonea1an 
peopleJ (2) the pea1antJ7 was comparativel7 well ott tor 
1ntlat1ona17 condition.1 had enabled them to wipe out a · .. 
large part or their 1ndebtedne1a1 (3) the oommuniats over- 
eatimated the 1upport which the7·had trom labor and trom 
within the armed torce1 ot·the Republic. D1aaat1ataot1on 
existed.in both ot the1e.groups.becauae of economic cond1t1onaJ 
neither group was, however, willing to support a movement 
to overthrow a government which ~as.tho.17mbol or Indonesian 
nat1onal1am,52 
4th Interim Report fd.. !h.! Committee .2! ~ 0.fficea 
On 15 Uovember 1948 the Committee ot Good Otticea 
submitted.to the Secur1t1 Council its tourth interim report~ . ' ,:. 
51Kahin·, · Nat1o~ai1~m nnd R~volution in Indo~eoia, pp. 289-~00. Chapter IX of tiiii book, pagea256-3031 
present• a clear picture of the events loading to the communiat revolt. 
• • 
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In this report the Committee noted that no political . . . 
nagot1at1ons had been held under ita auspices since the 
end of May; in addition, the Netherlands delegation had been 
"reluctant" to consider the Australian-United States working 
paper and prior· to~ 10 September, on which date the United .: 
s·tatea delegation hB.d aubin1 tted a dratt proposal, ne1 ther 
had ottered a'proposal tor an over-all settlement or the 
dispute. Thia stalemate in political negot1at1ona had tour 
consequences or major 1mportanoei '"(a) 'A· deterioration in 
the· economic situation within the Republic, and a dela1 
in the economic rohab111tnt1on ot Indonesia aa a wholeJ 
(b) 'An increase in political d1tt1ciilt1ea within the 
Republic : · ( c) An·· ·incroO.ae in poll tic al tens! on· be tween the 
partiea; (d) ·An increasing atra!n on the truce; with the. 
ever-present poss1bil1ty·or 1t•'general breakd0wn~n5:5 
The Comm1ttee•i estimate or the a1tuat1on'·conoluded.w1th: 
the observation that direct talks which were commencing 
at'that time might Qrepreaent a serious and possibly final 
attempt or the parties to!reach an over-all 1ettlement." 
These direct talks' were thf>. result ot an ott1c1al ?:~ther- 
land1 comnnmique dated 22 ?lovember which had announced that·., 
the NetherlQnds Govomment telt · that .. 1t ·might. be possible 
to reach a t1nal solut1on.54· , . 
! .: 
.. . 
.s: 
5~secur1t1 Council, Otficlal Records, Third Year, 
Supplement for December 1948, Document s/1685, ·P· 2. . l 
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. . . . Special Report .2!l !h! Direct Talks Between !h! Netherlands 
~~Republic 
. The Committee of Good Otticea, on.12.December,. 
aubmitted a special report.to the Security Council regarding 
the direct talks being carried on between the Netherlands 
and the Republic. The report presented the official view. 
ot both parties, each of which placed the·blame tor ta1luro. 
to·reach an agreement on the other. The Committee stated 
that the collapao ot direct talks intensified an alread7 .. 
aggravated 11tuat1on which threatened.to lead to complete' 
abandonment or the truce and a resumption ot hostilities. 
The report de•or1bed the propoaed establishment ot an 
interim federal government b7 the Netherlands, which action 
t ' • • ,: , ( ' '· ' .. .. t : . . ~ • 4 • : 
"is apparentl7 to occur before l January 1949," aa an 
~ ' • ._ ~ • ;.~ ,. . ·r ~ ' • ' t . .... . .. , • " . ' ... : . !.. ' . , . : 
action which would strengthen the Republic•• opinion that 
'. 
the Netherlanda intended to establish unilaterally a 
. ~ ' . United States ot Indonesia without the Republic. The 
• .. t • 
Committee alao concluded that, since the Dutch had openly 
stated that further negot1at1ona would be futile, almost · 
no chance existed t~r a re~Wnptio~ of bona rtde n~got1at1ons. 55 . . .. 
' ' .. ' ,.. . •' ' 
By a letter dated 14 December Mr; Palar urgod the 
Security Council to meet immediately tor the purpose of 
' . \ . 
. considering measure's to prevent a worsening of the ai tuation 
and to bring about a resumption ~r.·negoti~tiona~ The 
55:rb1d., Document S/1117, pp, 122-12~. Appendix VI, pp. 194-209, conta1na the Australian-United States working paper which the Dutch absolutely retused to consider as a basis for negotiation. 
• • 
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. Republican Government believed the aituation constituted 
a threat to the peace in view ot the special report or the . . 
Comm! ttee_ ot Good Offices in_ which. that body reported 
"that 1t has no confidence that even the present unaatia- . ·• .· . . . 
factor1 leve.l ot tr~ce enforcement can be mintained •••• "56 
On 18 December. the Committee ot Good Ottice1 · •• s.. .1 . • 
. aubm! tted t_o the Council. a report aupplementa17 to the one 
ot.l~ December. -~h1a report merel7_contalned commun1cat1ona 
Which had passed ~etween the repreaentat1vea ot the Nether- 
lands and tha,Republio as the part1ea tut1le17 attempted to 
create a baa1s upon which negotiations could be reaumed.57 
Renewal .2! Host111t1ea 
. . . . 
Ottices cabled a report to the President ot the Securit,- 
' t \ Council atat1ng·that the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands 
delegation had 1ntormed the United Statea representative 
. . . . . ' "that Netherlands torce1 had already commenced m111ta17 
operationa against the Republic and had creased the 1tatua 
,guo line into Republ1oen.terr1to~." The Committee urgentl1 
reque'sted ·the Security Coun~·11 to co~aider'· the ,out-bre'ak 
. . • ~ ' • . : .· ~ ' . ! ' . .• • '. ,,, or host111t1es in· Indone.aiaJ the Committee also riot.ed that 
thia resumption ot host1llt1ea waa· in violation ot the _ ." .. - .. 
Renville Agreeimnt in that no notice ot r~pud1at1on_ot the 
56Ib1d., Dooumont S/1120, PP• 210-211. - 
57Ib1d., Document S/1129 & Corr. 1,· pp. 215-224. 
.. . 
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truce agreement by the Netherlands had been received by 
the Committee ot Good Ot.t'icea ;.as· a whole .5a ·· 
Because ot the reaumpt1on ot military- operations in 
·- t ' • Indonesia, Mr. Je11up ot the United States, ·by ·a letter . . 
dated 19 I>ec~ber, 'requested that the President call an 
emergency meeting ot the Securit7 Counoil.59 Dy a letter 
bearing the same date, the Notherlands repreaent&tive 
submitted a memorandum to the President setting torth the 
reasons ~ich motiv~ted the'DU.tch to resume hoat111t1es. 
In general, the Dutch laid the bla~ upon en "increasing 
. . ' . . . number of 1nt1ltrat1ona ot Republican armed groups and ot 
acts ot ·violence ·Perpetrated by them against the Indonesian 
Population in Uetherland1~controlled terr1tocy.~. •" ·The · 
Netherlands Governme.nt maintained that it had notified the 
Committee of Good ·otiicea ot 1ta intention to terminate 
the Truce ·.Agre.ement ~ thus 11biding by art1~1:e 10 ot that 
agreement~E30 ~ ; 
"(,'·• 
The next day the Netherlands repre~~ntative trans- 
mitted to the President of the S~curity Council the·co1:1monto 
ot the Netherl&nds delegation'on the special report or the 
Comm1ttoe ot Good Ott1ces. Thia report objected to thG 
•tatementa in the CQmmittee•a report pertaining to the 
Probable results ot the eatabl1ahment ot an Interim Federal 
· 58Ib1d., Document S/1129/Add. l & Corr. l, PP• 224-228. Thia documenr-a110 contains a list of Ropubl1aan truce 
•1olat1ons aubm1tted by the Netherlands delegation. 
59Ibid., Document S/1128, P• 21,. - 60Ib1d., Document S/1130, PP• 228-231. - 
!· ,, ., 
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Governmsnt by the Netherlands; the Nethorlands, ot course, 
telt that the report should have pointed out "that the 
Republican point or .view is oppo~ed ~o the letter and 
the. spirit o£. the .R.~nvill,~ pr1n_c .. 1ples and that the 
Republican violations ot the truce continue at an over- 
increasing rate."~l 
,0 •••. The. League or .A.~ab St~tes appealed to the Sec~! ty 
Council, by a ca~legram to the President ot the Council 
dated 21 December, to order_the Netherlands to halt their 
military operations in Indoneaia.62 On the aame da1 the 
Netherlands representativo traMm1tte.d. to the Prea1dent 
a report containing ad~1t1onal .1ntorma.t1on c~.erning 
the situation in Indonesia •. Thia report contained the text 
.ot a apeech made by.the Netherlands Minister tor Foreign . .. ~ . 
Attalra on 19 December in which he 1tated that the Nether- . •'• 
landa Government had:demonstrated that it was willing to 
co-operate 1n t1nd1ng_a wa7 to giv~ freedom and sover~ignt7 
to Indones1~, but th~t the Republic refused to accept the 
other Indonesian States as equal partnera. The rest or 
the report.dealt with the ~ailure ot the Republic to.adhere 
to the Renville ~greemon~ and.to the number or violations 
ot the truce agreement by Republican troopa trom 1 January 
to 14 DeceMber 1948.63 
61Ib1d., Document S/1131, PP• 231-241. - 
62tb1d., Document S/1135, PP• 246-247. - 
63Ibid., Dooumont s/1136/Rev. 1, PP• 247-285. • • - 
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Reports from the Committee .2!_~ Offices 
In responae to a request trom the Securit7 Council, 
the Committee or Good Ottices submitted another report, 
dated 21 December, on the Indonea1an situation. 'Thia 
report contained the following conclusion11 (a) the 
Netherland.a Government had railed to not1r1 the Committee 
that Holland had repudiated the Truce Agreement and thus 
had tailed to compl7 with article 10 ot that Agraement; 
(b) there was no action on the part or Republican troopa 
which might have legitimatel7 precipitated the Netherlands 
action; (c) negot1at1ona under the auapicea ot the Committee 
. . 
we~e not adequatei1 ut111zedJ the direct talks preceding . . 
the Dutch military action.could not b~ con11de~ed to be 
. . . . 
negotiations since t.heJ consisted onl7 of Netherland• d~manda 
' . ' ). . . .. . . ... . 
tor acceptance or their point or view en all important 
iasuea; (d) in commencing m111tar1 operations, the Dutch 
Government violated "its obligations under tlit Renville . 
Truce Agreement."64 The following da7 the Committee aubniitted 
another report to the Counc11J tor th:J most part, this 
communication dealt with a description or the Netherlands 
attack on Jogjakarta on 19 December and on Kaliurang on 
20 December. The report noted that commun1cat1ons had been 
broken between Kaliurang and aa'tav1a tor • tour-day .period. 65 
On 23 December the Security Council received another report 
64Ib1d., Document S/1138, pp. 287-294. 
65Ib1d., Document S/1144, PP• 295-296. 
• • 
iso 
trom the Committoo of Good Otticea~· The Committee informed 
the Cotmoll that most or the Committee •a military observ~·ra· 
were returning to Batavia 1n compliance with orders rec.eived 
trom Netherlands military commanders •. The Acting Chairman 
ot the Netherlands delegation had informed the Committee 
that, ainoe the truce agreement was no longer binding, the 
m111tat7 observers• task had come to an end.66 
380th ~ ~89th Meetings, 22 December 1948 
In re1ponse to the request ot the United States 
representative the Security Council resumed consideration 
ot the Indonesian question at it~ 388th meeting. itr. van 
Roijen, Netherland• representative, stated that,the policy 
'. . ' ~ 
ot his Government, though it had been hampered b7 a lack ot. 
' ,- . ,.._ •. . 
cooperation on the po.rt of ext~emist groups in the Bepubl1o, 
"1a and rennins the promotion ot ti» freedom ot Indonesia 
1n order to create a sovereign federation or Indonesia 
I. 
linked in voluntary and equal partn~rship with the Kingdom 
or the Netherlands in a Netherlanda-Indoneaian union." . -~ . 
The purpoae of Dutch mil~tnry action was to eliminate . . 
irresponsible and extremist elements in portions or Central 
Java and SunBtra. The rest of l~. van R.>ijen'• speech, 
which consumed the entire meeting,.•~• concerned with a 
h1stoey or the happening• in Indonesia ainoe the signing 
or the Re~v1lle Agreement, with empha11a upon what the Dutch 
----------------------------------------------------------- •• 66Ib1d., Document S/1146 and Corr. 1, pp. 297-298. 
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conaidered to be the failure or~th•:Republic_to cooperate 
in implementing th1• agreement.67 At the a!'ternoon meeting 
Mr. Palar of Indoneaia presented the views or his Govern•, 
ment concerning the Dutch m111taey action. He maintained 
that, 1n actuality,, the Dutch policy was a "deliberate 
continuation of its economic end political warrare--a.!'ter 
the signing of tho truce agreement w1 th. the_ Republic--. 
carried out in outright violation or that agreement." 
The Indonesian representati•e rererred to.the Dutoh economic 
rostr1ct1ons, the establishment or new atatea in West Java, 
Madura. East Sumatra, Pasundan, ~d_South Sum~tra, and to 
Dutch demands that their terms be accepted as evidence or 
the intention ot the Netherland• Goverriment to eliminate 
.the Republi~. 6S Follow1.ng. this speech, Mr. Jessup ot the 
'· United States, after noting the seriousness ot the a1tuat1on, 
atated that hi• Govornment railed to tind an7 just1f1oat1on 
tor the renewal or m111tar7 operations -in Indoneaia. He 
. . 
further stated that his Government telt that the cease-tire 
· order or 1 August 1947 was •till binding and that the 
< 
Netherlands had violated this order by taking arimd·action. 
In view ot the taot that the situation in Indonesia could 
easily th.reatcn i~temat~onal peace, the United States 
. . . \ ' 
Joined w1 th Colombia and Syria in submitting a draft . . . 
resolution to th~ Council.69 This resolut.1on, atter .noting 
67secur1 tI Ooun.c11, 01'f1clal Records, Third Year, 
Number 132 (388th and 389th Meetings), 22 Deoelliber 19481 
PP• 1-31. 
68Ib1d., PP• ~1-42. - 
• • 
69Ib1d _., PP• 42-49. 
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that the outbreak ot host111tie1 waa in contliot with the 
cease-tire order ot l Aug\ist, ordered tho parties to cease 
hostilities 1mmad1ately and to withdraw their armed forces 
to their respective sides or the demilitarized zones which 
had been established under the Truce Agreement ot 17'Janu&r7 
1948. The resolution also instructed the Committee or Good 
orticea (1) to report to the Security Cowicil on t.he events 
which had taken place in Indonea1a's1nee 12 December, and 
(2) to aasesa re1pons1b111t1 tor the outbreak or hoat111t1ea.70 
390tb ~ 39lst Meetings, 23 December 1948 · · 
Mr. Hsia of China was or the opinion that the . , . ' '.·.. . .. 
Secur1t7 Co?11c11, in view. ot .1t1 past a~~1ons, was competent 
to deal w1 th the renowed outbreak o~- hos t111 ties J. he also 
pointed out that a real partnership ~d cooperation between 
the Natherlands and Indonesia was no.t likely to be estnbl1shed 
bJ the employmont ot.torce.7~ C~lonel Hodgson of Austrai1a 
' . 
presented a history of the events in Indonesia, emphasizing 
. ' . .. . . . 
the raot that the N_eth~rlands had conduot~d negotiations 
which had not been held wider the o.uap1ces of the Committee . . 
or Good Offices and had dermndad acceptance of Neth!rlands . .. ", \~ ·. . ·- . \ . . 
terms. The Australian representative proposed an amendment . - .• • J . .. I· 
to the joint draft re solu~1 on. subm1 t.ted by ths United States, 
70seour1ty Co~c11, Official Records, Third Year,· 
Supplement tor Deceni>er l948, Document S/1142, PP• 294-295. 
71secur1ty Couno11, Official Records, Third Year, 
Number 133 (390th and 39lat Meetings), 23 December 1948, 
PP• 1•5. 
•• 
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Colombia, and Syria. This amendment would delete the laat 
paragraph which instructed the Committee to report on eventa 
that had taken place since 12 December. The Australian 
delegation felt that the Council alread1 poaaea1ed aut't1o1ent 
1nt'armat1on end that responsibility should be asseaaed b7 
the Couno11 on the basis ot this in!"orimtion. The.amend• 
ment turther oalled tor (1) the 1mrmd1ate release ot the 
President -or the Republic and other political prisoners. 
who had been arrested since 18 Dece~er, and (2) t.b.e , 
Committee ot Good Ott!ces to observe;and report on com- 
pliance with the Council'• instructions ~nd to aee that no 
reprisals or punitive action be taken against 1ndiv1duala.?2 
.. At the ~9lst meet1~g the Representatives or Syria and 
India both condemned the Dutch tor resorting to the use ot 
military torce and urged the Securit7 Council to take 
ir.nnediate action to atop the host111t1e• in progresa.?3 
Mr. Malik of the U .S .S .R • declared that in ol l the 
time. that the Indonesian question had been before the 
Council, that body had not yet dealt with the problem 
t1rmly and errectivelyJ the ~ov1et delegate again charged 
• - f ' : • 
that the Co111J1ittee o£ Good Ott1ces merely operated to 
protect the colonial interests or the Netherlands. Mr. Malik 
p·laced the reapon11b111ty for all or the trouble in Indonesia 
upon the. Netherlands pol101 ttor colonial oppre111on, terror 
72Ib1d., PP• 5-1?~· The text or the Australian 
amendment may be round on pagea 15-16. 
73Ib1d., PP• 18-29. 
• • 
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and brute force applied to Indonesian patriots, ot shame- 
less oxplo1tat1on and inhuman oppreas1on of the local . population ••• •" Ile then stated that.the U.S,S.R. dele- 
gation could not support the Joint _draft resolution aince 
(l) they telt that tho or.der to with~aw armed tor~ea 
"should be addressed only to the Notherlands aa the 
aggressor," e.nd (2) the last clause calling.for the 
Committee or Good Offices to a11e11.responaibilit1 created 
• ' • • ' . ' .. I'. ....... ..-. 
ttthe false impression thB t - the Col.lllcil does not know which 
' . . "' . . ~ . ' . ~ 
11 the attacking Pf!lrtr, who_began operat1~na against whom 
and which agreenenta were broken."74 
.. . ~ 
392nd Meeting, 24 December 1948 
At the opening ot' tho 392nd ~et1ng, - r.tr. ?.talik · 
- . 
submitted~ resolution which \'OUld (1) condemn Nethorlnnds 
• • 1 , 
aggression; (2) r~quiro the immediate cessation or mili- 
tary operations e.nd the withdrawal ot Dutoh'troopa to.the 
positions T/h1ch they had occupied prior to the renewal or 
m111ts.ry operations; (3) require the 1mned1ate treeing or 
the President of the Republic and other Republican political 
. .. . . . . . 
leaders arrosted b7 the DutchJ and_ (4) provido tor tho 
creation of a· commi•s!on of,t~_Secur1t1 Council which 
would be compo~~d_or all the States members of the Council 
and requ1re.th~S. comm11sion to supervise the fulfillment 
•• 
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ot ceaaation or militarr operations and tho withdrawal or 
troops.75 
.. Ths French delegate, ifr. Parodi, expreaaed 
the.opinion' that, in spite or the tact that the action 
,, ' _• I •. ' ' . - .. taken by the Netherland.a Government wa1 "brutal and shock- 
ing," the Security Council was without competence in regard 
to th• ~ituation.76 
Mr. van Ro1Jen spoke in· opposition to the joint 
resolution on the groundathat '<i) a ceasatio~ ot. host111t1ea 
would restore the chaos which had exiated pr~viou1ly, · 
(2) the Committee1ot Good Office• had no j\irisd1ct1on over 
an internal 'confi1ot. and was not competent to asle11 re1- 
pon11bil1ty tor the 'cour•• of 'event•,'and (3) the with- 
drawal ot Dutch troop• 110uld allow terrible ·act• ·or 
repriaal against th• population or the evacuated areas by 
. .. ' - undisciplined torcea. · The Netherlands Govemment also 
ma1nt~ined its poai tion that· the. Securit7 Council did not. 
have 'jlir1adict1on.in this matte:r~77 The Bel.Stan 'repre~ 
1entative wa• also or ·th• opinion that the question or · 
competence waa not 1et·iettled and that the Security 
Council aotuall7 did not have legal jurisdiction over the 
75securitY Council, Ottic1al Rec.ords, Third .Yea:r 
Number 134 (392ndMeetlngJ, 24 December 1948, pp.· e-s. ' 
The text o£ the So~iet.~e1olution may be found on page 3. 
76Ib1d., PP• 7-12. - .. 77 ., . Ibid., PP• 13-24. ~. van Ro1jen alao referred to a document which presented the Dutch view of the economic 
reatr1ct1ons imposed upon Indonesia. Thia document may b• found in Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, 
Supplement tor December !948, Document S/ll57, pp. 315-319. • • 
Indone11an question. 78 · 
The joint resolution was then put.to a vote, paragraph 
by paragraph. Atter being voted on in th1• mnner, the 
amended text was voted on as a whole and wa1 adopted by a 
vote ot 7 to none with 4 abstaining. Th& adopted resolution 
called tor.a cessation or hostilities, ·the immediate release 
of the Preaident ot the Republic and other political pr11onera . . 
arrested since 18 December, and i~struotiona to the Committee 
ot Good ott1ce• to report t~ the C~cil on the event• which 
had takBn place a1nce 12 Dece~er and_to report to the 
Col.Ulcil on th• complianc~ of the parties with the above 
provi11ona. 79 Th• Soviet reaolution waa alao put to a .• ' i . 
Tote, paragraph by parag~aph, but was reje~ted in it1 
entirety.so .•. t' 
1 
., ( 1 .. ·,. . ,. 
Mr. Ritchie, repre1entative or Canada, presented 
t .- •• ~ , ! ·. \ • - 
a dra!'t resolution instructing the Committee or Good Otficea . . . .·. .• . .. . ...... . "'" ' 
to aubmit a report recommending practicable 1teps which the 
. , . , . r· • • ··•. ~ . . 
, , l , • • I ·• , 
Security Counc11,~1ght take in or~~r to eatabliah peaceful_ 
oond1t1on• in Indoneaia.81 ,Aa th• proposal 1eemed amb1guou~ 
.... ..... ' e , ,. ' • : ·_,. -·. ~ • ;_ .. • 
to a number or the Members ot the Council, th9 repreaenta- 
tivea or Australia, Syria, and the United States all 
79Jbid., PP• 30-38. The text ot the amended 
resolution-me:y be found on pagea 37-38. . . . 
· eo Ibid.~ PP• 39-42. 
61Ibid., P• 42. The text of the Canadian reaolution •• 
may be tound in Seouritx Council, Oft1o1al Record1, Third 
Y~ar, Supplement for December 1948, Document s/ll49, P• 298. 
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introduced amendment• tor the purpose or clarity1ng it.82 
Neither the amendmanta nor the dratt resolution itaelt 
wa1.adoptedJ the vote on the reaolut1on waa 6 1n·tavor, 
none against, and 5 abstentiona.83 
Reports !£2.!?! !h.!. Comm1 ttee 91 Good Offices 
The Security Council received reports rrom the 
Committee or Good Offices dated 25 and 26 December. The 
first or these report• r.JSrelr contained the letters which 
the Committee had sent to the delogritiona or the Netherlands 
and the Republic, respectively, requesting the partie1 to 
cooperate with the Committee and ita m111tary.a11istnnt1. 
The letter to the Netharland• Gov~rnment aleo requested. 
that Government to provide the President ot the Republic 
£nd his Govoniment with all tac111t1es necessary to issue 
directions from Jogjakarta or any other city that they 
might chooae.84 The report aubm1tted.on 26 Decent>er 
outlined the.major events which had taken place in Indonea1a 
s1noe 12 December. The Committee concluded that (1) nego- 
tiations :presupposed that neither party would attempt to 
\ 
cooroe the other by use or arimd torcea and that each waa. 
willing to oompromiae with the reasonable viewpoint ot.tbe . 
82Ib1d~, PP• 49-52. 
83 Ibid•, PP• 56-57, 
84seour1ty Council, Oft'icial Records. Third Year, 
Supplement for December 1948, Document S/!154, pp. 305- 
307. 
t I 
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other, (2) the Indonsaians would be reluctant "to accept a1 
~~any negotiations in which again they start wlth 
an area under their control diminished as a result or the 
resort to arimd torce ••• ," and (3) aince the demarcation 
line no longer existed, it vould not be possible tor the 
Committee's military obsorvera to distinguish between . 
internal security measures and hostilities between the 
partiea.85 
~93rd Meetinz, 27 December 1948 
The representative of the Netherlands opened the 
393rd meeting with a brief atatemsnt to.the etrect that 
the.action in Java hnd.pra~t1cal17 end~d~~cept tor cl~shea 
. - l , • 
with "irregular arnBd bands," that the· goal ot Netherlands' 
policy was still the establishment ot ~ all:Indor"esi.an 
. . . . . 
,· • . • t_"', .. . • ' . ~ ~ ... . ~ • • 
federal interim Government, and that fourteen prominent 
Republic.ans 1~ Batavia had been rele'ased.86 The policy or 
the Netherlands toward Indonesia and the hBndling. ot the 
' . . . Indonesian question by the Security Council was assailed 
by the Ukrainian dele$ate, Mr. Tarasenko; he then submitted 
' . . 
a dratt resolution which called tor thft 1nrred1ate withdrawal 
ot Netherlands troopi to the positions which they had occupied 
prior to the renewal or m111tar1 operations.87 
85~'., Document s/1156, pp. 307-315. 
86seour1ty Council, Official Records, Third Year, 
Number 135 (393rd Mestlng), 27 December 1948, pp. 1-~. • · 
87 ' Ibid., PP• 3-7. The text or the Ukrainian resolution 
mar be round on page 6. 
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Mr. Malik questioned the desire ot the Netherl.9inds to· 
ceaae'host111t1esJ according to the Soviet delegate, the 
statements or Mr. van Ro1Jen constituted "a direct refusal 
on the ·part o£ the Netherlands Government to ceass hoat11• 
1t1ea against the Republic or Indonesia." In view or thi• .. , 
situation,~· Malik. sub~1tted.a res~lut1on which noted 
that the Netherlands Government bad not ended military . . ' , ' :: " 
operations against t~e Republic and .order~d "r:rl.11tar7 
operations to cease within twent7•four hour• ot the adoption 
ot the present resolution."88 
Ur. El-Khouri or S7ria and Mr. Desai of India both 
noted that the President or th• Republic had not yet been 
releaaod and the latter delegate telt that armed torce1 . . . ~ . . ' 
should be withdrawn to tho linea_ occupied prior to the 
renewal ot m111t.ary operations .a9., These. opinioll~ .~ere 
followed bJ a lengthy speech b7 Air• Malik, who accused the 
' < I ' • • • <• ' 
. Uni tad State• or b.e1ng oppoaed to the wi.thdrawal or. troopa.90 
· Following this speech, both the Ukrainian resolution_ and the , 
Soviet proposal were put to a voteJ both were deteated, the 
former b7 a vote ot,6 in favor and 6 abstentions, the latter . . . . 
by a vote or 4 in tavor snd 7 abstentions. Mr. Palar, in 
the concluding apeech o! the day, charged that the ,Nether- 
landa was u11ng delaying tactic• in order that their m111ta.17' 
. ea · Ibid., PP• 7•8. 
ma7 be round on page a. The text or the Soviet proposal 
89tb1d., PP• 9·13. - 90Ib1d., PP• 24-35. - 
. ' 
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objectives might be achieved in defiance or the Securit7. 
Couno11.91 
395th Meeting, 28 December 194~ 
In the interim between d1acuaa1ona ot the Indonesian 
question at the 393rd meeting and at.the 395th meeting, the 
' . . Ch1neae delegate submitted a dratt resolution tor consider- 
ation b7 the Council. Thia proposal noted that theNether- 
lands Government had not released.the President ot the 
Republic and other political prisoners in accordance with 
the Council's resolution of 24 December and called tor the 
release of those perso~s within twent7-tour hours after the 
ado~t1on or the resolution.92 
, , ·. ' I .. The earl7 part'ot the debate at the 395th mieting 
. ' 
dealt with the failure of the Netherlands to release· 
' . . . political prisoners; the delegations of Syria, Indonea1a, 
and China.wanted an 1nmed1ate decision taken on this.subject 
while the Netherlands representative requested a delay until 
the tollawing morning pending receipt or authoritative 
inform~tion from hi• Gov~rnm~nt,93 The Soviet delegate 
supported the Chinese resolution, but felt that it did not 
go tar ono~~ Mr._ Malik maintained that the Securit7 
91Ib!d •• PP• 35-39. - 92secur1tx Council, Official Records, Third Year, 
Number 136 (3g4th and 395th t;etinga), 28 December 1948, 
P• 48. The text of the Chinese r~1olution ma7 be found on 
page 51. •' 
93Ib1d., PP• 48-54. 
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Council should not only demand the release ot political 
prisoners, but should also demand that the Netherlands 
Goverrunont cea1e hostilities and withdraw ita troops trom 
Republican territorr.94 Mr. El-Khouri of Syria proposed 
changing the wording in the t1r•t paragraph ot the Chineae 
resolution in order to take cognizance~ the tact that 
fourteen political pr1aonora had been releaaed, but not 
the President and h1a Cab1net.95 The amended Chine•• 
reaolut1on waa adopt•d bJ a vote or 8 in tavor, with 3 
abatentiona.96 
The Couno11'.then cons1dered· the Colombian dratt 
resolution which called tor the consular representatives 
in Batavia to submit to the Council a complete report . ,. - . ' . 
covering tho observance or the ~ease-fir~ end ~ondit~ona 
, I • 
in areas under m111 tary occ_upation or trom which tr~op1 
might be withdrawn. Thia resolution had been submitted 
I aa a working paper at the 393:d meeting; it was advanced as 
a draft resolution when the Ukrainian proposal failed ot 
adoption. The Colombian repreaentst1ve emphasized that 
~ ' . ·. . . 
this resolution waa not intended to circumvent tt_ie Committee 
ot Good Offices, but. nsrely to overcome the ob ject1onm ot 
those who telt that the Committee•a terms or reference did 
94Ib1d., pp• 55-58~ -.- 
95~., P• 65. 
96rb1d., P• 67. - •• 
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not include ·such an operation.97 The repreaentatives ot 
tho Soviet Union and ·or the Ukrainian s.s.R. oppoaed the 
Colombian resolution aince it did not demand withdrawal of 
troop1 and since they tel t that 1 t ·would be pre judicial to 
the Indonesian people.98 Mr. Jessup of the United States 
or.rared an amondoent slightly al taring the style of the· · 
wording ot the resolution which was.accepted by the Colombian 
delegatet.99' The proposal was adopted by ·a vote or 9 in 
favor with 2 abstentions.100 
.. 
Report·.2!:·.ih! Committee .2! Good Offices 
In accordance with the Security Council's resolution 
ot 24 December, the Committee or Good Offices submitted a . : . 
report, dated 29 December, dealing with.the extent or . ' .. 
compliance with the cease-fire order and the release or 
political prisoners. This report contained letters of 
enquiry on compliance with the Council's resolutions which 
had been sent to the parties by the Committee and tho replies 
trom the parties• The Indonesian delegate had replied, in 
a letter dated 28 December,· that he was unable to imke 
contact with·either thG Republican Government or the 
. , 97Ib1d., PP• 67-68 •. The text of. the Colombian 
resolution may bo found 1n Securit7 Council, Official Records, 
Third Year, Uumbe_r 135 (393r~ !!ee~ing), 27 'necomber l948, p , 21. 
98Ib1d., PP• 69-73, 76-78. 
1--' ' •I 
99Ib1d., P• 79. The amended text ot the Colombian 
resolut1on-mii1 bo found on page 80. 
lOOibid., PP• 82-63. 
• • 
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Republican delegation as they had been interned and he had 
received no 1ntormat1on·about them. By a letter of the 
same date the Netherlands delegation informed the Committee 
that fifteen Republicans had been released on 24 December; 
as to the letter ot enquiry, the Netherlands delegate 
•tated that ho would not be able to g1Te a tinal reply as 
there was not tiv~ to consult the Netherlands Government. 
In the remainder of the report the Committee noted that, 
aa or 26 December, they were in contact with only one party, 
the Netherlands; in addition, the Netherlands Government had 
not authorized the return ot military observers to the tield 
and had withheld permission which would allow the Committee · 
to operate aircraft, with the consequence that the Committee 
was unable to obtain first-hand information on the military 
a1tuat1on from its own representatives.101 
396th Meeting, 29 Decembe~ 1948 
At the opening or discussion of the Indonesian 
question on 29 December, Mr. van Roijen presented to the 
Council a declaration of the Netherlands Government. This 
declarnt1on included the toll.owing pointst (1) Uathor- 
lands forces in Java would cease hostilities on 31 December 
1940 at the latestJ cessation of ho~t111t1es in Sumatra 
would require two or three more days because of a "special 
e100rgenc7 situation." It would still be necessary to 
•• 
lOlseourity Council, ·Official Records, Third Year, 
Supplement for December 1948, Vocumant s/1166, PP• 319-~24. 
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continue action against disturbing elements.· (2) The 
Netherlands Government would litt the restrictions on 
freedom or movement from "a number or prominent personalities" 
1t such persons agreed to retrain trom "aot1v1t1es endanger- 
ing public security." (3) 'l'he Netherlands Prime ?Unister 
was to leave for Indone's ia w1 thin k tew days. ( 4) The 
Netherlands Government had granted "all possible tao111t1es" 
to the military observers and their starts and was prepared 
to grant similar tac1lit1ea to members or the Consular 
Commission. In connection with the third point, Mr. van 
Roijen added thnt with the arrival~ the Netherlands 
Prime Minister in Indonesia, consultations tor the establish- 
ment or an all-Indonesian federal interim governmsnt could 
begin.102 
!fr. Palar expressed extreme disappointment 1n the 
development or the d1aouse1ona and the dec1aiona taken on 
the violations of the truce a~reement b1 the Netherlands. 
He also stated that be.bad received a telegram trom the 
Indonesian representative in Singapore reporting that the 
Secretary-General o! th• Miniatr7 or Education and the 
Secretary-General ot the Ministry ct Intormation hnd been 
murdered by the Dutch. In addition to this, the Nether- 
lands Government, according to Mr. Palar, had issued a 
statement which was in completo defiance ot the Secur1t7 
Council resolution. In view ot these tacts, the Indonesian 
102secur1t~ Council, Official Records, Third Year, 
Nwnber 137 (396th :eating), 29 December l94S, PP• 26-27. 
I ' 
145 
representative reserved his position unt1l,the Council 
would take the·necesaar1 ateps to deal with the s1tuat1on.l03 
w Mr. Falla of the Un1ted·K1ngdom, 1n view ot the 
statement made by the-Netherlands representative, telt that 
the Council should rerrain trom turther action until its 
tirst imeting in 1949.l04 ~he Indian representative. how- 
ever, was very critical of the Netherlands statement, 
holding 1t to constitute an attitude.or detianoa in regard 
' . to the reaolut1on ot the Secur1t7 Council. Mz-.,Deaa1 felt 
that the problem betore the Seeur1ty Council had changed 
trom the dispute between the Netherlands Government nnd 
the Government ot the·Republic of Indonesia to a problem 
. 1nvolv1ng the Netherlands Government on the one hand and 
the Secur1 ty council on the other·.ios Mr. El-Khouri pointed 
out that the Dutch statement meant that "tho Hetherlands 
will order a cease-tire when the operations are completed 
and when the Indonesian Republic haa been completely wiped 
out." Aa to the second portion or the Netherlands statement, 
the Syrian delegate maintained that the Dutch intended to 
deprive the Indonesian leaders or the rir,ht "to engage 1n 
politics or to work tor the interests or their country."106 
Mr. Malik supported this position with a great deal or 
vehemence. declaring that the Netherlands waa an aggressor 
10~Ib1d~. PP• 27-28. --- . 
104Ib1d;, PP• 28-30. - 
105rb1d~, PP• 30-33. - 
l06Ib1d., PP• 33-~4. - 
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who refused to pay any heed to the Security Council end 
the United Nations.107 
Mr. Jessup, arter noting that no further resolution 
was needed to point out that the Netherlands had tailed to 
comply with the Security Council resolutions, advocated 
postponement ot turthe~.ac~ion on the part of the Council 
. . . until the first meeting in Januar7, 1949, YJhen additional 
reports trom the Committee ot Good Offices would be avail- 
able.lOS The meeting closed with both the Ukrainian s.s.R. 
and the SoY1et delegates condemning the Seeurit7 Council, 
allegedly led by the United Kingdom and the United States, 
tor sanctioning Netherlands aggression by tailing to adopt 
the resolutions· proposed by·. the representative• or the 
U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian s.s.R.l09 
. lO?Ibid,, PP• :S4-:S7. - 108Ib1d. PP• :59-4:1. _., . ' 
109Ib1d., PP• ••-47. - 
CHAPTER V 
INDEPENDEUCE 
Reaction to Dutch npolice Aotionn - 
In the interim between 29 December 1948 and 
7 Januar11949, the date ot its t1rst meeting in the new 
year, the Securit7 council rooelyed communications from 
several ot 1ts.~~mbera as well as reports from both the 
Consular Commission and the Committee of Good Offices. 
On 31December1948 the.Indian delegation notified the 
Secretar7-oenoral th.at the United Kingdom Prime Minister 
had roqueated the Indian Government to "grant tac111t1ea 
and sate conduct" to Dutch aircraft carr11ng the Nether- 
lands.Fr1me Minister and his partr to Indonesia. Since 
the Indonesian question was under the active consideration 
ot the Council, the Indian Government felt it necessary to 
ask for the council'• approval before taking such action. 
Arter consulting General Mcllaughton,· President ot the 
Security Council tor Januar7, the Secretary-General advised 
the Indian Govemment to grant aare conduct.l 
On 3 January 1949 the Government of'rakistan, in a 
letter to thti President of the ·council, expressed disapproval 
' 1 • • I 
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ot the failure of the Security Council to halt Dutch 
activity in Indonesia •. As a minimum action the Security 
Council should require (1) the withdrawal ot Dutch troops 
to the positions which they had occupied before the 
resumption or military activity, (2) release ot Republican 
leaders s.nd restoration or their treedom and authority, 
and (3) resumption or negotiations under the auspices or 
the Committee ot Good Otticea •2 · 
By a letter or the same date the Uetherlands 
Government, through its permanent representative to the 
United Nations, suggested to the Security Council that, 
; 
in order to avoid contusion and misunderstanding, problems 
which were being directly discussed_ by the. Securit1 Council 
should not be.handled simultaneously by nexecutive organs 
1n Indonesia of the Netherlands Government and bJ the 
Committee ot Good Offices." This letter also pointed out 
that visits by the Committee's military obserTera to certain 
areas might 1nvo1Ye a great deal or. p·e~aonal danger for which 
. . . 
the Netherlands Government felt obliged to disclaim reapon- 
~ \ , .. . 
a1bil1ty.3 
The Consular Commission submitted a report to the 
Securit1 Council on 6 January: the purpose of this report 
was to point out the. need for t~ther cla~itlcation of the 
relationship or the Commission and the Committeo ot Good 
2~~, Document S/1179, PP• 3-4 • 
. . . - _, .. 
~Ibld., Document S/1180, pp. 4-5. 
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Ott1.ces, particularly in regard to the disposal ot 
military obaervera.4 By a letter ot the same date the 
Belgian Government, in view or the tact that its term as 
a Member ot the Secur1t7 Council had expired, requested 
that it be allowed to participate in the discussions of the 
Council on the Indonesian quest1on.5 
Report .2! ~Committee ,g!. ~ Offices 
on.7 Je.nu8.l7 the Committee of Good Offices submitted 
a report to tho Security Council 1n accordance with tho.t 
-body's resolution ot 24 Deceooer 1948. The Committee, 
attar reviewing the course of events sinoe 1ta last report 
on 29 December 1948, reached the tollow1ng concluaionat 
(1) the cease-tire order had not been complied withJ 
(2) the order issued to the Royal Netherlands-Indonesian 
Army in pursuance ot the cease-tire order could not be 
considered as an order to "cease hostilities torthw1tha" 
(3) the Committee had no ttrst-hand 1ntorr.at1on aince its 
m111tar7 observers were still immobilized; (4) the Committee 
requeated that the Security Council detine the tunot1ons ot 
that body as opposed to those vested in the Consular 
Commission; (5) the d11appe_erance of the truce d8atroyed 
the tunot!ons exercised by the Conrnittee as an instrument 
ot negotiation;· ·consequently~ the Comm! ttee brought to the 
4Ibtd.,. Document S/1190, PP• 17-18. 
5Ib1d., Document S/1192, P• 18. 
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attention ot·the Council "the problem or its present and 
ruture status."6 
397th Meeting, 7 January 1949 
The Securitr Council ccntinued discussion ot the 
Indonesian question on 7 January at its first meeting or the 
new year. Before opening debate, the President, General 
McNaughton or Canada, in the absence of an1 objection 
trom the Members, invited the representative of Belgium 
to participate in the discussions or the Council. Mr. van 
. . Ro1jen then briefly summarized the evf'.lnta which had taken 
place since the last imeting of the Council, including the 
. . 
issuance or what the Uetherlands termed to be a cease-tire 
. .. 
order and the treeing of a number or Republican political 
' leaders. The Netherlands delegate stated that, since their 
release might "endanger public security," Sukarno, Hatta, 
Sjahrir, and Salim were released trom enforced residence, 
but were limited to the island or Bnngka. Mr. van Roijen 
also noted. the arrival of the Netherlands Prime Minister, 
Mr. Drees, in Indonesia ~or the purpose of instituting 
consultations leading to the.establishment ot en all- 
Ind~nesian t~deral interim g~~ernment.7 Mr. Palar ot 
Indonasia drew the council's attention to the (1) reports 
6tb1d., Document S/1189, PP• 6·17. - - 
7seeur1t~Counc11, Of~1c1al Records, Fourth Year, 
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ot the Committee of Good Offices which stated that the 
Netherlands had v.1olated the Renville Agreement,· (2) Nether• 
. . lands cease-tire orders which countenanced continued 
military operations against guerillas, in other words the 
bulk or the Indonesian army, and (3) tact that the President 
ot the Republic as well as several other meobers of that. 
Government had not been released •. The Indonesian representa- 
tive advocated the withdrawal or Dutch troops to .the previou.,, 
truce lines.a 
General Romulo supported the latter.contention ot 
Mr. Palar. Tbe Philippine representative maintained that 
the cease-tire order could not bo implemented as it existed; 
he held that w1th~awal. ot troops was the onlr measure which 
would ensure observance of ~hat order.9; Sir Benegal_Rau:ot 
India brought to the attention ot the Council the tact . 
that the Prime Minister or India had invited titteen countries 
or the Southeast Asia area to neet 1n New Delhi to d1scuas 
the Indonesian problem;_ in calling this conference, ?l.r. Hehru 
had dsscribed the Dutch action as "the most naked and 
unabashed aggression and the use of armed might to suppress 
a people and a Government." Sir Benegal Rau also questioned 
whether continued Marshall Plan a!d to the Netherlands 
could be. just!tieu in viow o: the!JO activities in Indonesia:10 
8Ib1d., PP• ·i0-17. - .. 
. 9Ib1d.;Pt>. 11-25; 
10Ib1d., PP• 28·31. - 
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Reports .2! .!!!! Committee£! Q2.Q!! Offices ,gn M111tai:x Observers 
.!!ll!.! Visit !!!h Republican Leaders 
The Security Council was'1ntormed b7 the Committee 
of Good Otticea,· through a report dated 8 Januar7, ·that 
arrangement had been made for Rtha dispatch ot the m111ta?-7 
observers to various areas in Java and Sumatra beginning 
on the morning of 9 January."11 Three days later the 
Comm! ttee subm1 tted to the codneil 'copies or correspondence 
between itselt and the Natharland3. delegation re'garding a 
visit by the Committee to the President and other leaders 
' . . . 
ot the Republic. The Natherlands delegation stated that 
•· "competent authorities are now 1nvest1gatirig tho poss1b111t1 
ot acceding to this requostJ" the report noted that final 
arrangements had n.ot been comple.ted.12 The Gov~rnment ot 
Burma submitted an application to part1o1pa.te 1n the 
discussions or the Security Council on the Indonesian 
queat1on on 11 January and this requast was granted at the 
398th meeting~13 · 
~98tb Meeting, 11·Janua;:y 1949· 
•. 
The United States representative, Mr. Philip Jessup, 
stated that his Government considered the Dutch m1lita17 
llsecuritI Council,· Official Records, Fourth Year, 
Supplement for Januar11949, Document S/119!, P• 19. 
12~., Document S/1199, pp. 46-47. 
l~seourity Council, Ott1c1al Records, Fourth Year, 
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activity 'to be completel1 unjust1t1ed and in conflict w1 th· 
the Renville AgreementJ he telt that the Secur1t7 Council 
should place more reliance upon the reports ot 1ta own 
egenCJt the Committee ot Good Ottices, than upon those 
trenam1tted by the Netherlands· Government, one or the 
parties to the dispute. ·The United States·· delegate, atter 
chargin~ the Metherlands w1 th ta!lure to enter into l?.£n! · · 
~negotiations; declared that the first.steps toward an 
ultimate settlement ot the Indonesian problem should 
include (1) t1x1ng of a definite date tor the holding or 
elections throughout all Indonesia tor the purpose.or 
eatabliah1ng foundations tor a United States or Indonesia, 
and (2) tixing ot a definite date tor the transfer or . . .· ~ . . . 
sovereignty trom .the Netherland~ Gavernme~t to the GOYern- 
. • -~ . • . ' r. .e \ . ' 
mant of the United States ot Indone11a. In conclusion, . •. ~ . 
Mr. Jessup maintained that the u.s.s.R. was actually opposed 
... ;. • . . •• : • , '. ~ ~ ; i "; ~- ' • • • ' ; ; • 
to an independent Ind~nes1a, prer~rr1ng instead a government 
controlled by the communist party~l~ , ~, 
After Mr. Moe of Norwa1 had made his initial speech 
on the Indonesian quest1on--1n which he expressed the . . . 
opinion that the arguments of both sides were at least partially 
correct but that the Dutch military action was not just1t1ed 
and that the D!lintenanoe or ~~wand order b7 the troops ot 
, . . . ' •, 
either part1 Bhould be auper-r1sed b7 the Committee or Good 
Offices with the Security Council as trustee--Mr. Malik 
•• 
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once agQ1n cr1t1o1zed the resolution adopted by the Council 
and accused the United States and the United Kingdom ot 
baoldns the "colonial interests.• ae·a1so tm1nta1ned 
that the Dutch military action was supported by Marshall 
Plan aid, concluding that the only solution to the problem 
was to (1) condemn the Netherlands aggression, (2) demand 
immediate cessation or hostilities and release or Republic 
political leaders, and (3) withdrawal or Dutch troops trom 
Republican territory.15 
Reports !!!.. ~ Committee Conoerninf.'; Republican Leaders ..!!!!! . 
.!!! M~11tary Observers ,. 
The Committee.or Good·Ottices submitted two reports 
to the SecuritJ Council on 14 January. Th& first ot these 
communications 1n1"ormed the Council that arrangemnta had 
been made tai• the Committee to v1a1t the V1ce-Pres1dent, 
the Chairman ot: the Republican delegation, and the Minister 
ot Eduoation on·th• I1land ot Eangka on 15 January.16 The 
1ooond or these reports concerned reports trom the Committee's 
~111tary observers in the field. These observers reported 
that (1) roads, bridges, and propertr had been end were 
being destro7ed on a much larger scale than Netherlands 
m111tar7 authorities had anticipated, (2) almost all or the 
151bid.' pp'. 13-25. 
16secur1ty Counoilt Ottioial Records, Fourth Year, 
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bridges ln the rormor Dutch demilitarized zone had been 
destroyed, and (3) the number ot Dutch troops available 
wa1 1nautf1c1ent to prevent guerrillas from performing acts 
ot sabotage and to maintain law and order 1n the towns.17 
400th Maetin~, 14 January 1949 
On 14 Januar7 Yir~ van R~ijen undertook the task ot 
. . 
answering the various charges leveled against his Govern• 
mentJ these charges were, for the most part, in regard to 
the termination of hostilities, the release or political' 
leaders, and the granting of tac111ties to the Committee ot 
Good Oftices and the Consular Commission. He denounced 
accusations concerning these subjects as ver7 biased and 
' ' lacking in object1v1t7. The Netherlands 'delegate "would 
not be ~bl~· t~'aoquiesce" in an1 proposal calling for· 
withdrawal ot Netherlands troops to the former status guo 
lin~tJ the a~g-..iments followed the same' general pattern aa 
' earlier speeches on this subject, asserting fear or 
extremist elements and ot reprisals against the population 
or areas formerly occupied by the Dutch. On behalf or 
his Government, Mr. van Roijen stated that (1) the Nether- 
lands Governinent "trusts that a toderal interim govern- 
ment will be instituted within one month from the present 
date," (2) free @;eneral elections would be held as 100~ 
as possible, and (3) a round-table conference would be held 
•• 
17Ib1d., Document 8/1212, P• 49. 
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between the representatives of the Netherlands and of 
Indonesia tor the· purpose or creating a draft ·statute tor 
I·. 
'. the Netherlands-lndonesian·union. The Netherlands Goveni- 
'··. . . ment also declared that it would take every posaible measure ... 
to bring about the transfer ot sovereignty c'hlring the year 
. . ~ ' 1950. Following this rather lengthy statement, Sir Alexander 
Cadogan ·or the United Kingdom maintained that political 
prisoners should be released, but that Dutch troops should 
not be withdrawn.le 
In his initial speech on the Indonesian question, 
Mr. Alvarez of Cu'ba outlined the position of .. his Govem• . . . 
men~ as calling tors. (1) withdrawal or Netherlands torcea 
to their positions a~,det1~ed by the ~rue~ agreenent except 
in areas where the Comm1 ttee or Good 0ft1~ea ma,., under .. 
the supery1s1on of 1ts m1litar1 observers, use them to 
maintain law and orderJ (2). release .and reinstatemn~ of 
the President ot the Republic and other political prisonersJ 
(3) the holding or.tree elections bef~re l July 1949 to 
create a sovereign constituent assembly; (4) withdrawal ot 
Dutch arrmd torces .rrom the Republic "on the day that 
announcement ot the forthcoming elections is made, and that 
withdrawal should be completed titteen dare before the 
elections take place1"·and (5) withdrawal of troops from 
other territories ot the United States or Indonesia betore 
. . . 
. 18secur1 ty Council,· Offic 1al Records• Fourth Year, 
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24 December 1949.19 irr. Hood ot Australia pointed out 
that, in view or the guerrilla act1v1t7 and the lack ot 
co-oper~~tlon w1 th the' ~tch on the part 'or the people· ot 
' ' I ' ' Jogjakarta, Mr. van Ro1jen•s statement that "lite 11 · 
nearly back to normal in the former Republican areaa~ 
was misleading to •ar· th~ 'ieast.20 · 
·">I 
" 
Report or the Committee Concerning Republican Leaders - ....,._ . ._ .... 
Tho Committee. ot Good. Ottices .. transmitted a· report 
conoemlng the visit ot the Committee to the Republ1crm 
leaders on the island of' Bangka' on 16 Januarf ... During .. - 
this meeting the Vice-President and others informed the - 
Committee that the High Representative of the Crown had 
indicated that he •no longer recognized·eith&r th& legal 
existence or the Republic nor the ot.f1c1al status ot its 
servants." The Republican leaders on Bangka aleo requested 
that the7 be v1s1ted·b1 the three members of the Republican 
delegation in Batav1a.21 
19Ibi1., PP• 18-21. 
20Jb1d., PP• 26-29 •. - 
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40lst Meetin5, 17 January 1949 
At the 40lat meeting ot the Counoll,·Mr. Palar 
expressed the opinion that none of the arguments advanced 
by the Netherlands delegate could refute the eyidence 
contained in the reports ot the Committee of Good Offices. 
He also pointed out that Mr. van Roijen's atatenents concern- 
, . . - . 
' . 1ng the existence of •tranquillity and peace0 in Indonesia 
-• 
were quite erroneous. In regard to the Netherlands pledge ' . .;. . 
or a transfer or sovereignty during 1950, ~he Ine.onesian 
representative declared that,. _1n actuality, the Netherlands 
wishes to establish an Indonesian union in which the baaio 
essentials ot sovereignty_woul~_be secured by the Nether- 
landa.22 
The position ot the Indian Government was outlined 
by Sir Benegal Rau under five 1lJajor points: (l) the pol1t1- 
. . ' '· . 
cal leaders or the Republic should be released end their . ' .. ' ._. -. . . 
authority to conduct negotiations re-est~blishedJ (2) the 
I • o ' 
Security Council should take.•. more active part in implementing 
its reeolut1ons, possibly throur.h the reconstitution or the . . 
Committee or Good Offices in a Commission of the Security 
Council; (~).armed torcee should be withdrawn and the 
authority or the Republic _re-established as soon as poasibleJ 
' ' ' I' ' 
(4) "definite dates should be t1xed for the plebiscite and 
tor the transfer of complete sovoroignty to.the Un1tod States of 
•• 
22secur1lt; Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, 
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IndonesiaJ" and (5) the economic blockade on Indonesia 
should be 11tt.ed so that the Republican Government might have· 
the neceasaey .financial resources tor operating a govern- · ·.· 
ment during the interim period.23 
.. . 
402nd Meeting, 21 'January 1949 
In view or Mr. van Roijen•s statement that the 
• • J \.- -~· ~ ", f .. /- .-. 
Netherlands Govo~nt still ma1nta1n~d its position that 
the Security Council was not competont to consider the 
Indonesian question, Mr. Nisot ot Belgium.noted that the 
Council had rejected _the Belgia~ propos_al that the. question 
or competence be _put before the International Court. He 
expressed the opinion that, since the co~petence or the 
C~unci~ had not been ~er1t1ed, that body should contemplate 
no measure without .first making cer~ain, by reference to 
the Court, that it is competent to tak~ such action.24 
Following this speech, Mr•. Alvarez or c.uba aubmi tted, on 
behalf of the Governments of Chi~a, Norway, the United 
States, and Cuba, a Joint resolution desi~ned to tac111tate 
a "Just and lasting solution" to the Indonesian problem . ' . ~ . 
while "observing due respect tor the fundamental rights ot 
both part1os."25 This reaolu~1on embodied the following 
. . . ,,. 
major provis1onss (1) the Government of the Netherlands 
24seour1ty Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, 
Number 6 ( 402nd Mee ting), 21 January 1949, pp. 2-5. 
25Ib1d., PP• 5-6. -· 
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was to discontinue military o,p~rat1ona_1mmed1atel1, while 
the Goveniment of the Republic was to order a halt to guerrilla 
wartareJ both parties were to co-operate in restoring peace 
and maintaining law and orderJ (2) the Netherlands Govern- 
ment was called upon "to release .1mmod1atel1 and uncond1t1onall1" 
all Republican political prisoners arrested aince 17.December 
1948, to provide tor th&1r return to Jogjakarta, and to 
provide the rac111ties neceasar1 tor the functioning ot the 
Republican Goveni!ll)ntJ (3) negotiations between the parties 
were to be entered into immed1atel7 on the basis that an 
interim federal governmont should be established not later 
than 15 March 194~, elec~ions ot repreaentatives to an 
Indonesian constituent assemblf should be completed by 
l October 1949, end the transfer ot sovereignt7 should take 
place as soon as possible and not later than 1 July l950J 
(4) the Committee ot Good O!f1ce1 was to become th& United. 
Nations Commission tor IndoneaiaJ this Commission was to 
assist the parties in implementing this resolution and would 
have authority to "consult with representatives ot areas 
in Indonesia other than the Republic" and to observe the 
elections to be held throughout IndoneaiaJ _the Commission 
was to assist in restoring the civil administration or the 
Republic and to submit regular reports to the Security 
Council wh1lo the Consular Commission was requested to. 
facilitate the work ot the United Nations Connn1ss1on through 
the use of m111ta?7' obeervers and other start tac111t1es; 
and (5) the Secretary-General was requested to provide the 
. ' 
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Commission with the necessary statr, funds and other 
fac111t1es and the Governments of· the ?letherlands and ot 
the Republic were called upon to "co-operate tully in glv1ng 
effect to the prov1s1ons·or this resolution."25 
After this resolution had been introduced, ifr. Jessup 
presented the reasons which had motivated his Government to 
Bhare in 1ts sponsorship. In general, these reasons consisted 
of the tacts that (1) the United States believed that the 
Security council should continue to concern itself with the 
Indonesian question, (2) despite their legal inequality, 
there were atill two parties to the dispute and both must 
be put in a position from which bona !!2.! negotiations could 
be carried on, (3) the Secur1t1 Council could not approve of 
the results or the second Dutch "police action," (4) negotiations 
should be assisted by an agency of the Security Council, and 
(5) an1 workable settlement or the Indonesian problem must 
be the result or •n agree?l'l)nt between the parties to the 
diapute.27 
The Soviet Government took a very critical view ot 
tho joint draft resolution. ~~.Malik-maintained that th11 
resolution "tully sat1st1es the aggressor, is acceptable to 
hia protectors and abettors and ignore~ entirely the legitimate 
interests of the Indonesian Republic and its people." BJ not 
ordering an immediate withdrawal of Dutch troops and by 
26 .. Security Council, Off1c1al Records, Fourth Year, 
Supplement for January 1949, Document s/1219, PP• 53-56. 
27security Coun~ll, Official Records, Fourth Year, 
Number 6 (402nd Moetlng), 21 January 1949, PP• 6-10. 
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demanding a cessat1on·or guerrilla warfare on the part or 
the Republic, th1s resolution would allow the Netherlands 
."to annex the Republican· territor7" which the7 had occupied 
as a result of their military activit,-. The onl7 difference 
between the Committee or Good Otf1ces and the United Nations 
Commission tor Indonesia was the change 1n name; the new 
·body would still serve to shield the attempts of the Nether• 
land.a to press.Indonesia back into colonial atatus.28 
The New Delhi Conference ____ ............ 
Be tween 20 Jenua.17 end 25 January a c onterence of 
the representatives of Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, met in New 
Delhi, India, to discuss the Indonesian situation. In 
addition to these representatives, tho Governments or China, 
Nepal, I~ew Zealand, and Siam sent obse~vers, to the Conference. 
A resolution adopted on 22 January b7 this Conference was 
transmitted to the Security Council along with a letter 
.from the Prime Minister ot India. .Mr. ?1ehru pointed out 
' ' 
that the sympathy ot the above-named nations was with the 
Republic, the Governments or Ilurma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, 
and Saudi Arabia having already deniod,the.Netherlands 
Government facilities or transit b7 land, sea, or air. The 
resolution adopted by the Conference on Indonesia stated . ' 
28Ib1d., PP• 15·19. --- 
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that tho second Dutch "police _action" const1tuted"a flagrant 
breach of tho Charter ot the United Nations and det111nce ot 
the ettorta of tho Security Council" and made the following . 
recommendations to the.Security Counoilr (1) all political 
prisoners should be imtmdiately treed and the Republican ... ~ 
Government should be allowed to function treely; (2) the, 
residency of Jogjakarta should be return~d to.the Republic 
and the parts of Java, Madura, and Sumatra which had been 
held. br the Republic on _l.8 December 1948 should _be· restored 
to that Government b7 15 March 1949; (:5) ?{etherland_s forces 
ahould be withdrawn imrned.1.ately trom the residenoy of 
Jogjakarta and gradually from the rest ot the te:rr1tO?'y 
held by the Republic . on 18 December 1949, such withdrawal ... 
to be completed under United Nations supervision by 15 Maroh 
1949; (4) all economic restr!ot1ons imposed upon Indonesia 
by the Netherlands should be rescinded 1mzmd.1atel~ and the 
Republican Government should be provided 1Dll!lec1iately with 
all necessary tacil1ties tor communication with the out- 
side world.29 
Report E.!.. _the Committee .EB !h! M111te.rx S1tuo.t1on .. 
Sy a report dated 24 JAnuary, th~.Committee ot Good· 
• '!. -· 
Ott1ces submitted an.nnal7sis ot ~he military situation in 
Indonesia to the Security Council. According to th1a report, 
29seour1ty £oun~11, Otfieial P.eeorda, I<"ourth Year,' 
Supplelll)nt for January 1949, Document s/1222, pp. 56-59. 
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the Republicnn forces had adopted a nscorched earth" po11c7 . 
and guerrilla tactics, with such effectiveness that the establish• 
mentor law and order in terri'tories formerly controlled by the 
Republicans was not yet possible; in general, the situation in 
such territories was very unstable. Because or the guerrilla 
tao.tics of the Republic, the Netherlands troops could n.ot 
cease hostilities despite· the tact that orders had beon 
given to that effeotJ since the Republican Government had 
been prevented trom .t"unot1on1ng, no authority existed to 
implement the "cease hostilities" order in regard to the 
guerrilla forces. The report also pointed out that "occupation 
ot large t'owns and important installations" had been the 
objective ot: the ~tch army, and, when the .Dutch co~nder• 
1n•c.h1er issued. the order. to 'cease host111tea,' "practically 
. . . . 30 all the obj~ctivea had been taken." · 
. 30lb1d. 1 noeumen t S/1223, PP• 60-62. See G. 1f. Kahin, "Resistance in Indonesia," Far Eastern Surve1,-Februar1 23, 1949, Vol. XVIII, PP• •5-47. In a report from Betavia, dated 22 January 1949, Mr. Kahin stated that the purpose or the Dutch military- action ot 19Deceni:>er1948 was the imposition 
ot a "speedy settlement of the Dutch~Indoneaian dispute 
along lines dictated by the Dutch." The Netherlands talt 
that the capture of tho principal Republican leaders and 
cities would cause native resistance .to collapse; the ferocity of guorrilla warfare and even the attitude of the 
population in Dutch-occupied Jogjakarta illustrated the 
tallaoy ot this beliet. The reports of lack or collaboration 
was corroborated by Mr. a. J. Muller,. head ot the Dutch 
Economic Administration in the Jogjakarta district; Mr. Muller reported that a maximum of only 150 of approximately 10,000 civil servants rormorly working in his district had agreed 
to work tor the Dutch. The Dutch had also been counting on 
the collaboration or "a large numberu ot Republican leadera · onoe Jogjakarta had been occupiedJ not on~ or the leaders in •• 
the city agreed to work for the Dutch and the ~ctivit7 or the 
Dutch arm:r--the shooting or an adviser to Prime Minister Hatta, 
a torroor cabinet member, and a high oft1c1al or the Ministry ot 
the Interior as well as numerous c1v111ans--d1d nothing to 
promote collaboration. 
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Report ,2! !!'.!.! Committee .2!! ~ Status £!. ~ Republ!ce.11 Leaders 
The next day the Committee ot Good Ottices submitted 
a report to the Council dealing with "arrangemsn~a fort.be 
transportation of roombers ot the Republican Mission to 
Lako Success and the present atatus of the Republican leaders.• 
In.regard to the P.oas~bil1ty ot receiving authorizat.bn tor 
the Republican repre~entativea to go to Lake Succeas, the 
Committee repor.ted that the Netherlands Government had 
reached no decision concerning clearance and tac111t1ea 
and, consequently, the Committee could not make any arrange• 
ment tor the trip. On the question of the status or the 
Republican leaders, the Committee transmitted a letter, 
dated 24 January, 1'ro~ the Secretary-General ot the Republican 
delegot1on. Thia letter_ stated that Sukarno and Salim, . 
interned on Sumatra, were _"confined under arned guard to a 
relatively small military area," while the leaders on the. 
island of aangka had freedom or movement on the island but 
had been instructed not to engage in an1 polit!cal act1v1t1 
other than that "in line with the polic1 or th8 Netherlands.n 
The Secretary-General also emphasized the taot that numerous 
obstacles stood in the.way ~r communications between Republican 
leaders and the Republican delegation and the Connnittee ot 
Good Ott1ces. 31, 
3lrb1d., Dooument 8/1224, pp. 62-65. - . . ' 
' . 
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403rd Meetinz 25 January 1949 
The 403rd meeting was devoted to discussion or the 
Joint draft resolution submitted b7 China, Cuba, Norway, 
and the United States. Sir Benegal Rau indicated several 
modifications which he thouetit necessary tor.mks the 
resolution workable and to bring it into conformity_ with the 
New Delhi resolution. He first suggested that the withdrawal 
or troops be accomplished betore a apec1tied date, 15 March 
l949J in the second plaoe the Indian representntive emphasized 
the necessity or "at least tour or five months or settled 
government" in order to make certain that the plebiscites 
would be held under proper condit1onsJ thirdly, Sir Dene~al 
Rau pointed out t.ha t, since the Republican Government would 
have virtually no economic resources •as a result ot the 
Netherlands aggression,• the United Nations Commission 
ahould make recorrumndations as to what economic resources 
ahould be provided in order to ensure the proper functioning 
of the Republican Government; all restrictions on 1nter- 
1sland trade and on trade between the 1slsnds and foreign 
c.ountriea should be abolished, w1 th .. tha exception or those 
at;reed upon by the Netherlands Government and tha Republican 
Government.32 . 
The primary motive or the Norwegian Government in 
' . . ' . 
·sponsoring the joint resolution was, according to its. . ' 
32seour1tI Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, 
Number 7 (403rd ifuetlng), 25 January 1949, pp. 3-8. 
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representative, Mr. Moe1 to find a solution ror the Indonesian 
problem. The solution ombod1ed in.the resolution was based 
upon compromise, and necessar111 so as there were two parties 
to the dispute in Indonesia. Since a great deal or mutual 
mistrust existed. 1t would be necessal97 to establish the 
United Nations as a trusteo of the actions or both parties. 
Finall1, V..r. Moe stated that his Government could not accept 
the contention that t~ Republic of Indonesia no longor 
existed, since its stato or disorganization had been caused 
by the Dutch military action.33 
The representative ot the Ukrainian s.s.n •• Mr. Taraaenko, 
stated that the joint resolution and the plan outlined b1 the 
Netherlands representative were both designed "to stifle the 
Indonesian Republic and to restore the old colonial order 1n 
Indonesia." He maintained that the United States and the 
United Kingdom end, under their leadership, the tnt1Jor1ty 
ot tho Council "opposed the defence of the legitimate r1ghta· . 
of the Republic and made themsolves parties to the encourage- 
n34 mont or the aggressor. 
404th and 405th Meetin~s, 27 January 1949 ........... 
At the next meeting ot the Council Mr. Palnr, 
atter referring to an article in the~~ Timea which·· 
carried a statement ot an official Dutch spokesman to the. 
3~ Ibid., PP• 8·12 • ............... 
~4Ibid., PP• 17-20 • .............. 
. ' 
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ettect that the expenditures in Indonesia would be mainly 
' ' .. 
"carried by heirs ~f the former Netherlands Indies Government," 
maintained that the heart of the Indonesian problem was that 
. . 
ot economic domination; the Indonesian delegate interpreted 
this news item as evidence that the Indonesian people were 
. ' ' . . 
to be toroed to pay tor tho Netherlands military- action. . . . ' .. .. -, 
In view of this feeling, Ur. Pale.r felt that. ~he joint 
resolution was not strong enough to relieve the doubts in . . . 
Indonesian minds as to the intentions ot the Netherlands • . . 
Decause ot this, the representative .or _the. Republic urged 
the Council to embod7 the pr~nc1ples ot the New Delhi 
. . . . - 
resolution 1..~ th~ j~int dratt r~solution by means ot amend~· 
\ . ... . 
ments.~5 Mr. Hood ot Australia also advised the Council to 
give careful consideration to the proposals ot the New 
.• \. .• : . * ' • 
Dolh1 Conference and to revise the joint dratt resolution 
accord!ngly.35 
At the 405th meeting, Mr. U So Nyu.n ot Burma suppor~ed 
the posi t1on taken by the Australian deleeate and l!k"wise 
1 ; • ; J • • • ' It 
advoonted the !ncorp~rat1on ot the principles ot the New 
. . . 
Dolh1 Co~ference into the Joint dratt resolution.3'1 
• ~ • •• ,. • • ' • '., .• ! • 
Mr. van Langenh.ove ot Belgium cautioned aga1ns t the adoption 
of amendments to tho joint resolution which would give that 
document ·a threatening chsracter; the Council should, rather, . ' 
· 35s~cur1 ty Cou."'le11, Officiel, Itecords; Fourth Year, 
Number a (404th end 405th Meetings), 27 January 1949, 
PP• 2·13• . 
30Ibid·. I pp , 13-20 • - 37Ibld., PP• 21-29. - 
. ' 
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avoid extremist positions, such as those consistentl7 
advocated by the U.s.s.R.,.and attempt to formulate a trulJ 
constructive aolution.38 
In view ot the debate carried on before the Council 
and the.receipt of the Hew.Delhi resolution, Mr. Ts!ang ot 
' ' ! 
China placed before the Council several amendments to, the 
joint resolution; these amendments were sponsored jointly 
by the Governments of China, Cuba, Norway-, and the United 
,' ' I ~ : ' • ~ • 
States. The wording in paragrap~ 2 was. revised so as to 
state that 'the official• of the Government or the Republic . ·. .. . ,. . 
'·. 
should tako over the administration ot "the Jogjakarta area" 
rather than merely "th~ city of J~gjakarta." He also 
referred to sev~ral amendimnts which were designed to 
I . .. : clarity the moaning ot the resolution, but embodied no 
substantive change.~9 
The Canadian delegation also submitted an aroondment 
which was designed to improve and clarity the wording or 
the joint resoiution, but contemplated no substantive 
change 1n the .. resolution.•0 .. In respon~e to an inquiry by 
< , , . .l . • • 
the representative of Indo~esia, Mr. van Roijen stated that 
38Ib1d., PP• 29·31. - . . 39Ib1d., PP• 32-33. The text ot the amendments 
submitted byehina, Cuba, Norway, end the United States ma7 be found in SecuritX Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, 
Supploment {or January 19~9, Document S/l23~, pp. 65-66. 
40Ib!d., PP• 33-34. The text ot tho Canadian amendrmnt may be found in Security Council, Otf1e1e.l Records, • · 
Fourth Year, Supplement t<Jr January 1949, Documont S/12321 
P• 66. 
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he had not received any f'urther intormation regarding a 
trip to Lake Success by one or more members of the Republican 
delegation. 41 
406th Meeting, 28 Ja.11uan 1949 
At the 406th meeting ot the Council, r:r. Malik or. 
the Soviet Union, after stating that the so-called 
"Anglo-Anerican bloc" had consistently aided with the 
"ag~ressor," submitted a resolution calling tor the 1mnsd1ate 
withdrawal or Dutch troops to their positions as apec1f1ed 
by the Renville Agreement. 42 · Before a vote was taken on 
the joint resolution, Mr. van Roijen, commenting on the 
New Delhi resolution,' stated that the fundamental mistake 
made by those' nations which'.condemned the Netherlands was 
thilt they identified Indonesia with'the RepublicJ the 
Netherlnnds, ot course, cons id.eretd the Republic to. be a 
. 43 . m1nor1 ty entity• · · 
The joint draft resolution was then put to a vote, 
paragraph by paragraph. The Soviet amendment tailed to 
secure the necoasary att1rmat1ve vote of seven members and 
thus wa3 not adopted. The rest or the joint resolution, as 
42seour1t' Council, Official Rooords, Fourth Year, 
Number 9 (406th A eilng), 28 January 1949, PP• 3-6. 
43Ib1d., PP• 6-19. 
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amended by its sponsors and Canada, was adopted.44 
410th Meeting, 16 Februarx 1949 
The only discussion or the Indonesian question 
during the month ot February concerned a report from the 
United Nations Commission dated 15 Februo.ry. This report, 
which was discussed on 16 February, embodied a recommendnt1on 
that the data on which the Cotr1r.11ss1on was to report under 
the Council's resolution ot 28 January be postponed trom 
15 Februar1 to l March.45 
Mr • .Malik considered that approval ot.thia 
recommendation would put the council in tho position or 
"faith.full7 pursuing tho policy ot encouraging thOS$ who 
were guilty of unprovoked aggression against the Indonesian 
Republic." Mahmoud Ber ot EgJPt agreed to the postponement, 
but expressed disappointment in the tact that the Commission 
did not l!llke an7.report to the Counc11.46 The United 
Kingdom and Canadian representat1Tes supported the President's 
proposal to grant the postponement. After another short 
comment by Mr. Malik, in which he accused the British 
delegate or alwar• being readr to speak in defense or the 
Netherlands Government, d11cu1a1on was closed and the 
44Ib1d~, PP• 20-33. The text or the amended Joint 
resolution-as-adopted may bs found in Security Council, 
Official Records, Fourth Year, Supplement for Februarr 1949• Document S/1234, PP• 1-4. 
45 Seourit~ Council, Official Raoords, Fourth Year, 
Number 13 (41btfi :eetine), l~ Pebruary 1949, pp. 1-2. The 
text of the Commission's report mar be found on page 2. 
46Ib1d., PP• 2•4. 
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President stated that the Commission would be notified 
that their recommendation had been aecepted.47 ·. 
Report_!!!~ United Nations Commission!.!!£. Indonesia 
The United Nations Commission submitted a report 
to the Security Council dated l March 1n compliance with 
' ·. " ( ... 
the ·council's.resolution ·or 28 January.· The Commission 
reported that, although the Netherlands had been g1Ten 
time "to adjust itsel.t' politically,". not only- had no : 
·agreement been reached on the establishment of a federal 
interim government, bUt also no negotiations had taken place 
as required by the resolution; 1n addition, the Commission 
reported that the Netherlands Government had not "complied 
with t,he basic preroqu1s1tes of t'urther action under the 
roaolut1on." The Netherlands had, however, declared that 
thoy would call a round table conference at the Hague on 
12 itarch; this conference, to which all parties interested 
in the Indonesian dispute would be invited, would deal with 
the problem ot "an accelerated transfer ot sovereignty" 
as well as the creation ot a federal interim government. 
The Commission stated that it had no authority to attend the 
conterenoe at the IIar,ue; einoe the Commission viewed this .. 
invitation as a substitute tor the provisions or th&. 
28 January resolution, ~t re~erred the matter to the Security 
Council and requeated that that bod1 instruct the Commission . ' 
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as to the poa1t1on it should ta~e 1n regard to the 
invitation. The report concluded by stating that it was 
conscious "ot the progresa1vo deterioration or the situation 
in Indonesia and ot t~ augmented danger to world stability 
which must result.n48 
Reports .En!h! Proposed Round Table Conference 
' ' By a·letter dated 2 Aiaroh, the Netherlands Govern- 
ment 1nt'orimd the Security Council ot its plans to call a 
. . 
round table conference which would be held at the Hague . , 
"at the earliest possible date, preferably on 12 March 1949." 
The purpose ot this conference TDUld be to (1) accelerate 
the transfer ot aoveroignty, (2) establish a Netherlands~ 
Indonesian Union, (~) dratt t1nanc1al, economic, and military 
arrangements pertaining to such a Union, and (4) institute 
a federal interim government and other arrangements tor the 
interim period. All interested parties had been invited to 
the conference, including the President of the Republic, 
the Chairman ot the Federal Consultative Assembly, and the 
United Nat1o~ commission tor rn:donesia. 49 
The United Nations Commission submitted a supple- 
nentary report dated 7 March in accordance with the Council's 
28 Januo.ry resolution• This report containe.d a le ttor from 
48seour1ty Council, Ofr1c1al Records, Fourth Year, 
Supploment for March 1949, Document S7l270 & Corr. 1, pp. 8·29. •· 
49Ib1d,, Document S/1274, PP• 35-41. 
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Sukarno to the lfotherlands Government concerning the 
1nv1 tation to attend the· round table con!"erence. While' 
. . . stating that he agreed with the idea or an accelerated 
transfer of sovereignty nnd'the purpose or the conference, 
Sukarno pointed. out that th&.·resporis1b111ty tor such 
decisions as would be arrived at by the conference ~can only 
be assumed by the Government or the Republic of Indonesia 
fully exerc is~n~ ~ts ai thori ty. in 1 ts terri tor1. and seated 
in Jo!jakarta."50 
on 10 March the Commission subm1 tted a second supple• 
mentary report which also. con~ained ~ommunioations between 
' . 
the parties and t~.e United_ Nation~. fo~1as1on •. No further 
information was available concerning the Netherlands position . ' , 
regarding the round table. conterence J . the ~etherlanda 
~ I ' • ' • 
delegation assured the. Commias~on. th.at 1.t ~ould keep that 
body- info med about sny. new dovelopmen ts. 51. The next day_ 
the Commission transmitted a third supplementa17 report 
I , ',-. • 
to tha security Council. This r~port containod a letter , 
from the Chairman of tho.Republican delegation which further 
clarified the Republican position in regard to the round 
table conference. This letter stated that the decision on 
the Netherlands 1~v1tat1on would have to be left to the 
Republican Government "when it is re-estnblished o.nd ftmct1on• 
• -. . • ' j • . . - .·. 
ing freely at Jogjakarta;" there should, however, be no dela7 
50Ib1d., Document S/1270/Add. l & Corr. l, PP• 29-32. 
. 511!?!!!•• Document S/1270/Add. 2 & Corr. i , PP• 32-34. 
. ' 
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1n implementing the Securit1 Council resolut1on·1n regard 
to the release or political pr1sonsrs, tho restoration or 
the civil administration of.the Republic, the re-establish• 
mant'ot·the Republican·aovernnent at~Jogjakarta, and.:the 
cessation or hostilities in Indoneaia.52 . J . 
. 't •• 
4l6th Maet1n$ 10 March 1949 ' ,, 
The Security Counc1_1 res~d consideration ot the 
Indonesian question on 10 ~~h· At the opening of the 
meeting, the President informed the Council that, upon a 
~ • . . t, . 1 • . , 
request trom the Indonesian delegation, he had asked sate . ; . ... ~ 
conduct for a member or the Indonaaian delegation tor a 
visit to the Republican leaders on tho island ot BangkaJ 
' , ; , . ~ . . . 
the Netherlands Government had .informed the President that ' . . . .. 
they had no obje·~·t1o~ .to the. Ind~n~sian .req~at.53 
: ,. ·~ ~ 
Mr. van Roijen declared that the Netherlands Govern• 
ment could not, at that time, return the Republican Govern- 
ment to Jogjakarta for sever~l ~asons, the more important 
. .. t ' . . : 
ones beingi (1) such action ~~d give rise to tear on the 
. . . . ' 
part ot Indonesians outside ot the Republic th~t the Republic 
. , would become the_ do~~nat1ng power ;n ~ndon&siaJ (2) .reprisals - - and other disturbances would be.the result of the restoration 
• • • • .- • -, '• I 
ot the Republican GovernmantJ and (3) tho restoration of the 
' . ·' ' I 
52Ibid., Document S/1270/Add. 3, PP• 34-35. . ' ... 
53sec~1 ti Council, .orrtcial R~~~ds,· .F-o~;th Y~s.;,, 
Number 1914lSth feetlng), 10 March 1949, PP• 2-s. 
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Republican GoverntD9nt "would entail the restorat1on·or the; 
influence of precisely the saDB militarist and extremist 
elemnts as have tor three years been the ··main atumbling- 
block 'in negotiations with the Republ1cJ".1n connection with 
this statement~ Mr. van Roijen particularlj emphasized the 
danger ot communist elenents taking· over the Re.publican·.· 
Govenunent it it were immediately restored to Jogjakarta. 
The Netherlands delegate then discussed the proposed round 
table oonterenoe as a means of oTercoming the dangers 
inherent in the immediate restoration or the Republican 
Government and requested the Council to allow the United 
Nations Commission tor Indonesia· to take part in the 
conference. 54 · 
·' General Romulo maintained that the Dutch had tailed 
to obse~e the Securit7 Council resolution·or 28 January 
and, further, that the proposed X'Ound table conference would 
be able to' consider onl1 those proposals which would be. · 
acceptable to the Netherlands• 'The Dutch, b7 amending their 
. ., . 
constitution and inserting provisions on the proposed Nether- 
lands-Indonesian Union, had defined unilaterallr what ther 
wanted the Union to be, "regardless ot the desires. ot the 
Indonesians•" The repre:\entat1ve or tho Ph111ppin~a stated 
that this Dutch counter-proposal was tmrely another attempt 
to circumvent the Security Council and to ignore its 
dec1s1ona.55 . ' 
54Ibtd., PP• 3·12. - ' ' 
5S~., PP•· 12•19. 
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Mr. Palnr pointed out that the Netherlands proposal 
: ! . ~ . ,. . 
would be ver1 attractive if :.the Indonesians could have 
confidence in the Netherlands. On the basis ot past 
experience and the reports of tbs.Se~urity Council's Committee 
ot Good Offices as.well as the reports ot the United Nations 
Commission, the Net.h.erlands.could hardl1 expect such confidence. 
The Indonesian delegate also aocused the Dutch or using 
"naz1 methods" in Indonesia and he cited as evidence several 
letters written by Dutch soldiers and printed in Dutch 
newspaper•; these letters described torture methods which 
were used to obtain intormation. According to Mr. Palar, 
the objective ot the Netherlands 1n calling the round table 
conterenoe was tour-told 1n naturea (1) to dis~egard the 
Security Council resolution or 28 3B'l.uar,-, "demote the 
United Nations Comrn1as1on tor Indonesia and avoid the. 
withdrawal or Netherlands troops and the reator~tion ot the 
RepublicJ" (2) •to reduce the Indonesian problem trom its 
international level to a domestic one where the Netherlands 
will have final d1scret1onJ" (3) "to avoid dealing with the 
/ .- 
Republic as the other party in the d1sputeJ" end (4) "to 
degrade our gallant troops to the status of rebels."56 
In the-last speech or the day, Mr. Austin of the United 
States, while supporting the idea of a round-table conference, 
maintained that his Government still considered the implemen- 
tation or the 28 January resolution to be necessary for the 
solution ot the Indonesian problem.57 
. ' 
56Ib1d., PP• 19-30. 
57Ib1d., PP• 30·35. 
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~17th Meeting, 11March1949 
The President or the Council, Mr. Alvarez ot Cuba, 
opened the 417th imeting b7 intorm108 the Council· that 
Pakistan had requested permission to participate in the. 
discussion ot the Indonesian problem. As there waa no. 
objection, the request was granted.59 
Sir nenegal Rau was ot the opinion that, .in view ot 
their past conduct, the Dutch would have to undertake sane . 
positive action toward the pe~ceable solution ot the · 
Indonesian problemJ mare promises on the part or thi. Dutch 
could not be expected to restore confidence in the objectives 
ot the Natherlands aovemment. Such positive action would 
have to include restoration of the Republican Government to 
Jogjakarta. Sir Benegal ~au also read a telegram received 
trom Batavia which requested that he call the attention ot 
the United Nations Commission to "atroc1t1ea ot Dutch 
troops in Jogjalmrta as a reprisal or recent attack ot the 
Republican Arm:r.n59 
The selgian representative~ Mr. van Langenhove, 
stated that,:.1~ regard to .treei~g the peoples of Indonesia, 
the Council could issue no injunction since the Charter did ., 
not cont'er such power upon that.body; he asserted.that, in 
regard "to the settlement or the substance or a question, 
. 58secur1ttx Coune11,·0tf1o1al Records, Fourth Year,· 
Numbor 201417th~etlng), ll.Maroh 1§49, P• 2. The text ot the letter trom.the representative ot Pakistan '1181 be 
tound on this page. 
59tb1d., PP• 2-7. - 
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the Counoil cen only make recomnsndat1ons.ft In general, 
the Belgian delegate felt that the Netherlands proposal was 
a major step towards settling the dispute and that the 
Republic was being unreasonable in demanding the restoration 
ot their Government in Jogjakarta.60 The representatives · 
of both China and Canada auggestsd that·· a prel1m1nar1 conter- 
ence be called in Indonesia tor th~ purpose or ettectivel7. 
implementing the cease-tire crder and to decide on the timo 
and oond1t1ons under which the conference could take place. 
Mit. Ta1ang also telt that, unless the t1ght1ng was halted 
and the Republican Government restored, the United Nations 
Commission should not participate in the round table 
e onterence. 61 
410th llfeetln~, 14 Maroh 1949 
On 14 March, Abdur Rahim ~n of Pakistan outlined 
the position of his Government.on the Indonesian problem. 
' ' ' 
The Government of Pakistan telt that the Netherlands m111tar1 
' . . ; ' . 
' action had been'in de~iance °!_the Council's orders; further, 
. . . . •. ,,,. ,.~ . "" . "'" . . 
1t felt that the action which the Council had taken ~as 
. .. , '• ... ·., ' . . ; ... ~ ~ \ 
not only inadequate, but had also been taken in too hesita• 
• . . ·.• . ' : ~. ,,. c :. ' ' '"l . . ... , : ~- ·' ;,. • 
ting a manner. The P~ldatan1an ~elegate declared that the 
' ' ' 
restoration.of the Republican Government to. Jogjakarta was .. 
absolutel1,nece1sary, aa was_ the withdrawal ot Dutch troops . ' 
6~td., PP• 7•13. 
61Ibid., PP• 16·22. 
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from Republican territory.· Consequently, the Government 
ot Pakistan felt that the proposed round table conference, 
particularly its composition, was unsat1itactory~62 
· Mr. Palar ot Indonesia tm1nta1ned that the Dutch· 
concept ot a transrer'ot" sovereignty "concerns-thB transfer 
ot something which ·has ··nothing to.do· with ·sovereignt1J" ene . . 
ot the tiajor reason's tor this contention was the tact that, 
under the newlf amended Netherlands Constitution, one'ot 
. . . 
the tune tions ·of the proposed Netherlands•Indone•1an Union 
would be to "guarantee juridical warr~nts and a good govern• 
mant. in Indonesin, both bas1~ tuna tiona of sovereignty. tt63 ' 
The. reprosontat1Te of Egypt attacked that eleinont in the ·· 
Netherlands which still clung to the·ideals of a colonial 
sy-stem~ While agreeing with th~ Belgian contention that 
the SecUl'ity Council ·has no·· power to· ordain the existence 
or a new state, Mahmoud Be1 declared that'the Republic or 
Indonesia "has been.and.still is there, whether some 
reactionaries like it or not.a64 
Mr. Malik once again accused tha United States ot 
giving encour,agement t<? ~he aggressor, the.Netherlands, by 
1ta actions in the Security Coun~ilJ. he_ condemned both the 
' .. 
United States and the .united King~.oni for all~gedl7 using . , 
. ' ' . : 
their influence to bring about the rejection or the Soviet 
• c > 62seo~1ti Couno11, Oftioial Records, Fourth Year, 
Number 21. (418th !eetlng)' -14 March 1049, PP• 2-7. 
63Ibid., PP• 7-11. 
64' . Ibid., PP• 11-17. - 
. ' 
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proposal tor the withdrawal ot Netherlands_ troops. The 
representative of the u.s.s.R. charged that the proposed 
round-table conference was nothing more than an attempt on 
the part of the Netherlands Government to create "a cover 
tor the aggressive nction of that Government and an attempt 
to legalize the state of lawlessness resulting trom Nether- 
lands aggression in Indonea1a."65 
The Government ot the United Kingdom telt that 
the proposed round table conterence should be atudied in 
an unbiased manner, despite existing teel1ngs caused b7 the 
non-oompl1anoe or the Netherlands with the Securit1 Council 
r~solution •. It also telt, however, that the Council should 
do eyerythlng possible "~award e1tablishing with the least 
possible dela1 the conditions whic,h will make it possible 
tor the Government of the Republic or Indone11a to agree 
to participate in the round table eonterence proposed 
b7 the Government ot the Netherlanda."~6 
419th Meeting, 16 March 1949 
The representative ot Norwa7 expressed agreement 
with the stateimnta made by the Chinese and Canadian 
delegateaJ he telt that the "preliminarr problemsn concerning 
the cease-tire and the restoration of the Republican oo~ern• 
ment to Jogjakarta should be settled before considering the . ' 
65 Ibid., PP• 18-21. --· 66Ib1d~, PP• 21-23. - 
182 
major problem regarding the transfer or sovere1gnt7 in a 
rol.llld table conterence.67 Thia point ot view was also 
supported by Mr. Chauvel, the French delegate, who stated 
that the problems whioh concerned only the Netherlands cmd 
the Republic should be settled under the·ausp!oea or the 
United Nations Commission before holding a round table 
conference in which the.Federalists would also participate.68 
Mr. Alvarez or Cuba was concerned about the failure 
ot the Netherlands to implement the 28 January resolut1onJ 
he declared that complete compliance with this resolution 
should be neeedsa17 betore any additional methods would be 
utilized 1n attempting to aolve the Indonesian problem. 
The Cuban delegate al•o telt that caretul c~n~1derat1on 
ought to be given to the role.which the United Nat1ona · 
Commission would play in any round-table conference in· 
order to prevent any att•M!>t to by-pass previous resolutions 
ot the Seourit7 Counoil.69 Mr. Hood of Australia agreed 
with the conclusions ot the Cuban representative, but was 
surprised that 10 man1 members or the Couno11 were pertectlr 
willing to consider a DBasure "which ie tantamount to the 
invalidation or 1ta o;irn reaolution."70 
67seeuritD Co11nc11, orr1eial Reoords, Fourth Year, 
Number 22 14i9tbeeting), 16 March 1949, pp. 2-4. 
68Ib1d • .f PP• 4•6. 
69Ibtd., 
. ' 
PP• 6-8. - 70Ib1de1 PP• e-12. 
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In answer to arguments put torth by Mr. J>alar in an 
earlier meeting,· Mr. van Roijen declared that the transfer 
ot sovereignty was to be Areal, complete,· and unoond1t1onal1" 
in addition, he stated that the anendments to the Netherlands 
Constitution embodied only "the principles of the Nether• 
lands-Indonesian Union which were agreed upon and laid down 
in the L1nggadjat1 Agreeme.nt." ConsequentlJ', these amend• 
ments could not possibly be interpreted in such a way that 
they would prohibit.the trilnsfer ot oanplete and uncondi- 
tional sovereignty. 'll ·~-' · 
Mr.' Tarasenko, ot ·the ··Ukrainian delegation,· stronglJ 
opposed tho proposed round t~ble conference •. He once again 
accused the "colonial powers" ot using the.Secur1t7.Council 
to cloak Netherl.8.nds aggression in an aura or legal1t1• 
Since he considered the round table conference to be only 
a deception, the Ukra1n1an·repreaentat1ve opposed not onl1 
thG suggestion that tho United Nations Commission be allowed 
to participate in that conference, but also t~e Chinese 
proposal that it participate in a prel1m1narr conference 
on the Indonesian quest1on.'2 
420th ?.!eet1ng, 21 March 1949 · 
. ' 
had been expoun~ed rogarding_the restoration or the Republican 
Goyernment to.Jogjakarta, Mr. Sen or India declared that the 
After reviewing the various points or view which . . . . 
. ' 
71 . Ibid., PP• 16-25. 
72Ibid., PP• 25-28. 
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respons1b111t1 tor the cont1nuat1on'ot host111tiea,'which 
was ondangering the peace ot South East Aaia, rested upon 
the Netherlands Government. Mr. Palar then.pointed'out 
that the Dutch were attempting to deatro~ Jogjakarta·and thus 
make it physically impossible to restore the Republican 
Government to that city. He sumzmrized t.he position o~ his 
Govsmment" as tollQW81 . (1) 1DlJDldiate implementation or 
the 28 January resolution should be aocompl1shedJ (2) a 
prol1m1nary- conterence could be .. held under the· auspices ot · 
tho Unitad Nations Commssion, but such a conference, and the 
restoration ot the Republic wh1oh would follow, should last 
no more than fourteen daJSJ (~)the United Nations Commission 
should report izmoodiatel7 on the situation in JogjakartaJ 
(4) attar the restoration ot the Ropubl~oan Government, 
'• ·• I • 
that Government "should be able to participate lawfully . . . . . . . . 
in whatever conferences or negot1&t1ons are provided tor in . . 
the Council's re~olution or are deemed necessar1 by both 
parties and the United Nations Comm~ssion tor Indonesia;n 
(5) a report on the military situation in _Indonesia, 
including those areas. which were ocoupie~ b7 the Netherla~da 
bo!oro 16 December 1948, should be rm.de as soon as possibleJ 
. . . . .. .' : ' i .. 
and (6) an 1mmed1at~ investigation should be made, by any 
. . . . .. 
competent international organ, on_ the _reports oi: ai;ooities.'13 
.Mr. van Langenhove ot Belgium, 1n answer to those . . 
who demanded a literal appl1cnt1on ot the Council's 28 January •· 
73s~cur1t~ Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, 
Number 23 (420th ~eotlng), 21~:arch1949, pp. 2-16. 
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reaolut1on, stated that the Council's competence had never· 
been verified or.established since the matter had not been 
submitted to the International Court. He also alluded.to· 
the tact that it would be extremely d1tt1cult for the · 
Republican Government to bring to an end the resistance' 
movement since, in the past, that Government had advooated 
•war to the b1tter end."7' The Egyptian delegate, Viabmoud 
Fawz1 Bey, concluded the day'• speeches by pointing out that 
• J 
the only logic~l procedure would be to allow the leaders 
ot the Republic tn contact their people before holding the · 
round table conterenc•. 75 · · 
. . . . . ~ .. 
42lst Meeting, 23 March 1949 ",1 '. 
As no nsmber or ,the Council objected, the President 
I 
' stated that he would send~ telegram to the United Nations . . 
- Commission requesting information on the general situation . . . 
in Jogjakarta. Since a goQd deal of the Council's time 
had been tak~~ up by va171ng interpretations or his suggestions, . : ·. . . ., . . . ' . 
General McNaughton_of Canada formally atated his proposal 
• : . ~ '! . • 
comernin~ a ~r~liminarr conference. Th~s proposal d1J'.ec~ed 
the United Nations Commission_ to (1) assist the parties in 
implementing the Council's ceaee•tire order ~nd in restoring 
the Republican Govornmont to. Jogjakarta, and (2) assist the . ' . ' 
parties in reaching an agreement on the time end e ondi tiona . ' 
74Ibid., PP• 19-24 • . - 
75Jb1d., PP• 24-28. - 
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tor holding the proposed round table oont'erenoe. In addition, 
the proposal stated that, if an agreennnt was reached, "the 
holding or a round table conference end the participation or 
the United Nations Connn1ss1on in such a conference would be 
consistent with the 28 January resolution or tho Counc11."76 
?dr. Sen ob jectod to including the natter or deciding . 
the time and conditions of-a round table conference in the 
agenda or a prelimino.%7 meeting. Mr. Hood or Australia 
agreed with this point or view, na1nta1n1ng that the Republican 
Government would have to be restored to Jogjakarta before it 
could be expected to consider an1 such conterence.77 The 
Soviet delegate attacked the whole idea of holding a 
conference, either the suggested pre11m1narr conference or 
the proposed round table conterence. )Tr. Malik im.intained 
that the Security Council should reaffirm its demand tor the 
imned1ate and unconditional release or the Indonesian pol1· 
tical leaders and, 1n response to the "~rowing demand ot 
tho peoples ot·As!a," order the immediate withdrawal of 
Netherlands forces from Republican territorr.78 At the 
request or the Scwiet delegate, the Canadian proposal was 
put to a voteJ it was adopted by a vote or 8 to none, with 
France, Ukrainian s.s.R., and the u.s.s.R. absta1n1ng.79 
76seour1t-i Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, 
Number 24 (42lateet1ng), 23 March 1949, PP• 2-6. The text oft~ Canadian proposal may be tound on page 5. 
771big., PP• 11-18. 
79Ibid., pp• 18-21. 
79Ibid., PP• 25-25. - 
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... ,.. . 
Report E! !h!?. Extent 2!, Datmge !2 J'oa;jakerta 
..... , 
On 26 March the United Nations Commission submitted 
a report on the alleged damage to the o1t1 or. Jogjakarta. 
The Commission reported that the danage to the city was not 
serious enough to "interfere in anywa1 with·the re-establish• 
ment of the Republican Government .Ln JogjakartaJ" the report 
stated.· however, that it would be necessary for the Nether- 
lands to furnish "noceasar1 tac111t1ea" because ot ,a lack or 
materials and equipment~ part or wh~ch had been destroyed 
or removed aa a result ot·th~ Dutch·m111tary action or , . 
18 December 1948, which would •seriously hamper an ettect1V•· 
. . . . ' 
tunct1on1ng ot the Republican adm1n1etrat1on."80 ·When 
this communication waa brought to the attention ot the 
Security Council, Mr. Malik maintained truat the report w~!. 
,, 
' . ; 
contradictory since. it had declared that no serious damage 
had occurred, yet there was a laok or materials and equip- 
ment necessary- for adm1n1~ter1ng a government.Bl 
.!!! Interim Repor~ .!?!. !h! United Uations Connn1ss1on 
The first interim report of t~· United Nations 
. . 
Connnission was submitted to tho Security Council in a letter 
dated 4 August. ThiB report covered the·period trom the 
BO c Secur~ ouno11, Official Records, Fourth Year;·- , , 
Supplement" !or ch l\l49, p -. ia. . 
~ . . . 
. 8lsecuritn,Counc11, Official Records, Fourth Year, 
Number 25_l422nd eting), 28 March 1949, pp. 1-3. 
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establishment or.the Commission on 28 Janue.17 to 3 August.~ 
In accordance with the Security Council directive 
adopted on 23 March, the United Nations Commission made 
contaot both with the Netherlands.Govemment and.the Govern- 
ment ot the Republic tor the purpose or setting a date tor 
the beginning ot discussions under the auspices or the 
Commission. Mr. van Ro1jen arrived in Batavia on 12 April 
and discussions were opened in that city on 14 April.8:5 
The question of the. restoration ot the Republican 
Government to Jogjakarta was one ot the most important issues 
considered dur!ng·the newly-opened discussions. The Republican 
delegation submitted a plan which "envisaged tour consecutive 
phasea to bring about the return of.the Special Territo17 ot 
Jogjakarta to the administration ot the Republio." On 
21 April Mr. van Roijen stated that the Netherlands Govern• 
ment was willing to agree to the reatorat1on'.or the 
Republican Government to·Jogjakarta on two conditions: 
(1) the Republican Government should order "ita armed adherents 
to cease guerilla warfare and co-operate in the restoration 
or peace and the Dllintenance of law and order," and (2) a 
binding oOlllllitment must be made "concerning the time and 
co~ditlon~ for the holding of the Round Table Conference at 
The Hague." On 7 May the Chairman of the Republican dele- 
gation, in a formal statement, accepted the Netherlands . ' 
82seour1ty Counoil, Official Reoorda, Fourth Year, 
Special Supplermnt Number 5, P• 1. 
83Ibid.~ PP• 5•7. - 
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conditions and Sukarno and Hatta agreed·to urge the adoption 
ot such a policy following the restoration or·the Republican 
GovernmentJ the Chairman ot·th& Netherlands delegation,· 
in view of the Republioan statement; agreed, on behalf ot· 
his Government, 'to the return of the-Republican Government 
to Jogjakarta.84 
A jo1nt.si.ib-comm1ttee was set up "to make the neceaaar1 
' 
investigations and preparations preliminary to the return ot 
the Republican Government to Jogjakarta:" this sub-committee 
went to Jogjakarta on 11 May. In compliance with Nether- 
lands dena.nds, anyone who wished.to leave Jogjakarta betore 
that city was turned over.to Republican authorities was· 
allowed to do so.' This evecuatlcm was completed on 9 June 
and Netherlands authorities est~mated that.approximately 
30,000 people had lett the Res1d$noy o~ Jogjakarta.as 
In accordance with plans worked out between the 
parties and with the assistance ot the Commission'• 
military.advisers, the evacuation ot Netherlands troops 
trom Jogjakarta started on 24 Ju.~e and was completed on 
30 Jurie. The withdrawal was accomplished without en1 
hindrance or serious incident. On 6 July, Sukarno, Hatta, 
and the o~her.members ot the Republican Government.returned 
to Jogjakarta; the' tirst meeting or the Republican Cabinet 
was held on 13 July• 8G · , · · . ' 
S4Ib1d., PP• s-12. ·- asrbid., P~ 12. 
86Ib1d., ;>. 13. - 
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A second sub-committee waa aet up under the auspices 
or the Commission to study possible ways in which the cease- 
fire e.nd the cession ot guerilla warfare could be brought 
about. Informal d1scuss1ona were held between·the parties 
and on 22 June ?.fr. van Roijen announced. that an agreement 
had been reached. Following the agreement ot 22 June, .t'urther 
1n!ormal consultations were heldJ on 3 Augwst oease•host111t1es 
orders were issued simultaneoual7 by the Governments or the 
Netherlands and ot the Republic. These orders were. to be 
ettect1ve in Java as of midnight on 10/11 August, end in 
Sumatra as of:m1dn1ght on 14/15 Augu1t·.a7 
. Though discussions had been held on the subject, 
no .final agreement had been reached on. th• release or·. 
political prisoners •. On 1 August the parties agreed to 
consider "the establishment of a joint sub-oommittee under 
the auspices of tha Coumission to adviae upon and to 
accelerate the release of political prisonera and prisoners 
of war,n88 
Informal discussions between the parties on the 
qusst1on or holding a round tabla conference were initiated 
on 19 April and, on 7 Ma7, resulted in an agreement on the 
time and conditions or holding auch a conterence.89. This 
agreement called for the conference to be convened.bf 
87 . Ibid., PP• 14-17. - . ' 88Ibtd~,_pp. 17-21. - 
09Jb1d., P• 23. - 
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l August, it possible, and tar the conference to be completed 
within two months after the date ot convening. The participants 
undertook to rat1ty the agreements reached by the conference 
within six weeks after its close and sovereignty was to be 
transterred to the United States ot Indonesia "before the 
end or 1949." Tho participants in this conference were to 
cons1at of representatives ot the Netherlands Government, 
. . 
the Government of the Republic ot Indonesia, tho Federal 
.. 
Consultative Assembl7,_ and_tho United Nations Commission 
. ~ . . tor Indonosia.90 On 22 June the representatives of the 
. . ' 
. . . Netherlands, the Republic, and the areas in Indonesia other 
• l • ' . • 
than the Republic formalized the agreenDnt discussed above. 
. . . - . 
' ' The Chairman of the Netherlllnda delegation stated that 
his Government approved the agreement and the Chairman or 
. . .. . .. . : 
the Federal Consultative Asaembl7 also endorsed the agreement. 
, , 
The Chairman of the Republican delogation declared that the 
agreeme"nt would be a part of the policy "t_o be urged upon 
•o ,• • ~ ' ' • • . 
the Government of the Republic or Indonesia after its 
' l 
restoration to Jogjakarta ••• •" Arter its restorat.1on, the 
Rep.ubli~~ Government approved thG ag~eement. 91 
In conclusion, the Commi_as.~on•s 1st Interim Report 
atated th.at the following objectives ot the Council's 
directive or 23 March had been ach1oved: (l) the Govern• 
ment ot the Republic had been restorod·to Jogjakartaf . ' 
90rb14., Appendix X, PP• 74-76. 
9lrb1d~, PP• 23-24. 
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(2) an agreement had been reachod on a cessation or hostilities 
and both parties had issued cease-hoat111t1ea orders to their 
troopsJ and (3) the time and conditions tor the rowid table·· 
conference at The Hague had been agreed upon.92 
448th ~~eting, 27 September 1949 
At the 448th and the 449th meetings the Security . . 
CoUn.c!l dealt with. (1) the problem ot the payment of 
' . 
travelling expenses and aubsiatence allowances to alternate 
representatives on Security Couneil Commissions, and 
(2) a request trom the Consular Commission at Batavia that 
the United Nations assume tuture costs o£ military observers 
in Indonesia. A French resolution which called to?!' the 
rotJ!'oactive payments ot such expenses.was adopted by a 
vote ot 7 to 1, with~ abstentions.· The rest'of the ~et1ng 
was devoted to speeches on the queetion raised bf the 
Consular Cocm1as1on •. In general, the United States supported 
the Consular Commission's proposal, while the u.s.s.R. and 
the Ukrainian s.s.R. oppos.ed 1t.93 . At th~ 449th meeting, a · 
Cuban proposal to transmit the Consular Commission•s J!'equeat 
to the Secretary-General was adopted by a vote ot 9 to 1, 
with l abstention, the u.s.s.R. and the·Ukrain1an S.S.R. 
being opposed to the meaaure.9~. 
92.!!?!!i•• P• 29 «>, 
93secur1t~Couno11, Ott1o1al Records, Fourth Year, 
Number 44 (44ath eting), 27 Septent>er 1949, pp. 2-20. The 
text ot the French proposal ma.1 be tound on page 10. 
· 9•seour1tneCoune11, Ott1c1al Rooords, Fourth Year, 
Number 45 (449th etlng), 5 October 1949, pp. 2-10. The text or the request rrom the Consular Commission may be tound in Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Supplement tor 
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!h! Round Table Conference .!! .!!!! Harms 
The Round Tll.ble · Con!'erence was convened at The Hague 
on 23 August and continued 1n session until 2 Noveni>er •.. 
According to the report ot the United Nations Co'Cnlission, 
· the con.rorence was "eminently- successful" and, as a result 
or the Oonference, a new era in the relations ot the peoples 
or Indonesia and the Netherlands was beginning.95 The 
achievements ot this Conteronoe may be summarized 1n four 
main categories. 
Political~ Constitutional Issu~s 
,. 5 • 
' ' was reached on (1) a provisional constitution tor the . ,_.. . . .. 
Republic of the United States of Indonesia, (2) the Charter, 
tor th~ Tran~f~r of S~verei~ty;. (.3) th~ St.atute ~t the 
, ' • • l 
As a result or the Round Table Conference, agreement , . . . . .. ·' 
?letherlands .. Indonesian Unlon, (4) an agreement in the matter . 
or foreign relnt1ons, (5} an agreement on transitional 
" , 1 ,. • ·.· · r ·-. 
measures, (6) an agreement on the right or selt-determination, 
. . 
and (7) en agreement concerning nat1onal1t1 and c1t1zensh1p.96 
',' ' I 
The provisional constitution provided for the creation 
ot a federal state in which the sovereign authority ~ould be 
. ·, . . 
vested in a government composed ot a President and Minister•, 
·'· . . ·. 
together with a House of Representatives and a Senate. The . ' 
95secur1tY Council, 'orricial Records,· Fourth Year, 
Special Supplement Number 6, PP• l, 37 •. 
96Ibid., PP• 15-20. - 
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Senate was to be composed or two representatives trom each 
• c • , . 
of the participating territories- while the House ot . . . . . - . . 
Representatives was to consist ot 150 med>era- with the . ~ . ~ . 
number or members representing the Republic being -~qual to 
one-halt.the total number of ?Tl)mbers trom the other . ~ . . 
·territories ·or Indonesia. The Chinese, European, and 
Ar~bian m1norit1 groups were.~C'.)_ba represented b7 a.minimum 
ot 9, G, and~ membe~a respe~tivelr.97 
The Charter.of the _Transfer or S?vereignty provided 
that the Uetherlands Government "unconditionally end . .. . . . . . : . . 
1rrovooably tre.n~ters complete sovereignty over Indonesia . . ~ ' . . . . 
to the Ropublic of .the Unite~ States of.Indonesia and therebf . . ,. ' ' . .. 
recognizes said Republic of_ the United States .or Indonesia . ' . ; ~ . . . . . 
as an independent and_aoveroign State;" the transfer or 
sovereignty was to take place no ~ator than 30 December 1949. . . ' . ' ' ~ " . . . 
In regard to the problem of.the r~s1denc1 ~r New ~u1nea, 
article 2 or tho Charter stated that the status guo would . . . . . . 
be maintained in that terr1tory,.w1th the provision thnt . . . 
within a year atter.the.transter_or sove~e1gnty the political 
status or New Guinea would be determined by negotiations . . ~ . 
between the now Republic .and the Netherlands.98 
The Statute of the. Uetherlands"'."Indonosian Union was 
designed to promote the commo~ intere~tS of the two partioSJ 
co-operation was to take place pr~mar117 in the tields of 
97Ib1d~, Appendu VI,· ~P• 5:5-71. - .. 
98Ib1cJ~, Ap~ndix VII, ~. 91-92. 
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ot foreign relations, detense, and finance, and also in 
matters ot an eoonomio and a cultural nature. All deo1s1ons 
in the Union were to be tnken "in agree~nt between .. the .two 
0 • 
Partners;" a conferonoe, composed ot three ministers ot 
. ' 
each party, was to ~e held at least twice a year and more 
often if the partners deemed it necessary •. The Union 
Statuto also provided for a Union Court ot Arbitration . . . . . ,- . 
which was to be composed or six members, three to be app~inted 
by each party; doois1ons were to be taken by a majority vote 
and, in the case or a tie, the Court was authorized to call 
upon the Presi~nt of thD International Court or Justice or 
another international authority to appoint a person ot 
another nationality ~o sit _as a ~pecial member o£ the Union 
Court with the right to.vota .• 99 
An agre~mGnt was also concluded concerning .foreign 
' . . . 
relations between the two parties. Under this agreement, 
tho parties were to aim at co-ordinating their foreign 
policies and they agreed not t~;conclude any treaty or .. , 
perform any "juridical aot in international intercourse,. 
which involved the interests ot the other party without 
first consulting that party.100 
The Agreement on. Tran1·1t1onal Measures stated that 
the division or the Republic o.f the United State a or Indonesia 
into component states should be accomplished by a Constituent· . ' 
99Ib1d., Appendix IX, PP• 95-101. - 
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Assembly with the stipulation that a plebiscite be held 
among the population ot the territories to determine whether 
they wished to form a separate component state. It a component 
' . state railed to ratit7 the tino.l Constitution, that state 
would be tree "to negotiato ~bout a special relationship 
towards the Republic· ot the.United St~tes·or Indonesi~:~d 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands•" In add! tion, the Nether• 
lands agreed to promote Dembersh1p or the new Republic in 
the Unitod Nations.101' This agreement settled the problem 
. . ot self-determination of areas outside ot the Republic which 
had been so important to the Netherlands. 
A separate agreement was o cncluded concerning the 
\ . . . , . 
problem of nationality ond ·citizenship. In general, those 
persons who, becaus~ · ~r ·the 'trans.fer of sovereignty, possessed 
• i •. 
dual citizenship were given the right to elect either.Nether- 
lands or Indone aian n~tl~~li t.1 ~l02 . 
J • j ,.. • .. 
F1nano1al and Economio Problems - . 
In this field, th• parties were agreed that the 
Republic should assume 11ab111t1e1.as well.as rights 
upon the transter ot sovereignty. A ditfel'f)nce ot opinion 
arose, naturall1 enough, over the extent to which the Republic 
should take over the debts ot Indonesia. As the parties were 
lOlibtd., Appendix XI, PP• 102-105 • 
. - 
l02Ibtd., Appendix XII, PP• 105-109. - 
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unable to reach agreement, though both made considerable 
concession, a "Debt Commission" was given the task ot proposing 
the amount of the debt to be a asumed by the Republic, giving 
due consideration to expenditures which it might. attribute 
. . 
to military action.103 
The proposal of tho "Debt Commission" in regard to 
the domestic debt was accepted by th~ parties; upon the 
transter or sovereignty, the R~public would assume 
' "responsibility tor both interest and amortization in the 
mnount ot 871 million gu1ldGrs and tor the debt.to. third 
countries in the amount of 420 million guilders.~ The . ' - 
Republic also nasumed (l) respon51b111ty for "ce.rta~n items 
of the external floating debt," amounting to a maximum or 
2G8.5 million guilders, and (2) obligations assumed, with 
. . regard to Indonosia, wider.the Dretton Woods Agreement. 
The Debt Agreement also reduced the."external debt duo to 
the N~therland~ by 2 thousand million Nethe~lnnds gu1ldera.nl04 
The parties agreed.to promote vo~untary cooperation 
1n foreign oonmsrcial relations through consultation and 
continuous contaot; a "most-favored nation" clause applying 
to "Netherland& nationals, corporate bodies, products, ships, 
... . . ! ,. .. . .. 
and other objects" was included in th~ Debt Agreement. On 
the other hand, nationals·~ third countries were to enjoy ·· 
"equal rights in ·p~rt1~t~~t1on in t;ade with Indonesia and . ' 
l03Ib1d., P• 21. 
l04Ib1d. 
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in that country's economic activities and development."105 
M111tary Affairs 
Separate agroementa were concluded in regard to the 
withdrawal ot Netherlands naval forces, land·torcea, and . 
air foroes •. The Netherlands nav1 was to be withdrawn from '. 
Indonesia within one 1ee.rJ upon the·request or the Republican 
Government, however,· the Netherlands was, tor a limited 
period or time, prepared "to lend aid in.the detenco ot 
Indonos1a at sea and.1n,tho·bu11d1ng-up.ot the nav1 ot the 
Republic ot the United States ot:Indonesia.n The Nether• 
lands Government also agreed to turn over to the Republic 
a number ot ships and naval aircraft. Atter the transfer or 
sovereignty, the naval base at Suraba1a was to pnss 1mmed1atel1 
into Republican hands end other naval. establishments were to 
be graetUall7 transterred to the navy or the Republic. All 
naval bases, however, were.to continue·to serve ships ot 
both tho nav1 of the Republic and the.Ro1al Netherlands 
Nav7.l06 
The Ro1al Netherlands Anrr/ was to be withdrawn trom 
Indonosia "within the shortest possible. tima;" until the 
time of suoh withdrawal, Nethorlands troops were to be . 
1051.E!!!~· PP~ 23:.2s: Appe~dlx XIII, PP• 109 .. 122, 
contains the text ot the-t1nano1al and economic agreement 
reached at tho Round Table conterence. · 
lOGibid.~·, PP~ 21-2a·. Appendix xv' PP• 128-135, 
contains the-te'xt or the agreenent concerning Netherlands naval forces in Indonesia after the transfer ot sovere1r;it7. 
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assembled in areas designated bf mutual agreement. Within 
these areas, the Dutch would bo wider the comnnnd of their 
own officers and have treedom of movement; in order to leave 
the designated areas, however, Dutch troops would have to 
obtain a pass which had been approved by a m111tai-,- author1t1 
or the Rep.iblio. The Royal Netherlends-Indon~sian A~· was 
to be reorganized into the ar'lr!'f of the Republic ot'the United 
States ot Indoneata,107· 
(' 
. 
The agreement regarding.Netherlands air forces 
stated that the "parties should aim at withdrawal,· or 
reorganization, of Netherlands Air Forces in Indonosia 
within six months ~tter the transfer ot aoverelgnt7,n· Ths 
Netherlands Govemment expressed its willingness to.aid th8 
Republio in building up, ~raining, and equipping an Indonesian 
Air torce bJ supplying personnel, materiel, and technical 
e.dvice.108 
, An agreexmnt was also reached concerning co-operation 
between the Netherlands end the Republic in thG field ~f 
defense •. Each partner was to be responsible tor the defense 
ot 1 ta own terr1 tory I any jolnt regulations adopted bf a 
Union arGml were to be implemented by each or tho partners 
l07tb1d., PP• 28-29. ,\ppendiX XVI, ·PP• 135-145, contains th~xt or the agreement regulating Netherlands 
land forces in Indonea1a·after the transter ot sovereignty. 
lOOibid., PP• 29~30. ·The toxt of the agreement· 
regarding t~etherlands air forces in Indonesia may be 
tound in Appendix XVII, PP• 145-146, 
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within their own juriadiction.109 
Cultural _!!ll! Social Artair~ 
The partners ~greed to aet up a· joint colil!llitteo 
composed or roitrteen member3, seven to be appointed bJ' 
each partner, to promote knowledge or each other's culture': 
and t.o exchange information in the cultural field. ·The 
agreement envisioned an ·exchange' or professors, teachers, 
and experts as well as of books aind'per1otl1c~la. 
The Government or the Republic. agreed to accept 
into 1ts service all civil government ott1c1als who were 
employed by the Government or IndOnes.ia at· the transfer 
ot sovereignty. The Republican Government also agreed that, 
tar a period or two yen.rs, 1 t would "retrain trom taking 
any measures which would unfavourably affect the logal position 
ot these government officials who have Netherlands nationality, 
and who will have been taken over trom the service of the 
Government or Indonesia."110 In concluding 1ta report, 
the United Nations Commission 1n1'ormed the Council that it 
would continue to carry out its tunctions and observe the 
implementation ot the agreements reached at the Round Table 
Cont"erenco.111 
109Ib1d., PP• 30-31· ... . . . 
llOibtd., PP• 31-33. - . 
lll!bido P• 37. - 
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455th Meetinr;, 12 December 1949 · · 
On 12 and 13 December the Securit1 Council considered 
the spocial report ot. tho United Nations Commission on the 
Round Table Conterence. In the initial speech of the day, 
General McNaughton of Canada brought to the Council •s attention 
a draft resolution which the Canadian delegation had submitted. . . 
This resolution noted tho.special report on the Round Table ~ . . . ' . . . 
Conference which the United Nations Commission had submitted, 
welcomed the "forthcoming oatabl1s.hnlent of tho Republic of 
the United States of Indonesia as an independent, sovereign 
) : . . 
atate .. " commended the Commission for its part 1n settling 
the dispute, and requested the Commission ato observe and 
. . 
assist" in the implementation ot the agreements reached at 
'. . ·'· 
the Conference. General McNaughton stated that hia Govern- 
ment noted particularly the "outstcnding contribution made 
by the Council's representatives in Indonee1A,•ll2 
Mr. van Roijen echoed this opinion of the United 
Nations Commission, but declared that his Government still 
maintainod their original att.1.tude in reg~rd to the c~mpetence 
or the Council to deal with the s1tuat1onJ he expressed 
regret thet the question ot oompetenc.e had never been 
submitted to the International Court ot Justice. After 
•• 
112secur1ty Council, Offioial Reeor~s, Fourth Year, 
Number 51 (455th.Meetlng), 12 December !g49, pp. 2-3 •. The 
text of the Canadian re&olution may be found in Security 
Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Supplement tor 
September, October, November, and December 1949, Document 
S/1431, PP• 13•14. 
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in.forming the Council tbs. t the Second Chamber of the Nether- 
lands Parliament hed approved· 'the res~ita of the Round Table 
Conference, the Netherlands representative· stated that he, 
personally,~ felt. that :the Neth~rlands a~~ I,;idones1·a·'wer8 
., .. 
"about to enter upon a new par1od or friendship and 
' "' .. 
co-operation."11~ 
Mr. Pnlar laid much.importance on the fact that, aa 
a result ot the Round Tablo Conference, absolute and cocplete 
sovereignty v.ould be transferred to the nevi Republic. Ile 
pointed out that none of the concessions which the Indonesian 
' ' 
dolegat1on hnd made at the Conference would ln nny way 
restrict the Republic's 8overeignt1. 'The Indonesian delegate 
. . . ' supported the Canadian draft resolution, snd urged that the 
United lfations Commission assist in the settlement or the 
status of New Guinen.114 
The representstive of the Ukrainian s.s.R. took a 
much more pessimistic view or the results or the Round Table 
Conference. Ho maintained that th~ Dutch wero· still waging 
war upon the Indonesian people "who re.ruse to submit to the 
Dutch occupiers and to the Hatta clique, which has betrayod 
the interests or its peoplo." ·Mr. Galagan then attaokod 
tho United Stutes and the United KiDGdom, accusing them or 
supporting.the Dutch in "a co~se of armed aggression against' 
. . 
the Indonosisn people; he i'ollowed this attack w1 th a history- 
l1:5Ib1d., pp~ 3•7• - 114tb1d., PP• 7-13. - 
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or the Indonesian dispute in which he purported to show how 
the United States and the United Kingdom had supported 
Netherlands military operations.· The Ukrainian delegate 
ma1ntainad that the· United Notions Commission was onl1 a 
tool or United States policy and that the· composition · 
ot the Round Table Conference "determined in advance the 
character ot the United States ot Indonesia and of the 
Netherlands-Indonesian Union as a new political torm ot 
colonial alaverr ror the Indonesian.people." In view · 
ot this situation, the Ukrainian delegation submitted a 
dratt resolution calling.tor (l) withdrawal of Netherlands 
troops to th~ poa1t1ona which the1 held prior to December 
1948, (2) the release of Indonesiari political prisoners and 
an investigation or the activities ot Netherlands authorities 
"which have taken the term ot brutal terrorism; murder, and 
persecution ot the demooratio leaders or the Indonesian - . 
people," (3) creation or a United Nations Comm1as1on which 
would be composed or states members ot the Security Council, 
(4) instructions to this Comm1ss1on to submit to the Council 
within three months proposals tor the settlement ot the·· 
Indonesian problem; (5) the United Nations Commission for 
Indonesia to be diasolved.115 
The representative~ or Pakistan and China both praised 
; 
the work ot the United Nations Commission and supported the 
Canadian resolution.116 - 
•• 
ll5Ibtd.·, PP• 14-27. The text of the Ukrainian 
resolution may. be found on pa ge 27. 
ll6Ib1d., PP• 28-32. 
204 
456th Meetinz, 13 December 1949 
Sir Senegal Rau ot India and Mr. Blanco ot Cuba 
supported the Canadian resolution and extended oongratulationa 
to the representatives or the Netherlands and or the Republic 
on the successful conclusion ot the agreements at the Round 
Table Conforenoe.117 Mr. Taarapkin ot the u.s.s.R. attacked 
the agreements which had been reached at the Conterenco on 
the grounds that, tcr the Indonesian people, "these agree- 
ments aignit7 thoir return to their former colonial slave17 
unde~ new and moro subtle legal torms" and that, under these 
agreements, "Indonesia's freedom and independence are being 
· saor1t1oed to the pol1 tic al and e oonomic interests ot a 
bloc or Colonial Powera, namel7 the United States ot America, 
the Neth.!)rlands, the United Kingdom and othera.nllO 
ThG representatives of Eg71>t llnd ot Belgium expressed 
satisfaction in the outcome ot the Round Table Conterence 
and support tor the Canadian dratt reaolution.119 Mr. Gross 
ot the United States felt that the agreements reached at 
The Hague "ahould be regarded as a substantial contribution 
to the adyanoement ot the purposes and principles or the 
Charter." In reply to the charge• ot the Soviet delegBte, 
117seour1t~ Council, Ott1o1al Records, Fourth Year, 
Number 52 (456th_b etlng), 13.Deoember 1949, pp. 2-5. 
ll8Ib1~., PP• 5·12. 
ll9Ib1d., PP• 12-15. - 
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ttzt. Gross stated that the delegates of the U.S.S.R. and or 
the Ukrainian 8.S.R. were attempting to twist the m:lan1ngs 
of the agreenents reached at the Round Teble Con!"erence 
and that the Soviet Union had been attempting to thwart the 
ettorts ot the parties to reach agreement and to smear the 
Indonesian loaders.120 
Following several other speeches which, except for 
one by Mr. Ga.lagan of the Ukrainian S .s .R., all· expressed·· 
sat1staot1on with the results or the Round Table Conference, 
the resolutions before the Council were put to a vote.' 'I'he 
CQnndian resolution was defeated by a Soviet veto,; the vote 
being 9 1n tavor and 2 against. 'l'he Ukrainian resolution 
waa rejected by a vote ot 2 in favor and 9 against. ·The 
President declared that the defeat or the Canadian r~solution 
had no effect on previous Council resolutions concerning the 
activities or the Comm1ssionJ consequentl7,.that body would 
remain 1n Indonesia under its existing terms of reference 
to observe the 1mplensntat1on oft~ agreements concluded 
at The Hague.121 
.!h!. T~ansfer ,E! Sovereignty· 
On 14 Deoember the representatives of the Govenunent 
ot the Republic ot Indonesia and of the regions associated .. ' 
l20Ib1d., pp. 15·21. - . 
l21Ib1d~, PP• 33-35. - 
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with the.Federal Consultative Assembly met in Batavia and 
signed an agreenent indicating that their governments 
accepted the Constitution of the Republic ot the United 
States ot Indonesia which had been formulated at the 
Round Table Conterence. Mr. Sukamo was unanimously elected 
as the tirat President ot the new Republic and, on 20 December, 
the first cabinet was appointed with Mr. Hatta as Prime 
Minister. At the aaxm time a special delegation was appointed 
to receive the transfer or sovereignty ~rom the Government 
ot the Netherlands. On 27 December sovereignty waa trans- 
ferred to.the Government ot the Republic ot the United:· 
States or Indonesia 1n a tormal ceremon1 held at Amsterdam; 
nt the 1ame time the High Representative ot the Crown in 
Batavia transferred administration to the Sultan ot 
Jogjakarta, who had been appointed acting Prime Minister 
tor the oocasion. With the transter ot sovereignty, 
administrative and m111tarr responsibilities throughout 
Indonesia were, 1n accordance with The Hague agreements, 
taken over b7 authorities 0£ the new oovernmen t • On 
28 December President Sukarno arrived in Jakarta trom 
Jogjakarta and assumed control ot the da7-old Republio,122 
. , 
• 
122securitI Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, 
Special Supplemont Number i, PP• 16-!9. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
· When the s 1tuation in Indonesia was brought to the 
attention· ot the Seeuritr Council in Januarr, 1946, and 
again !n July, 1947, a new step was taken in the t1eld ot 
international organizationJ tor the t1rst time an inter- 
national organization, the United Nations, was dealing.with 
the problem or a colony seeking to becomo independent or 
its mother count%7• While one ma1 be critical ot the 
prooeduro and the methods which were used by the Securitr 
Council, such an attitude must be tempered with the real- 
ization of the enormous difficulties which.exist when a 
new type of problem is considered for the first time~ 
In addition to the tact that the problem was a new one, the 
United Nations itselt was an organization ot only recent 
creation, and this undoubtedl7 accounts tor even more 
obstacles !n the path lead!n~ to a tinal solution to the 
Indonesian problem. The very tact that the Indonesian dispute 
did pose a new type of problem would seem to add to the 
importance of a study of the dispute and or the measures 
used in searching tor a solution to the problem. 
During the treatment ot the Indonesian dispute b1 
the Security Council, a number or pt9oblems arosoi sot!8 of 
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these wore resolved to the sat1staot1on ot all parties . 
•. . ... . . . '- . 
concernad while othars contin:uall1. recurred to plague the 
Council. One or the most basic ot the latter problem:s 
involved tho .legal question ot tho compotence or the Securit7 
Council to deal with the Indonesian question. This question 
was actually a man1testat1on.ot o~e or the basic problems 
of all international organization, the problem ot d1stingu11h1ng 
between the respective jurisdictions ot an international 
organization and or a state which is a nnmber or that 
organization •. A related problem arises in the determination 
I • .. ' ' 
ot the Council's competence in such a situation, namely, 
who is to determine the competence or an international bod7 . . . 
in a given situation, the international organ1za~1on by the 
simple expedient or taking action, the member state by 
unilateral declaration, or an international judicial 
authoritJ• In the treatment of the Indonesian question, 
it would aeom that the tirst alternative was utilized; it 
would be foolish to assert th.at the Security Council took 
the act~on that 1t.~d if that body did.not bol1eve itself 
competent to take such action. Whilo there was no concrete 
declaration made.by the Security_Counc~l ~n the l!lltter ~r 
competence, obviously a majority~ the members believed . . . . . 
that that body was competent to deal with the situation. 
It is, or course, true that the Coun~~l ..rejeoted a Belgian 
proposal to submit the question ot competence to the Inter- 
national Court of Justice. For the most part, those who . , .. 
abstained from vqting on the proposal (Australia, Draz11, 
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China, Colombia, Syr1~, and the U.S.S.R.) did so because 
the7 telt that submiaaion ot the issue to the International 
Court .would merel1 dola1 and hinder. the Sec~1t1 Council in 
considering a matter with which th&f telt the Council was 
competent to deal. or.the t~ur nations which voted tor the 
Belgian proposal (Belgium, France, United Kingdom, United 
St~tes), onl7 the United States had not, at some time, 
deola~d that the Indonesian disput~ ~id not tall within 
the Jurisdiction or the Security Council •. It an answer had 
to be given as to the Secur!t1 Council's competenoo in the 
Indonesian dispute, it would seem that one r.ust admit that 
th9 Council was competent in that it a,~se~ted jur1~d1ct1on, 
ev~n th~ugh no conorete answer was given to the legal or 
theoretical question. 
Another very basic question arose in connection with 
the problem or the competence o~ the Securit7 Council, that 
of. the legal status of the Republic of Indonesia prior to 
the transfer of sovereignty in December,.1949 •. The Nether- 
lands, ot c curse, c onsistentl7 maintained that the Republic 
was not a state in international law and, hence, the 
Indonesian situation tell within the.domost1c. jurisdiction 
of the Netherlands. Most o~.the ro1olution1 adopted by.the 
Securit7 Council were worded so aa to give no concrete answer 
to the problem) tho Security Council took action under the 
provisions ot the Charter ~egarding the nm.intenancG ot 
i 
international· peace and security, and several speeches given 
before the Council indicated that the action taken by that 
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bod7 waa aimed only at bringing about a cessation of 
hostilities and not at conferring upon the Republic a 
status to which it was n~t already entitled~· At least 
.... partial ret'utntion ot the Dutch contention that the 
Republic was' not 'a state in !international law is embodied 
in the L1nggadjat1 Agreement ot 25 f4arch 1947. Under 
this Agreensnt the Netherlands recognized "the Government 
or the Republic o.f Indonesia aa exercising..!!!, facto 
authorit7 over Java, Madoera, and Sumatra."l Following 
the signing ot this Agreement, a number or other nations, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and India, extended~ .facto recognition to the RefA.lblio • 
Thia problem, as well as the problem ot the c~mpetence 
of the Council, received no concrete answerJ the Whole 
field of the et.feat or recognition and the distinction 
between .2!, .faoto and~ Jure recognition "ie a somewhat· 
' 2 elusive point of the law or recognition." 
In the handling ot the Indonesian dispute a number 
ot problems arose in connection with the methods and 
procedures to be used to bring about a ce~sation ot 
hostilities. In the discussions carried on in the Secur1t1 
Council, this problem embodied another·procedural problem, 
that or the withdrawal ot the armed torces or the disputants. 
::I 
1soebandr1o, "De Facto Status at Linggadjati,w 
.E!.!: Eastern survey, yol. XVII, Februarr 11, 1948, P• 30. 
2Ib1d. - 
·II 
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For the most part, the U .s .s .R. and the Ukrainian S .s .R •. 
supported proposals calling tor the withdrawal or the troops 
or the Netherlands and, in SOZD9 inste.nces. or both ct the 
parties. The Netherlands ani its supporters, Belgium, 
Frence, and, to.a somewhat lesser extent, the United Kingdom, 
opposed troop withdrawals on the grounds that such action 
would lead.to ropr1eals and retaliator1 action against the 
population of areas from which Netherlands troops would 
be evacuated. As with most of the other disputes which 
the Security Council handled and the attendant cease-tire 
orders which were 1ssued,.the problem ot bringing about a 
ceaaat1on of host111t1ee did not produce a clear-cut example 
as to how cease-hostilities orders may be implemented. 
The obvious det1c1ency 1n an undertaking of this kind is. 
or course, the leek or an 1nternat1onalpolice force or 
m1litar7 unit.which could supGrYise a ceaso-tire etteot1vely. 
In the absence ot auch a bod7, sanctions other than the use 
I 
of armed force may be applied through the states which are 
moni>ers ot the United Nations. Several countries of the 
Southeast Asia area did appl7 sanctions 1n connection with 
the Indonesian dispute by denying to the Netherlands the 
right of transit across their respective territories. 
This action, however, was not taken at the request or the 
Security Council 11nd, consequently, 1t cannot serve as an 
example of the application ot sanctions through the United 
Nations. 
"' 
r 
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Another procedural 'Problem which was solved with a 
great deal less trouble involved extending an invitation 
to participate 1n tho d1scuas1ons or the Council when 1t 
was considering the Indonesian question to the repreaenta- 
t1vea or Burma·,· Belgium, the Philippines, and Pakistan. 
An invitation was,·or course1·extended to the Republic or 
Indonesia, and later to the Netherlands when that country's 
term on the Secur1t7 Council expired. Australia was alao 
invited to participate in the Council's discussions and 
to continue to aerve aa a nember of the Committee or Good 
Offices even though her term on the Security Council had 
expired. The Netherlands opposed extending an invitation to 
the Republic because they telt that such an invitation 
would carry tha implication that the Security Council 
·was recognizing the Republic; the 1nv1tat1on was extended, 
but the question of the legal status ot the Republic was 
not answered until the transfer or sovereignty took place 
in December, 1949. 
The treatment of the Indonesian dispute by the 
Security Council supports the contention that disputes 
between nations are not to be eolved merel7 through the 
creation or elaborate ttach1neryJ th• parties to the dispute 
must poeseas a genuine desire to tind a solution to their 
problem as well as a willingness ·to accept a compromise 
solution which involves concessions from both parties. 
For th13 reason, it would be extre~ly difficult to make 
a comparative evaluation ot_ the services of the Consular 
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Commission, the Committee ot Good Ott1ces, and United Nations 
Commission tor Indonesia. The Consular Commission was set 
up primarily for the purpose of reporting to the Security 
Council on the situation in Indonesia and.was, by its ve17 
nature, quite limited as to the amount of:ass1stance·it 
could otter the parties in the settlement of the dispute. 
An additional weakness of the Consular Commission was 
exposed in the Soourit7 Couno11 d1scuas1onsJ namely, while 
colleot1vel1 it represented the United ?Jations, ind1v1duall7 
the members of the Consular Commission represented different 
nations whose policies might d1tfer from those or the 
United Nations. The composition of the Consular Commission 
also caused controvera1 over the reparta which it rendered. 
As Mr. Kahin pointed out, 'the Consular Commission had a 
more pro-Dutch composition than the 3ecur1t7 Council since 
.Belg1wn, France, and Great Britain were r~presented on the 
Commission whereas Russia, -. Syria, Colombia, and Poland 
were not.3 
The Committee of Good Offices and the·United 
Nations Commission tor Indonesia repres~nted tho Uuited 
Nations in Indonesia tor all except th• very early part 
ot the dispute. The ment>ership of the two bodies was the 
same, the difference.lying in their respective powers. The 
Committee of Good Offices was, quite obviously, limited in 
the role which it could assume 1n a1d1n3 the negotiations 
between the parties. The United Netions Commission was 
granted additional ,powers, including the power to nake 
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recommendations to the parties as well as to the Security 
Council.· While th~ reconstitution ot the Committee ot Good 
Ott1ces as the United Nations Cor.nn1sa1on tor Indonesia 
undoubtedly aided in tho final settlement, it would be 
very d1tt1cult, ·1r not impossible, tO evaluate with any 
degree ot exactness the specific contributions which the 
Commission made toward the final settlement. It would 
seam that such torees a~ increased pressure by the United 
States on the Neth~rlands and continued Republienn resistance 
played at le.ast e.s r,reat a pert 1n the ultimntc settlement 
ot the dispute. 
· · · \Vh!le the value of tha work ot the Security Council 
in regard to the Indonesian ·dispute 'cannot be assessed with 
any dagroo or exaotness, it seem~ qu1te·apparent that the 
Council did contribute substantially to the settlement ot 
the problom. Throu~h the work ot its Consulr.r Commission, 
Comm1tteo of Good Otfioes, and ·united lla.tions Commission 
tor Indonesia, ·the Security Council mnde the tacts or the 
situation ava1leble to the members ot ths Council and to 
the peoples or the world. Through the debates carried on 
in the Security Council; the Indonesian question was given 
publicity; following submission of the Indonesian dispute 
to the Security Council, the activities ot the two disputants 
were carried on in tho spot11eht or world opinion, end it 
seoms that this toctor exercised a moderatinz influence 
upon the parties. In the coursa or the debates in the 
Security Council', the two parties to the dispute in particular, 
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and the other members ot the Council 1n general, were forced .. 
to discuss their points or view and to listen to er1t1o1ams 
ot their respective points ot viow. It would seem ta1r to. 
oonsider these factors as having served a valuable and 
substantial part in the tinnl solution or the Indonesian 
problem. 
In regard to the attitudes of the major powers 
toward the Indonesian dispute, the Dutch "police action" 
of December, 1948, seems to have pla1ed a rather important 
rote• Prior to that ti me a number of nations had been 
favorable to the point ot view or the Netherlands: following 
receipt ot the reports or the Committee or Good Otticea, 
the attitude of the Security Council as a whole clearly 
indicated disapproval or the action taken by the Nether- 
lands Oovemment. The New Delhi Con.t'erence 1 which was 
called by Prine Minister Nehru of India tor the purpose ot 
considering Netherlands aot1v1t1 in Indonesia, and the 
resolution adopted b7 the conterenoe was indisputable 
evidence that the countries of the Southeast Asia area 
were strongly_sympathetic to the cause ot the Repiblic 
ot Indonesi&J as noted above, several or the countries. 
which participated 1n the conrerence had denied the right 
of transit to the Netherland•• 
In general, Belgium and Fronce sided with the 
Netherlands, particularlr on the question or the competence 
ot the Council to deal with the Indonesian questionJ 
consequentl7, when Belgium's term on the Security Council 
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expired, the Uetharlands lost one ot its·atrongest supporters, 
though Delg1um cont1nuod to aorve on the Cotn!11ttee ot.Oood 
Ottices and on the United Nations Comi:iission tor Indonesia. 
The United Kingdom was directly concerned with .the situation 
in Indonesia.for a longer period of timo than any ot the 
other 1lEmbers of tho Security Council with the oxaeption ot 
the Neth.Srlands. The Dritish, quite naturnlly, leaned 
toward the Dutch point of view, thoUgh not to as grGat 9.n 
extent as did nolgium and Prance; in 1946 they had exertod 
pres::mro upon the ffotherlnnds to roach an' agreement with the 
Republic, but thi! was tor tho purpose. of tnc111tat1ng the 
withdrawal or British troops from Indonosia. At least in 
the 1n1t1nl stagea or the Counoil•s del1b~rat1ons,'Oreat 
Br1tn1n seemed to regard the Indonesinn dispute as a matter 
which tell within the doi:testie jurisdiction·or Holland, but 
she did not Clll.intain this position in the later staGes with 
cleo.r-cut sto.temen~ as did Belgium end Frn.nce • 
Tho U.S.S.R. nnd the Ukrainian S.S.R. followed a 
strongly anti-Dutch and sllogedly pro-Indonesian policy 
fro~ January, 1946, r.hen the Ukrainian delegnto brought to 
the attention of the Council tho presence ot Dr1t1sh troops 
in Indonesia, until the transter or sovero1gnty 1n Pocember. 
1949. Tha representatives o~ these two countr1ea also · 
maintained a consistent policy in reg~rd to the nct1ons and 
stands taken by the United Kingdom and the United 3tntes; 
tho Comr.n.mist doleg&tes periodically attacked the two 
western nations 'as the supporters and abettors of "?rctherlanda 
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aggression." At one point 1n particular, however, the 
Communist bloc seems to have been inconsistent. During· 
almost all of the debates in the Security Council the 
u.s.s.R. took the part or the Indonesians and, more particu- 
larl7, or the Republic. , With the successful conclusion or 
the Round Table Conference at The Hague, the Canadian dele- 
gation introduced a resolution expressing satisfaction 
with the results of that ConferenoeJ th& Ukrainian delegation 
opposed this resolution and, in the course or the discussion, 
referred to the "Hatta clique" as having "sold out" the 
people or Indonesia to the Dutch; 7et it was Hatta who, 
along with Sukarno and Sjahrir, had !\lrn!ahed.the leader- 
ship for the Republic when.the u.s.s.R. so vehementl7 
attacked Dutch polic7 in Indonesia and praised th& 
Indonesian leaders for their stand against the Dutch. 
The United States delegation, during the earlier 
consideration or the Indonesian question, seemed to be 
s1mpathetio toward the Republic's desire tor independence, 
and 1et seemed quite careful not to antagonize th• Nether- 
lands by taking too positive a stand. At least a partial 
explanation or this policy may b• round in the tact that the 
United States was, at that time, actively pushing the 
development ot a European Army and a plan tor the un1t1- 
cat1on or Europe. Quite obviously if the Netherlands, 
beoau3e of United States activity in the Secur1t7 Council, 
aotivoly opposed this prosram,·the results could ver7 well 
have been extremel7 detrimental to that portion of United 
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States policy. The United States, both through their 
representatives on the Security Council and through their 
representatives on the Consular Commission, the Committee 
of Good Offices, and tha United Nations Commission tor 
Indonesia, was very active in sesking tor a peaceful solution 
to the Indonesian dispute. Following the second Dutch 
"police action," however, United States policy seemed to 
beco~e firmer, more clearly deai.nd1ng that the Dutch settle 
th& dispute by negotiation rather than by resort to armed 
force. 
At least two suggestions mar be advanced for the 
improvement of the hn.ndlin~ of disputes by the Security 
Council. The first ot these would involve the creation or a 
permanent taot-tinding body which would be prepared tor dis- 
patch to any part or the world upon the request or the Security 
Council. Such a bodr would serve the Security council in much 
the same way that tho Peace Observation Comm1as1on !Unctions 
1n relation to the General Assembly. With its present 
' organization, the Security Council, upon taking cognizance 
ot a dispute, J:IUst create some special body tor thB purpose 
ot securing 1nt'ormat1on concerning that dispute. Such a 
situation poses the second difficulty 1n Security Council 
procedure, that ot the length ot time generally required 
tor the Council to take action on a problem. While 
it would ba very d1tf1cult, it not impossible, to limit 
equitably the amount of time consumed by speeches, the 
process could caioeivably be spoeded up it accurate 
,! 
1nf'ornnt1on on a dispute could be mo.de available to the 
Council with grea. tor speed than 1 t has been in the past. 
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